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The **STORY OF THE GREAT WAR**

CANADA'S
ARMED FORCES
ENGLISH BLOCKADE

A great war Zeppelin on a bomb-dropping expedition is sailing over an enemy city. High above it are the city's defending aircraft—a biplane and a monoplane—ready to attack the raider with their machine guns

The
**STORY OF THE
GREAT WAR**

CAUCASUS · MESOPOTAMIA
ENGLISH BLOCKADE



V O L U M E V I I I

P. F. COLLIER & SON, NEW YORK

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CONTENTS

PART I.—THE DARDANELLES AND RUSSO-TURKISH CAMPAIGNS

CHAPTER	PAGE
I. SARI BAIR—PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL OF ALLIES	2239
II. AGGRESSIVE TURKISH MOVEMENTS—OPINION IN ENGLAND— CHANGE IN COMMAND	2243
III. ABANDONMENT OF DARDANELLES—ARMENIAN ATROCITIES . .	2255
IV. CAMPAIGN IN CAUCASUS—FALL OF ERZERUM	2266

PART II.—ITALY IN THE WAR

V. REVIEW OF PRECEDING OPERATIONS—ITALIAN MOVEMENTS . .	2279
VI. ITALY'S RELATIONS TO THE OTHER WARRING NATIONS . .	2285
VII. PROBLEMS OF STRATEGY	2290
VIII. MOVE AGAINST GERMANY	2296
IX. RENEWED ATTACKS—ITALY'S SITUATION AT THE BEGIN- NING OF MARCH, 1916	2299

PART III.—CAMPAIGN IN MESOPOTAMIA

X. OPERATIONS AGAINST BAGDAD AND AROUND THE TIGRIS . .	2305
XI. ADVANCE TOWARD BAGDAD—BATTLE OF KUT-EL-AMARA . .	2312
XII. BATTLE OF CTESIPHON	2323
XIII. STAND AT KUT-EL-AMARA—ATTEMPTS AT RELIEF . . .	2330

PART IV.—THE WAR IN AFRICA

XIV. THE CAMEROONS	2341
XV. GERMAN EAST AFRICA	2349
XVI. SUEZ—EGYPT	2357

PART V.—THE WAR IN THE AIR

XVII. DEVELOPMENT OF THE STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF AIR FIGHTING	2364
XVIII. ZEPPELIN RAIDS—ATTACKS ON GERMAN ARMS FACTORIES— GERMAN OVER-SEA RAIDS	2369
XIX. ATTACKS ON LONDON—BOMBARDMENT OF ITALIAN PORTS— AEROPLANE AS COMMERCE DESTROYER	2376
XX. AIR FIGHTING ON ALL FRONTS—LOSSES	2383

PART VI.—POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONS OF THE BELLIGERENT COUNTRIES

XXI. NEW ENVIRONMENTS—INTERNECINE WAR POLITICS—TWO PICTURES OF BELGIUM	2391
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PART VI.—POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONS OF
THE BELLIGERENT COUNTRIES—*Continued*

CHAPTER		PAGE
XXII.	CARDINAL MERCIER'S INDICTMENTS AGAINST GERMAN RULE IN BELGIUM—THE EXECUTION OF MISS CAVELL	2398
XXIII.	EVADING ARMY SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN—WANING RE- SPONSE TO CALLS—CONSCRIPTION FOR SINGLE MEN	2404
XXIV.	GREAT BRITAIN AN ARMS FACTORY—LABOR IMPEDIMENTS TO PRODUCTION—THRIVING WAGE EARNERS	2410
XXV.	BRITISH TAXES SOAR—ENFORCED ECONOMICS—MOBILIZ- ING AMERICAN SECURITIES—THE MOUNTING DEBT AND WAR COST	2416
XXVI.	TURMOIL IN RUSSIA OVER DEFEATS—AN ANGRY DUMA— FOOD SHORTAGE THROUGH TRANSPORT DEFICIENCIES	2426
XXVII.	FOOD RIOTS AND PRIVATIONS IN GERMANY—SUPPRESSION OF COMPLAINTS OF CONDITIONS IN AUSTRIA-HUNGARY	2439
XXVIII.	TURKEY'S LOAD OF DEBT—EXTERMINATION OF ARMENIANS —CHARGED WITH AIDING RUSSIA	2448

PART VII.—THE UNITED STATES AND THE
BELLIGERENTS

XXIX.	SINKING OF THE ARABIC—ANOTHER CRISIS—GERMANY'S DEFENSE AND CONCESSIONS	2454
XXX.	ISSUE WITH AUSTRIA-HUNGARY OVER THE ANCONA— SURRENDER TO AMERICAN DEMANDS	2464
XXXI.	THE LUSITANIA DEADLOCK—AGREEMENT BLOCKED BY ARMED MERCHANTMEN ISSUE—CRISIS IN CONGRESS	2470
XXXII.	DEVELOPMENTS OF PRO-GERMAN PROPAGANDA—MUNI- TIONS CRUSADE DEFENDED—NEW ASPECTS OF AMERI- CAN POLICY	2479
XXXIII.	AUSTRIAN AMBASSADOR IMPLICATED IN STRIKE PLOTS —HIS RECALL—RAMIFICATIONS OF GERMAN CON- SPIRACIES	2487
XXXIV.	THE PLOT TO DESTROY SHIPS—PACIFIC COAST CONSPIRA- CIES—HAMBURG-AMERICAN CASE—SCOPE OF NEW YORK INVESTIGATIONS	2495
XXXV.	VON RINTELEN'S ACTIVITIES—CONGRESSMAN INVOLVED— GERMANY'S REPUDIATIONS—DISMISSAL OF CAPTAINS BOY-ED AND VON PAPE	2502
XXXVI.	GREAT BRITAIN'S DEFENSE OF BLOCKADE—AMERICAN METHODS IN CIVIL WAR CITED	2508
XXXVII.	BRITISH BLOCKADE DENOUNCED AS ILLEGAL AND INEFFEC- TIVE BY THE UNITED STATES—THE AMERICAN POSITION	2515
XXXVIII.	GREAT BRITAIN UNYIELDING—EFFECT OF THE BLOCKADE— THE CHICAGO MEAT PACKERS' CASE	2524
XXXIX.	SEIZURE OF SUSPECTED SHIPS—TRADING WITH THE ENEMY —THE APPAM—THE ANGLO-FRENCH LOAN—FORD PEACE EXPEDITION	2529
XL.	AMERICAN PACIFICISM—PREPAREDNESS—MUNITION SAFE- GUARD	2536

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

ZEPPELIN ATTACKED BY AEROPLANES *Colored Frontispiece*

Opposite page 2296

BRITISH SOLDIERS WATCHING AN AIR DUEL
EMBARKING STORES AT SUVLA BAY, GALLIPOLI
DUGOUT SHELTER AT WEST BEACH, GALLIPOLI
LANDING BRITISH TROOPS AT SALONIKI, GREECE
FRENCH STORES OF CORN AND HAY AT SALONIKI
BRITISH INDIANS SPREADING MUD ON THE ROOF OF A HOSPITAL TENT
TURKISH SHELLS BURSTING NEAR THE DESTROYER LOUIS
BLACK SEA PORT OF TREBIZOND

Opposite page 2360

ITALIAN HEAVY MORTAR HIDDEN IN THE FOREST
VIEW OF THE TYROLIAN ALPS—THE AUSTRO-ITALIAN FRONTIER
MUNITION TRANSPORTS ON A MOUNTAIN ROAD IN THE TYROL
BICYCLE SQUAD OF THE ITALIAN BERSAGLIERI
HUNGARIAN HUSSARS AND AUSTRIAN INFANTRY ON THE MOUNTAIN
FRONTIER
HUNGARIAN OBSERVERS IN TRENCHES TAKEN BY STORM
BAGDAD OBJECTIVE OF BRITISH AND RUSSIAN ARMIES
TURKISH ARTILLERY ON THE WAY TO MESOPOTAMIA

Opposite page 2424

FOKKER AEROPLANE FALLING IN FLAMES
ARMORED CAR OF A NEW FRENCH DIRIGIBLE
RUSSIANS REMOVING A CAPTURED GERMAN AEROPLANE
BRITISH AVIATOR IN A PARASOL AEROPLANE
BELGIAN OBSERVATION BALLOON
FAMOUS FRENCH AVIATOR, VEDRINES
GERMAN SOLDIERS ATTACKING BEHIND POISONOUS GAS
COLONIAL TROOPS IN GERMAN EAST AFRICA
GERMAN ZEPPELIN SHOT DOWN BY A FRENCH 75

Opposite page 2488

- TUNNELING UNDER THE GERMAN LINES
- COLUMN OF HUNGARIAN TROOPS IN DALMATIA
- TURKISH TROOPS DRILLING IN BAGDAD
- DESTRUCTION WROUGHT BY A 30.5-CENTIMETER GUN IN BELGRADE
- GERMAN INFANTRY STORMING A HILL IN THE ARGONNE
- FLOTILLA OF DESTROYERS MAKING A NIGHT ATTACK
- TORPEDO JUST LEAVING A TORPEDO TUBE
- RUSSIAN TROOPS MOBILIZING NEAR THE MOUTH OF THE DANUBE

LIST OF MAPS

	PAGE
DALMATIA AND AUSTRO-ITALIAN FRONTIER (<i>Colored Map</i>)	<i>Front Insert</i>
DARDANELLES, OPERATIONS AT THE	2254
TURKISH EMPIRE, THE	2267
TURKEY IN ARMENIA, THE RUSSIAN ADVANCE ON	2276
BAGDAD RAILROAD, THE	2306
RUSSIAN ADVANCE THROUGH PERSIA, THE	2324
MESOPOTAMIA, THE BRITISH CAMPAIGN IN	2337
GERMANY, THE IRON RING AROUND	2441

PART I—THE DARDANELLES AND RUSSO-TURKISH CAMPAIGN

CHAPTER I

SARI BAIR—PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL OF ALLIES

THUS practically ended the Suvla Bay operation and its supporting movements. Much had been expected of it and, by the barest margin, in the opinion of many competent military men, great results had been missed. Just what ultimate effect its success in this operation would have had on the Gallipoli campaign, on the position of Turkey in the war and, finally, upon the course of the war as a whole, it is obviously impossible to say. There are those who claim that the capture of Constantinople would have brought the struggle to a quick and disastrous end from the viewpoint of the Central Powers. There are others, equally entitled by experience and knowledge to speak, who claim that it would have had no appreciable influence on the final result. And there is a third body of critics of opinion that the capture of Constantinople would have been a disaster for the Allies, inasmuch as it would have opened up vast questions of age-long standing that would have led to wide dissension between England, Russia, and France.

There is another and no less interesting phase of the Suvla Bay operation that will one day be studied with care. In this crucial attack a reliance was placed upon raw troops who had seen little or no actual fighting. It was, in a way, an attempt to prove that patriotic youths, rallying to the colors at their country's need, although without previous training, could in a few

months be made more than a match for the obligatory military service troops of the Continental system.

Some extremely interesting details of the preparation for the landing at Suvla Bay have been given by a correspondent who was permitted to be present, but who, like all except a few officers of General Ian Hamilton's immediate staff, was kept in absolute ignorance of the exact location of the spot selected.

"It has long been obvious that some new landing on a vast scale was about to be attempted," he wrote, "and surmise has therefore been rife as to the exact point on which the blow would fall. It was hoped to take the Turk completely by surprise, and to obtain a firm foothold on the shore before he could bring up his reenforcements. In this it would seem as if we have been successful, for two divisions were yesterday (August 7, 1915) put ashore almost without opposition. The enemy probably had accurate knowledge of the arrival of large reenforcements, for it is almost impossible to keep movements of troops unknown in the Near East, and his airmen have frequently flown over our camps. He knew, therefore, we were preparing to strike, but on the vital point as to where the blow would fall he seems to have been entirely ignorant.

"No one who has not seen a landing of a large army on a hostile shore can have any idea of the enormous amount of preparation work and rehearsal which must precede any such movement. For three weeks this has been going on incessantly.

"For many days past a division has been practicing embarking and disembarking until every officer and every man knew the exact rôle he had to play.

"On the morning of August 6, 1915, I was told to hold myself in readiness to embark that evening for an unknown destination, which would not be disclosed to me until after I got on board the transport. There was general rejoicing among the troops when it became known that the period of preparation was at length passed and that the hour for action had at last arrived.

"Throughout the whole of August 6, 1915, the work of embarking proceeded without a stop. Dense masses of fully

equipped infantry, each carrying two days' rations, and tin dishes strapped on their knapsacks, moved down to the quay and were there embarked. The troops seemed in excellent spirits and full of fight. They were cracking jokes and singing many familiar songs, the favorite of which seemed to be a blending of 'Tipperary' with 'Are We Downhearted?' Which query was answered by a deafening roar of 'No!'"

In writing of the country around Suvla Bay the same correspondent said:

"The country is in fact terrible; the hills are an awful jumble, with no regular formation, but broken up into valleys, dongas, ravines, and partly bare sandstone, and partly covered with dense shrub. In places there are sheer precipices over which it is impossible to climb and down which a false step may send you sliding several hundreds of feet."

Finally, deeply illuminating is the official communiqué published in England on August 26, 1915, regarding the operations in early August. The most striking paragraphs follow:

"Very severe and continuous fighting, with heavy losses to both sides, has resulted. Our forces have not yet gained the objectives at which they were aiming in sphere eight, though they have made a decided advance toward them and have greatly increased the area in our possession.

"The attack from Anzac after a series of desperately contested actions, was carried to the summit of Sari Bair and Chunuk Bair Ridge, which are the dominating positions on this area, but, owing to the fact that the attack from Suvla Bay did not make the progress which was counted upon, the troops from Anzac were not able to maintain their position in the actual crest, and after repeating counterattacks, were compelled to withdraw to positions close below it."

And the communiqué ends up with the significant sentence:

"But these facts must not lead the public to suppose that the true objective has been gained or that further serious and costly efforts will not be required before a decisive victory is won."

Picturesque accounts of the fighting by the Australian troops for Sari Bair on August 6, 7, and 8, 1915, have been written by an eyewitness of the fighting. Speaking of the few moments before the fighting, he said:

"Meanwhile the combined Australians and New Zealanders braced for the desperate night attack that had been decided upon. The men had long been waiting for this hour to arrive.

"Strict orders were given that not a shot was to be fired; the bayonet alone was to be used. Exactly at ten o'clock on Friday night a brigade clambered over their trenches and furiously charged the Turkish line amid loud cheers, bayoneting all the enemy found therein. The Turks, taken apparently quite unawares, fired wildly and were unable to check the advance.

"Thus in a few minutes all the enemy nearest the sea were in our hands and the way was thus cleared for the main advance. The New Zealanders stopped only to take breath and then pursued their victorious career, rushing in succession the old No. 3 outpost, 'Bauchop's Hill,' and other Turkish positions. The native Maoris entered into the charge with great dash, making the darkness of the night hideous with their wild war cries, and striking terror into the hearts of the Turks with the awful vigor with which they used their bayonets and the butt end of their rifles.

"The darkness of the night, the broken nature of the ground, and the shell fire with which the enemy had smothered every available bit of ground, with his deadly snipers, delayed the main advance somewhat after these preliminary positions had been successfully rushed, for every hill and spur had to be picketed to keep down the fire from lurking marksmen left in the rear of our advancing columns. The fighting throughout the night was continuous, for amid these gloomy ravines the Turks offered courageous and despairing resistance to the Australians, the New Zealanders and Maoris, and many bloody encounters, the details of which will never be known, were fought in the dark hours which preceded a still more eventful dawn."

CHAPTER II

AGGRESSIVE TURKISH MOVEMENTS—OPINION
IN ENGLAND—CHANGE IN
COMMAND

WITH the withdrawal of the allied troops from Anzac Cove and Suvla Bay, the Turks were free to concentrate all their forces in the Gallipoli Peninsula in the south against the British and French forces that were still intrenched on a line running roughly from Y Beach on the *Æ*gean Sea to Kereves Dere on the Dardanelles, skirting the slopes that led up to the town of Krithia and the heights of Achi Baba.

Immediately the Turks began to transfer the guns and men that had been used against the northern position. Obviously such a transfer in difficult country with few roads and a restricted front took considerable time. In the meantime the British and French in front of Krithia were not inactive. They countered constantly against the ever-increasing pressure of the enemy. Although few infantry attacks were engaged in, bomb and mine warfare for the improvement of the allied positions and the prevention of fresh inroads by the Turks was an almost constant affair.

Fortunately for the safety and subsequent plans of the Allies, the Gallipoli Peninsula at that time of the year was rendered most difficult for offensive fighting. Heavy rains and consequent floods make the country almost impassable for the movement of big guns or large bodies of troops in the face of a determined defense.

But while the position of the allied troops in the hills away from the fringe of coast was becoming desperate, at or near the beaches they could enjoy practical immunity except from a few long-range Turkish batteries. The powerful guns of the allied warships so far outranged and outweighed anything the Turks could bring into the field about Krithia and Achi Baba that the allied troops could lie sheltered under their protection.

This fact undoubtedly contributed largely to the astonishing success of the reembarkation operations here, as it had at the two northern bases. The chief danger to the allied troops about Krithia was in the retreat over the few miles that separated them from the embarkation beaches.

Finally, however, the pressure of the Turks became so heavy that there was very real apprehension for the safety of the allied troops still left on the peninsula. Whether or not it was ever intended to maintain the positions won in the south it is impossible to say at this time. Some observers were of the opinion that it was England's desire to construct on the territory in her possession at the entrance to the Dardanelles a second Gibraltar, commanding at least one end of the important waterway. German opinion held that it had been agreed between the Entente Powers in the event of the forcing of the Dardanelles that the land commanding the waterway was to be divided among the three countries, each dominating a stretch—probably Russia in Constantinople, England at the Narrows, and France in between.

However that may be, any intention of hanging on to the territory captured in the south was soon to be impracticable. By the first of the year, 1916, the Turks were hotly pressing the allied troops to the left of Krithia and it became imperative to shorten the line.

Favored by the floods and the fact that, despite the knowledge of the Turks that a reembarkation had been decided upon, they did not know exactly when it was to be carried out, the retirement was effected with small loss. On the nights of January 8-9, 1916, the men were embarked from the beaches at the north of Sedd-el-Bahr under the guns of the British and French fleet.

At the last moment it was found impossible to get eleven British guns away. Reluctantly it was decided to destroy them and they were rendered useless by the last troops leaving the peninsula. Similarly the French were compelled to abandon six heavy pieces. Immense stores were burned and all the buildings, piers, etc., erected by the allied troops blown up.

While the Allies' offensive was beginning to wane at Gallipoli, an interesting incident developed at Constantinople which gives some idea of the high tension existing there at the time. The story is best told in the original words of Mr. Henry Wood, an American newspaper correspondent, who in a dispatch dated August 17, 1915, first gave the news to the New York "World." He wrote:

"The following is the story of the manner in which Mr. Morgenthau, the American Ambassador, intervened in favor of 2,000 English and French civilians whom Enver Pasha had decided to expose to the bombardment of the allied fleet at Gallipoli:

"The decision had not only been taken, but every detail had been covertly prepared for its carrying out on a Monday morning, when on the previous evening Mr. Morgenthau learned of it. He at once telephoned to Enver Pasha and secured from him a promise that women and children should be spared. A second request, that the execution of the order be delayed until the following Thursday, was only granted after the ambassador had assured Enver that it would be the greatest mistake Turkey had ever made to carry it out without first advising the powers interested.

"Mr. Morgenthau at once telegraphed to France and England by way of Washington, and no reply having arrived by Wednesday morning, again telephoned to the War Minister, insisting on being received in personal audience.

"'I have not a single moment left vacant until four o'clock, at which time I must attend a Council of the Ministers,' was the reply.

"'But unless you have received me by four o'clock,' Mr. Morgenthau replied, 'I will come out and enter the Council of Ministers myself, when I shall insist upon talking to you.'

"An appointment was therefore granted for three o'clock, and after a long argument Enver Pasha was persuaded to agree to send only twenty-five French and twenty-five English to Gallipoli 'as a demonstration,' the War Minister arguing that any farther retraction would weaken discipline. It was also agreed to send only the youngest men, and Bedri Bey, the Constanti-

nople chief of police, was at once sent for in order that he might be acquainted with the new limitation of the decision. But he at once protested. 'I don't want to send a lot of boys down there. I want to send down notables. You have tricked me,' he declared, turning to the ambassador.

"Next morning the ambassador attended personally to the going aboard of the twenty-five French and twenty-five English who had been finally selected. For all that, they knew the original orders to expose them to the fire of the fleet were to be carried out to the letter, and the farewell to their friends and relatives at the Golden Horn pier was one of the most affecting ever enacted at Constantinople. At the last minute one of the British ministers, who still remained at Constantinople, volunteered to go along in order that he might offer spiritual consolation should they eventually face death, and a young Englishman was released in his place. Mr. Morgenthau insisted that the party be accompanied by Mr. Hoffman Phillip, First Secretary of the American Embassy.

"On their arrival at Gallipoli they were imprisoned in two empty houses and informed that the allied fleet was expected any moment to resume its bombardment. The city had been under fire for several days, and was almost completely deserted. No provision had been made for their subsistence. During the days which followed the fifty men suffered considerable hardships, but at last orders came from Constantinople for all fifty to be returned and released."

Meanwhile a curious hardening of public opinion regarding the Dardanelles was taking place in England, which in the course of time was destined to have an all-important influence on the operations in that part of the world. Before the Suvla Bay landing there had been considerable but mild criticism of the manner in which the whole affair had been undertaken and carried out. Close upon the early successes of the naval bombardment there had been an unjustified public optimism. Then came weeks of pessimism following that black day when three battleships were sent to the bottom almost at one blow.

Subsequent events and the false color given to them by the official, but especially the unofficial, accounts served to hearten the British public for a time. Then came Winston Churchill's famous speech in which he spoke of Sir Ian Hamilton's forces being "only a few miles from a great victory," such as would have a determining effect upon the outcome of the war. This was followed by many absurd but circumstantial reports that the Dardanelles had actually been forced but, for some unexplained reasons, the news was being withheld by the Government.

A little later there came news of the arrival of German submarines off Gallipoli and of the sinking of two more battleships. This was followed by unofficial intimation that the major fleet had had to be withdrawn from the waters about the peninsula and that the forces on land were in a measure cut off and dependent upon smaller vessels for naval support and supply.

At this point criticism of the Dardanelles campaign became more pronounced and daring in many quarters in England. The public was ripe for it and many openly expressed their regret that it had ever been entered upon. Then came the Suvla Bay landing, and affairs rapidly moved to a climax.

The Suvla Bay attempt, like all of the other operations at Gallipoli, was conceived in a spirit of excessive optimism. It was intended to be a surprise and the public in England were kept absolutely ignorant of the preparations, so far as it was possible to prevent a leakage with thousands of troops being sent out of the country. Even after the landing and the fighting were well over, little or no news was allowed to get into the papers. Finally there came a long dispatch from the United States, which, curiously enough, the British censor passed, telling of the utter defeat of the Turk, the complete success of the Suvla Bay maneuver, and intimating that the forcing of the Dardanelles was now but a question of a few days.

This amazing dispatch, in which there was of course no truth, was printed in the leading English papers, and a large part of the unthinking public and even a portion of the more intelligent classes swallowed it whole. The news came just at the time of the blackest week of the war up to that time, from the British

point of view, when the Germans were racing to the end of their remarkable drive against the Russians and the czar's great fortresses were falling like packs of cards before the furious onslaughts of the Teuton forces.

But with the arrival and publication in England of Sir Ian Hamilton's account, and the declaration by him that the ends aimed at had not been achieved, it soon was realized that even this great attempt, upon which so much had been builded, had failed. Depression became universal, and there were for the first time responsible demands that the whole expedition be abandoned.

This question of the total abandonment of the attempt to force the Dardanelles was a tremendous problem for England. Involved in it was the great question of her prestige, not only among her millions of Mohammedan subjects, but also in the Balkans, then rapidly moving to a decision. Turkey was the only Mohammedan power still boasting independence, and for Great Britain to acknowledge herself bested in an attempt to defeat her was likely to have far-reaching and serious results throughout India and Egypt, where Great Britain's ability to hold what she had won was dependent in a large measure upon the very prestige now in danger.

One of the reasons for urging the abandonment of the Dardanelles campaign was the urgent need for troops elsewhere. It was declared that it was absurd folly to be wasting troops at Gallipoli when the western front was being starved for men. Furthermore there were rapidly accumulating evidences that the Entente Powers were soon to be compelled to fight on a new and important front.

About this time Germany began her preparations for a final attack upon Serbia. Try as the Allies might, they had not been able to force an agreement between Serbia and Bulgaria on the question of the ownership of those parts of Macedonia won from the Turk in the First Balkan War, and taken from the Bulgar by the Serbians in the second. Germany, taking advantage of these irreconcilable differences, was about to launch a heavy attack from the north upon the kingdom of aged Peter.

In these circumstances there came before the British Government, in common with the French Government, the question of just how great an obligation rested on the shoulders of the two great powers. Serbia certainly looked to them to assist her with all their strength, and at the height of the agitation Sir Edward Grey made a public declaration that in every circumstance Serbia could look to England for unlimited support.

It was when those who knew began to discuss the question of where Great Britain was to find the military force to make good Grey's pledge to Serbia that the Dardanelles campaign came in for hot criticism. It was known that few, if any, fully trained troops were available in England for a fresh campaign. Indeed, as matters ultimately worked out, it was France who found the bulk of the force that was hurried to Saloniki when Bulgaria declared war on Serbia and joined in the Austro-German attack upon the Balkan kingdom. Later, under French pressure, England withdrew 40,000 of her troops from the western front and rushed them off to Saloniki, but much too late to succor Serbia.

Finally, so powerful became the influences calling upon the Government to retire from the Dardanelles with as much grace as possible that the opinion of Sir Ian Hamilton was asked. Probably the inside truth of the affair will not be known for some years, but it later developed that there was considerable friction between Sir Ian Hamilton and the British War Office at the time. Sir Ian, it is known, laid a large part of blame for the failure at the Strait to the fact that Earl Kitchener did not send him large reinforcements that were expressly promised. At any rate he was against a withdrawal from Gallipoli in the circumstances and in favor of a swift and overwhelming assault with all the troops and forces that could be gathered. He was still firmly convinced that the forcing of the Dardanelles was possible and probable.

Just what were the relations between France and England, and especially how they each regarded the Dardanelles campaign in the winter of 1915, it is impossible to say with any degree of assurance. It is known, however, that there were serious differences of opinion, not only among the more influ-

ential men in both Paris and London, but between the two Governments.

Obviously, the British were the more reluctant to abandon the project, which had been entered upon with so much confidence and enthusiasm. It was distinctly a British operation, although the French Government had given its unqualified approval at the start and had loyally contributed all the troops it could spare. But the plans had been drawn up in London and had been worked out by British commanders; and the acknowledgment of failure was a confession of British, not French, incompetency. It was a blow at British prestige such as had not been dealt since the early disasters of the Boer War.

While the whole question of the Gallipoli campaign was being reconsidered there occurred something that had a profound effect upon subsequent events in that part of the war area and elsewhere. The defeat of the Russians while the French and British troops were unable, through lack of preparation and foresight, to carry on an energetic offensive that might have drawn the Germans from their Slav prey, convinced all the allied Governments that the time had arrived for a thorough revision of their system of cooperation. In short, if the war was to be won and each of the Entente Powers was to escape a separate defeat while the others were doomed to a forced inactivity, it was necessary that their military, economic, and financial affairs should be so coordinated and administered that they should be directed with one object only in view—the winning of the war.

For this purpose representatives of the allied powers met in Paris and discussed plans. One of the first results of these discussions was to be seen in the military field. The armies of France and England in the field became, for all practical purposes, one. The supreme command of the allied forces in France was placed in the hands of the commander in chief of the French army.

General French, who had been only nominally under the orders of the French commander in chief, retired from command of the British army in France and one of his subordinates, Sir Douglas Haig, took his place. Similarly, in the southwestern theatre of

the war, where Sir Ian Hamilton was in supreme command, the leadership passed to France, Hamilton resigning and his place being taken by Sir Charles Monro. When the British and French troops from Gallipoli were ultimately landed at Saloniki the supreme command of the allied forces in that theatre of war was given to General Sarrail of the French army.

Undoubtedly, too, the influence of France, and of Joffre individually, was thrown into the scales at these Paris meetings against a continuance of the Dardanelles operations. French public opinion was strongly in favor of sending immediate succor to the Serbians. So strong, in fact, was this public opinion that, when the expected help failed to arrive, it forced the immediate downfall of Delcassé and the ultimate resignation of the French Cabinet.

Soon after Kitchener returned to London from these Paris conferences a sensation was caused by the announcement that he was leaving the War Office temporarily and would undertake an important mission in the Near East. Ultimately it developed that this important mission was nothing more nor less than a first-hand examination of the problems confronting the British commander in withdrawing his force from Gallipoli and a study of the field into which it was proposed to transfer, not only these troops, but hundreds of thousands of others.

Probably no high officer of the British army was more fitted for the mission. Whatever one may think of Kitchener's administration of the British War Office during a period of unprecedented difficulty, no one can deny his success in India and Egypt. With those commands had necessarily gone an exhaustive study of military operations that might conceivably have to be undertaken for the protection of British prestige and power in the Mohammedan world.

Thus he was thoroughly at home in the Near East and he brought back to London an encouraging report. Even high military opinion in England had been of the opinion that the withdrawal of the allied troops from Gallipoli could not be effected without terrible losses. Some even held that it would be better and less costly in human lives to leave the troops there

on the defensive until the end of the war than to attempt to get them out of the death hole into which they had been dumped.

This, however, was not Lord Kitchener's idea. He reported that they could be withdrawn, not, it was true, without heavy losses, but at a cost much smaller than the general estimate. This conclusion he came to after an examination on the spot, and subsequent events, as we shall see, more than justified his judgment in the matter.

Once having made up its mind to risk the loss of prestige involved and withdraw the army from the Gallipoli Peninsula, the British Government acted with speed and intelligence. It turned the difficult task over to General Sir Charles Monro, whose subsequent accomplishment of the operations earned him the admiration of every military man throughout the world.

General Sir Charles Monro's job was difficult and dangerous enough for any man. In the face of an enemy numbering something like 80,000 men, along a line of 20,000 yards, he had to withdraw an almost equal number of men with their stores, trucks, ammunition, guns, etc. Only by the greatest of good fortune could he have the inestimable advantage of surprise.

Moreover, the enemy had been tremendously encouraged and emboldened by the successful defense which they had offered to all the allied assaults of the previous year. Their Mohammedan fanaticism had been stirred by the Turkish, Austrian, and German press, and their pride quickened by the thick crop of rumors that the Allies were finally about to acknowledge defeat.

In many places the French and British trenches were separated by less than fifty yards from the Turkish defenders. In few cases were they more than 500 yards distant. Furthermore, the Turkish positions overlooked the allied troops, being in almost every case on higher ground. And finally the Suvla Bay and Anzac regions, the points from which the troops would have to be embarked, were all within artillery range and often within rifle range of the enemy.


Every effort was made by General Monro and his subordinate officers to conduct the preparations for the embarkation of the troops in secret. That is to say the exact day decided upon was

kept a secret from all except the highest officers. For it was not possible to keep from the Turks entirely the knowledge of a complete withdrawal from the Gallipoli Peninsula of the allied troops. Too much publicity had been given to the whole discussion in France and England for that.

Eventually, Monday, December 19, 1915, was decided upon for the critical operation. With all possible secrecy a great fleet of transports was gathered at Mudros Bay and, under the protection of this fleet of warships—the strongest that had approached the Gallipoli Peninsula since the arrival of the German submarines in the neighborhood—sailed for Suvla Bay and Anzac Cove.

It had been decided to remove the allied troops from these two bases before attempting the perhaps more difficult task of getting the force away from the Krithia region. Indeed, after the troops had been safely extricated from the northern bases it was officially announced in London that the Allies would continue to hold the base won in the south. This proved, however, to be merely in the nature of a literary demonstration to divert the attention of the none too credulous Turk from the real purpose of the allied command.

While the fleet of transports and warships was approaching the two bases under cover of the night, the Australian and New Zealand troops at Anzac and the British troops at Suvla were hastily preparing for leaving. Among the colonial troops there was the keenest regret in thus relinquishing what had been so hardly won at the price of so many precious lives. To the Australians the operations at Anzac will always remain one of the greatest, if not the very greatest military feat in their history. To be sure they fought in numbers and with conspicuous bravery throughout the Boer War; but Anzac was an operation all their own, on a scale never before attempted by them as a distinct military organization. They had won undying fame and unstinted praise from the highest military authorities, and the success of the operation in that part of the Gallipoli Peninsula had become a matter affecting their pride.



OPERATIONS AT THE DARDANELLES

CHAPTER III

ABANDONMENT OF DARDANELLES—
ARMENIAN ATROCITIES

FINALLY, by midnight of Sunday, all was ready. Just after that hour the allied troops on shore at Anzac and Suvla Bay could see the dark forms of the warships and the transports as they dropped anchor close inshore. If they had listened attentively they might have heard the soft splash of the hundreds of muffled oars as they slowly propelled the ships' boats toward the beaches.

On shore preparations were being made to repel a hurricane attack by the Turks. For it was felt that as soon as the enemy got knowledge of the contemplated withdrawal they would attack with unprecedented fury.

But, though the British troops waited, the expected attack never came. Finally, just after three o'clock in the morning, the Australians exploded a large mine at Russell's Top, between the two systems of trenches, and made a strong demonstration as if about to initiate a big offensive. About eight o'clock the last of them were taken off. Before these last men left they set fire to the stores that it had been impossible to carry away.

It was only then, apparently, that the Turks awoke to the real progress of events. Immediately from every Turkish battery a hurricane of shells was poured into the deserted Allies' base. Those within range turned their fire upon the allied fleet, now swiftly disappearing from sight in the thin haze.

Highly significant, as showing the serious state of public opinion in England during the closing days of the Dardanelles campaign, were the published statements of E. Ashmead-Bartlett. Ashmead-Bartlett was in the nature of an official eyewitness of the major part of the operations at the Strait, although the British War Office took no responsibility for his opinions or statements. It was at first intended by the British authorities that there should be no newspaper correspondents on the spot,

but finally, as a concession to the demands of the united press of Great Britain, it was agreed that one man should be allowed on the scene and that his dispatches should be syndicated among the papers sharing the expense of his work. Ashmead-Bartlett was the man selected for the unique task.

His dispatches from the Dardanelles were censored on the spot and again in London, so they did not possess much information of direct value. It was when he returned to London and was in a degree free from restraint that he wrote frankly. His remarks are quoted in part because they are the best, perhaps the only, unprejudiced opinion on the operations from a British point of view.

Writing in the middle of October, 1915, he strongly advised the abandonment of the campaign, "which," he says, "if it ever had any hope of success, now is completely robbed of it." In his opinion, giving up the campaign would not hurt the Allies' prestige in the Balkans, for the simple reason that their prestige had "been reduced to nil" by the Foreign Office, loquacious politicians, and faulty diplomacy.

Speaking of the military operations at the Dardanelles, after paying the highest tribute to the ability and the courage of the Turks, and berating the British politicians who interfered with the General Staff, he said:

"Apart from the question that the conception is of doubtful paternity, we committed every conceivable blunder in our methods of carrying out the plan. Few minds were engaged that had any knowledge of the character of the Turks' fighting qualities and the geography of the country. Never before in this war has the situation been more serious.

"Our boasted financial stamina in outlasting our opponents is going fast to ruin in excessive expenditures in enterprises which, if they ever had any hope of success, now have been finally robbed of all such hope.

"A good gambler, when he loses much, can afford to stop. He waits for a turn in his luck and a fresh pack of cards, and clears off for another table. The mad and headstrong gambler loses everything trying to recoup, and has nothing left to make a fresh

start elsewhere. Which is England to be, the former or the latter?"

It is natural that the Turkish people should have been jubilant over the turn of events in Gallipoli and elsewhere. After the series of defeats during the Balkan War the successes of the Great War against such redoubtable opponents as France and England were all the more inspiring. The final success in the Dardanelles had been predicted some weeks before in the Turkish Parliament, and therefore was not unexpected. In the last week in October, Halil Bey, president of the Turkish Chamber of Deputies, declared:

"At the time when the most serious engagements were taking place in the Dardanelles and in Gallipoli, I was in Berlin. I was there able to realize personally the feelings of high and sincere admiration entertained by our allies for the extraordinary bravery with which terrible attacks were repulsed by our armies. The German nation publicly congratulated their Government, which, at a time when we were despised by the smallest nations, was proud to sign an alliance with us. That alliance carries with it obligations for the distant future, and unites in a sincere and unshakable friendship three great armies and three great nations.

"The cannon which thundered on the Danube will soon be heard again in greater force and will create in the Balkans an important sector in connection with the war. After the reestablishment of communications, which will take place within a brief space of time, our army will be in a better position to fulfill its mission on all the fronts, and in irresistible fashion. The hopes of the enemy are forever destroyed as regards Constantinople and its straits, and can never be renewed."

Extremely significant is one of the concluding paragraphs of his speech in which he foreshadows economic developments after the war. In view of the Allies' expressed intention of making an effort to boycott German trade even after the signing of peace terms, the following words of Halil Bey are illuminating and important:

"The most important result of this war is that from the North Sea to the Indian Ocean a powerful group will have been created

that will be ever in opposition to English egotism, which has been the cause of the loss of millions of human lives and of thousands of millions in money, and will act as a check on Russian pride, French *revanche*, and Italian treachery. In order to secure this happy result the Turkish nation will be proud to submit to every sort of sacrifice." The president concluded his speech by eulogizing the memory of those who had fallen in the war.

Halil Bey's prediction of the reestablishment of communications with the Central Powers was not long in being fulfilled. Within two weeks the Germano-Austrian drive from the Danube had penetrated to Bulgarian territory opposite the Rumanian frontier, and within another fortnight it had linked up with the Bulgarian columns in the south operating against Nish. For all practical purposes Serbia was in their hands, and the powerful economic group heralded by Halil Bey was in the process of completion.

There is no doubt that the forging of this strong link with Berlin was one of the main considerations in inducing the Allies to abandon the Dardanelles campaign. There were two immensely important reasons why this should have radically changed conditions in the Gallipoli Peninsula.

In the first place, there was the question of supplies. There are three ways in which modern wars on a big scale can be won: by direct military pressure, by financial pressure, or by economic stress. In the case of the Allies' offensive against Turkey, after the first disappointment of the naval military operations, it was confidently predicted that economic stress would accomplish what military pressure had failed to do. It was known that Turkey had but meager means of making good the enormous expenditure of heavy-gun ammunition necessary in modern battles. Indeed, as early as the big naval attempt to force the Dardanelles, rumors were heard of a shortage of ammunition in the Turkish forts, and in this connection it is interesting to print a report that gained currency at the time of the abandonment of the Anzac and Suvla Bay bases.

Had the allied fleet returned to its attack upon the Dardanelles batteries on the day following the great bombardment of March 19, 1915, the waterway to Constantinople would surely have been forced, in the opinion of several artillery officers of the defense works near Tchanak-Kalessi expressed to the Associated Press correspondent, who had just reached Vienna.

One of the principal batteries, it appeared, had for three of its large caliber guns just four armor-piercing shells each when night ended the tremendous efforts of the British and French fleet.

For the fourth gun five shells were left, making for the entire battery a total of seventeen projectiles of the sort which the aggressors had to fear. What this meant is best understood when it is considered that the battery in question was the one which had to be given the widest berth by the allied fleet.

During the evening of March 18, 1915, the correspondent talked with several artillery officers from this battery.

"Better pack up and be ready to quit at daybreak," said one of them.

"Why?" he asked.

"Oh, they are sure to get in to-morrow!"

Then the officer stated his reasons. He was so certain that the British and French would return in the morning to finish their task that there was no question in his mind as to the propriety of discussing the ammunition matter.

"We'll hold out well enough to make them think that there is no end to our supply of ammunition," he said, "but it can't be done if they go about their work in real earnest. With our heavy pieces useless they can reduce the batteries on the other shore without trouble. The case looks hopeless. You had better take my advice."

Following the advice thus given, the correspondent rose early next morning and packed his few belongings, keeping, meanwhile, a watchful eye on the tower of Kale-Sultanie, where the flag, showing that the allied fleet was near, was usually hoisted. But the morning passed and still the danger signal did not appear. Evidently the allied fleet was not inclined to risk more

such losses as those of the previous day, when the *Bouvet*, *Irresistible*, and *Ocean* went down and five other ships were badly damaged. Yet even with the eleven remaining ships, it appears from the Turkish admissions, the Dardanelles could have been forced on March 19, 1915.

The correspondent visited several of the batteries during the day. The damage done the day before was slight indeed, consisting mostly of large earth displacements from the parapets and traverses. Four guns were temporarily out of commission, but the general shortage of ammunition made these pieces negligible quantities anyway.

Although the British information system in this field of operations was efficient, it must have failed in this instance, for it seems certain that with seventeen shells the battery in question would have been easily disposed of, a channel could have been made through the mine field, and the way to Constantinople would have been open.

All this was realized in the Turkish capital. The court made arrangements to transfer to Akhissar Anatolia, and the German and Austro-Hungarian Embassies were ready to leave for this ancient seat of the Ottoman Government. The families of many German officers in the Turkish service left Constantinople. In short, everybody understood that a calamity was pending. What its exact nature was but a few knew.

Whatever truth there may have been in this particular story, there seems to be little doubt that the Turks were woefully short of ammunition. During the Balkan War it was reported on good authority that much of their ammunition was defective. When countries like France, England, and Russia hopelessly miscalculated the need of ammunition for modern warfare, it is not asking too much of us to believe that the Turks suffered in a worse degree.

Without direct or indirect communication with Germany, it is easy to imagine this condition of affairs getting steadily worse. At the beginning of the war, there seems to be good evidence, large quantities of all kinds of munitions and war supplies were rushed from Germany to Constantinople by way of Rumania

and Bulgaria, but it was not long before the Rumanian Government, either of its own volition or in the face of threats by the allied powers, refused to permit these supplies to pass through her territory.

It became evident to the Allies that sooner or later the Germans would have to make an attempt to link up with the Turks. Thus, from one point of view, the operations at the Dardanelles became a race against Germany, with a common objective, Constantinople. Those who laid their money on the allied horse were confident of winning, figuring that long before the Germans were free of the French menace on the west and south and the Russian menace on the east, and so in a position to undertake an offensive against Serbia, the allied troops would have forced the Dardanelles, vanquished the Ottoman troops before the gates of Constantinople, and opened the Strait of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus.

So it was that when events did not transpire as expected, and the allied troops were still hanging desperately to their bases on Gallipoli Peninsula, when the Germans had subdued Serbia, and arrived in triumph in the capital of the Ottoman Empire via the Berlin to Constantinople Express, there was no longer any hope of starving the Turkish guns nor, having even forced the Dardanelles, any certainty of the capture of Constantinople. In other words, conditions had radically changed, and, even with better chances of success than were believed to exist, the game was no longer worth the candle.

The second reason was that, with a neutral Bulgaria, the benefits to the Allies of a successful offensive in the Dardanelles were obvious. The forcing of the Strait, a combined naval and land attack upon Constantinople, the driving of the Turk from Europe, and the insertion of a firm defensive wedge between the empire of the Sultan and any possible German offensive from the north, were objectives important enough to justify almost any expenditure of money, men, and effort the Allies might have made.

But with the Turkish army linked up with a friendly Bulgaria, and backed by a strong Austro-German force led by

General Mackensen, the conditions were changed to a state of hopelessness. An allied army operating on the European side against Constantinople would be dangerously flanked by the Bulgarian and Austro-Germans and hopelessly outnumbered if limited to the force the Allies had been able to send to the southeastern war area.

Just how many men it was possible for Bulgaria and Turkey to put in the field it is not possible to state definitely. It would be reasonable to figure that they could by a great effort, after many months of war, put at least twice their reputed war strength into the ranks. The larger countries far exceeded such figures. Enver Pasha, at the end of October, 1915, stated that Turkey had raised a total of 2,000,000 soldiers. Bulgaria, in a case of necessity, might possibly have added another million, while Germany and Austria, at the time of the operations against Serbia, demonstrated their ability to supply, in action and in reserve, another 500,000 for this front.

These are huge figures. There were many reasons why all these troops could not be used against an allied offensive. It is not meant to imply, for instance, that an allied offensive on a large scale, based on Saloniki, is doomed to failure. The figures are quoted simply to show the military conditions that made an offensive from the Dardanelles hopeless in the circumstances that obtained at the end of 1915 and that weighed with the military authorities in London and Paris in deciding upon a withdrawal from the Gallipoli Peninsula.

Probably it will be a long time before the world has any accurate, adequate idea of the terrible disaster that overtook British prestige and allied troops in their year's attempt to force the Strait. Official figures announced by Premier Asquith speak of more than 100,000 troops killed, wounded, or missing, but these total figures took account of the sick, who reached an extraordinary high total. Lack of drinking water, the difficulty of keeping the troops supplied with food, the intense heat, and the fact that the men engaged were unused to the climatic conditions, combined to lay low thousands upon thousands of men not mentioned in the restricted casualty lists. An estimate of

another hundred thousand put out of action, temporarily or permanently, by sickness is not unreasonable.

Thus 200,000 men, six battleships and smaller war vessels, enormous stores and millions of dollars' worth of ammunitions were the price Britain paid to discover that the Dardanelles were impregnable even to British battleships and British endurance. And who shall estimate the loss of vital prestige, the waste of fine efforts at a time when it was so much needed elsewhere? Some future historian, with all the facts in his possession, with the saving perspective that only time can give, will have a fascinating subject for discussion in this Dardanelles campaign, destined to go down into history as one of the most spectacular and daring in the annals of warfare.

It was not until some weeks later that the outside world began to hear rumors of the dire predicament of the Armenians under Turkish rule. In their case, as in that of the French and British who were to be sent to the Dardanelles, Mr. Morgenthau finally intervened with effect.

It had always been recognized that the elements of serious trouble existed in the districts of Asiatic Turkey populated by the Armenians. In the days of Sultan Abdul Hamid there had been frequent massacres by the Turks, following outbreaks of racial and religious strife. The Armenians had not been easy people to govern, and a constant and deep hatred existed between them and their rulers.

With the coming of the Young Turks the lot of the unhappy Armenians had apparently bettered. Indeed, at the time of the outbreak of war, one of two special European inspectors, specially appointed to watch over the administration of the six provinces of Asiatic Turkey in which the Armenians lived, was actually on his way to his post.

Of course the war changed the entire situation and made the position of the Armenian population a precarious one. All hope of reform for the moment was banished and the old hatred, of which it was hoped the world had heard the last, was revived and intensified by the passions aroused by the entrance of Turkey into the struggle.

Nor were the Armenians content to await their fate. In several important instances they took matters into their own hands. It was, perhaps quite natural that many of them, especially those who lived near the Russian frontier, should sympathize with Russia.

Early in April of 1915, a considerable force of Armenians in the city of Van collected and resisted the attempts of Turkish gendarmes to apply the terms of an order banishing certain of their number suspected of Russian or anti-Turk sympathies. In such force were they that they actually, with the help of Russian troops, captured the city.

With the Van revolt Talaat Bey, the powerful Turkish Minister of the Interior, determined upon a ruthless policy of repression, and it was largely due to efforts to put that policy in force that there resulted the subsequent massacre of Armenians that shocked the world. It is difficult for anyone not in possession of the actual facts to apportion an exact measure of blame for these bloody reprisals; and in the following account, it must be remembered, we are compelled at this juncture to rely almost entirely upon English and Russian, and therefore biased, information.

The district covered by the massacre, in which it has been said 1,000,000 Armenians (probably a gross exaggeration) were killed, were Eastern Anatolia, Cilicia, and the Anti-Taurus regions. It is said that at Marsovan, where there is an American college, the Armenians early in June were ordered to meet outside the town. They were surrounded and 1,200 of their number killed by an infuriated mob. Thousands of the rest were hurled into northern Mesopotamia.

At Bitlis and Mush, in the Lake Van district, it is reported that 12,000 were killed and several Armenian villages entirely wiped out.

As has been pointed out, the Armenians of some districts did not sit still and wait to be massacred. At Shaben Karahissar in northeastern Anatolia, within a hundred miles of Trebizon, the Armenian population held the town for a short time against Turkish troops. Finally they were overcome and 4,000 are said

to have been killed. At Kharput, a hundred and twenty-five miles southwest of Erzerum, the Armenians held the town for a whole week, but were finally overcome by troops and artillery. In many of the districts the able-bodied men of the Armenian population have been drafted into the labor battalions for military work at the front and at the bases. The men too old for this class of work, and yet suspected of agitating against Turkish rule, were exiled into districts where their powers for harm would be nil.

It must not be assumed because of these accounts that the Turkish Government gave its unqualified approval of these massacres. Undoubtedly Talaat Bey adopted a deliberately ruthless policy in dealing with all cases of actual or suspected revolt. But it is a far cry from a systematic, intelligent policy of frightfulness to an indiscriminate massacre.

Protests against these massacres were not confined to the outside world. Many influential personages in Turkey openly protested, and in some notable cases conscientious and brave officials actually refused to obey the demands of the Constantinople authorities and hand over Armenian subjects or assist in their exile.

Again in this case, as in that of the proposal of Enver Pasha to send a large number of allied citizens to the bombardment area of Gallipoli as a reprisal, it was Mr. Morgenthau, the American Ambassador at Constantinople, who followed up his protest by real action. He threw himself heart and soul into the work of softening the lot of the unfortunate Armenians. Of course he had to move warily in order not to offend the pride of the Turkish authorities, but working through the American Consular officials stationed throughout Turkey and through the American missionaries and teachers working among the Armenian and Turkish people he undoubtedly saved the lives of thousands of men, women, and children, while other thousands undoubtedly owe to his zeal their escape from exile or starvation.

It was due largely to the publicity given to these deplorable happenings in the American press that the attention of the

world was drawn to Asiatic Turkey and the conditions there, resulting in action by the Turkish Government that effectively put a stop, for the moment at least, to the persecution of an unhappy people.


CHAPTER IV

C A M P A I G N I N C A U C A S U S — F A L L O F E R Z E R U M

THE fall of 1915 and the early winter of 1915 were periods of feverish activity behind the lines in the Caucasus. A severe winter held up any active operations of consequence on the part of either belligerents, but both knew that with the coming of better conditions their defensive and offensive organizations would be put to severe tests.

On the part of the Russians the Caucasus front became at the time one of prime importance. Not excepting even the Balkan frontier, to Russia the Turkish line was of more importance than any other on which her army was aligned. In the first place, of all her frontier that running through the Caucasus promised the best return for the least expenditure of effort, time, money, and men. Against both Germany, in the north, and Germany-stiffened Austria in Galicia and the Carpathians, Russia had had severe reverses. The czar's staff, through grim experience, realized the tremendous difficulties that confronted them on these two fronts. Turkey, ill prepared, lacking superlative military leaders, without organization, and barely recovered from the terrible effects of the Balkan wars, appeared to be an easy opponent, comparatively speaking, despite the frightful difficulties of large military operations in the roadless and railless mountain passes of the Trans-caucasus.

Furthermore, the military pressure was becoming steadily easier on Russia. The great German drive was drawing to its close. With its front established in a straight line from just south of Riga on the north, to the Rumanian frontier on the south, the



THE TURKISH EMPIRE

Austro-German army decided to abandon the offensive for the time being and be content with holding that front; and devote its energies to the Serbian and French theatres of war. This promised to provide a very welcome breathing spell for Russia, permitting her to reorganize her military forces, remedy her deplorable shortage of munitions and incidentally to turn her attentions to the Turks.

Finally, once in the war, the whole of Russian official opinion tended toward a settlement, once and for all, of her age-long dream of Constantinople. The consolidation of the Balkans on a Slav, pro-Russian basis, important as it appeared to be and furnishing the ostensible causes of the war, was but incidental to the Russian dominion over and control of Constantinople, the gate to the warm waters of the Mediterranean.

From the viewpoint of the Entente Powers as a whole there were cogent reasons why a Russian offensive against the Turkish Caucasus front would be highly desirable. It would, for instance, relieve the pressure, not only on the Gallipoli front, but as well on the British forces in Mesopotamia. In the latter field, of course, Great Britain, with a miniature army of not more than 40,000, was attempting to reach Bagdad, but was being hard pressed by the Ottoman forces. Furthermore, an eventual junction of the Russian columns from the Caucasus and the British troops from the Persian Gulf, and the establishment of an impregnable line, would provide against any future drive of a German-Austro-Turkish army toward India.

These, then, were the considerations that influenced the preparations for a resumption of the Russian offensive against Erzerum and beyond, which had been more or less quiescent since the smashing defeat of the Turkish army on the frontier in December, 1914.

Undoubtedly this state of affairs had much to do with the transfer of the Grand Duke Nicholas to the Caucasus command when it became apparent that the German offensive in the north was nearing its finish. With masterly skill the Russian commander in chief had withdrawn his huge army in the face of a victorious and highly efficient enemy, not, to be sure, without

serious losses, but certainly without permitting his long front to be really broken or his forces utterly defeated. It was felt in Russia that he, of all men developed by the war, was the one to organize and initiate the proposed operations in the Caucasus.

It was early in the month of September, 1915, September 5 to be precise, that the czar issued his famous order relieving the Grand Duke Nicholas of his command in the north and transferring him to the Caucasus. Taking with him a number of the higher officers who had been with him through the trying months on the Warsaw front, the Grand Duke Nicholas immediately journeyed south and took over the command of the Russian forces in that theatre of war.

It was not long before there were to be seen many evidences of the arrival of a commander with energy and determination. Despite the lamentable shortage of munitions known to exist in Russia, guns, shells, rifles, provisions, and stores of all kinds were rapidly accumulated at the main Caucasus base and from there distributed to the points along the line of advance into Turkey. Many of these supplies of all kinds, provisions as well as munitions of war, came from the United States by way of the Siberian port of Vladivostok and even by way of Archangel, although that port was, in most cases, reserved for British shipments. From Vladivostok the American shipments were carried over the 6,000 miles of the great Trans-Siberian railway to Petrograd and from there continued on their long and slow journey to the Caucasus front.

Among the endless stream of supplies were many special and ingenious conveyances for transporting guns, provisions, and soldiers over the otherwise impassable snows of this terrible region. It was necessary, to insure success, that by some means hitherto unknown to military transportation guns weighing tons should be moved about the trackless, roadless country almost like playthings. Only thus could a commander hope to secure that preponderance of heavy gunfire without which the modern offensive is doomed to defeat or stalemate.

By the beginning of February, 1916, all was ready for the Russian advance upon Erzerum. To begin with, the Turks were

known to be busily occupied in other fields. The British forces in Mesopotamia, although held up at Kut-el-Amara, and known to be in sore straits, were in daily expectation of strong reenforcements. The campaign against Bagdad, which had been originally undertaken by the Indian army, had proved too big a task for that relatively small organization, and the conduct of that campaign was taken over by the imperial military authorities in Great Britain, who have larger militant forces at their disposal than those possessed by the Indian Government.

Aside from this fear of strong reenforcements, the Turkish commanders were straining every effort to capture the British force shut up in Kut-el-Amara, and thus secure a great victory that could not fail to have far-reaching military and political effects both in Turkey and throughout the whole warring world. For this reason every unit of troops that could be possibly spared from other fields was rushed to Bagdad and thrown into the field against General Townshend's sorely pressed command awaiting relief at Kut-el-Amara.

Furthermore, although the pressure on the Gallipoli front had been relaxed through the practical abandonment by the allied troops of the attempt to force the Dardanelles, with the entrance of the Bulgarians into the war and the prosecution of the offensive against Serbia a new need had been found for Turkish troops. For the Bulgarian and Serbian development had brought the Allies in ever-increasing strength to Saloniki. The Allies at the Greek port were a constant potential menace to Turkey, as well as to Bulgaria, and through the Entente press were running constant rumors of a coming offensive directed at Constantinople "through the back door," as it was called.

To be sure the allied forces at Saloniki, beyond a half-hearted effort, with but a fraction of their numbers to assist the escape of the Serbian army from the menace of the Austro-German-Bulgarian pincers that threatened it on three sides, had made no move to carry the war to the Bulgarian or Turkish enemy. Yet Turkey found it necessary to keep constantly at Constantinople, or in the country immediately to the north and in close touch with the Bulgarian forces, an army estimated at at least 200,000 men.

In other words, the Turkish General Staff could withdraw few if any of the men concentrated about Constantinople at the beginning of the war to fill the enormous gaps made in her line on other fronts. Indeed, she had need to add to them to offset the extraordinary number of men who were constantly being poured into Saloniki by France and England until, in the early spring, their total was variously estimated at from 250,000 to 350,000 men of all services.

It was in these circumstances, then, that the Grand Duke Nicholas ordered the advance upon Erzerum. They go far to explain the events of the subsequent few weeks in and about the great Turkish Caucasian fortress town.

Russian forces had, during the three months immediately preceding the big offensive, prepared the way by the capture of points from which the grand attack was to be launched. In command of the czar's troops was General Judenich, although the Grand Duke Nicholas was officially responsible for operations on this front. General Judenich had devoted years of his life to a study of the special problems attending an offensive in the Kars-Erzerum regions and carried through his task with a skill and an expedition that have hardly their equal in the history of the war.

The advance of the Russian forces upon Erzerum was made from three points. It is well for the reader to keep this constantly in mind. It was an application of the principle of the pincers, combined with a great frontal attack, used so often and so successfully by the Germans in their Russian drive. It adds tremendously to the difficulties of a commander battling to defend a big position. Nowadays, under the new conditions of warfare, fortresses or other positions are not defended to the end. They are held just as long as it is safe for the army within to hold out. But a commander must on no account endanger his force. Discretion is more than ever the better part of valor, and "he who fights and runs away, lives to fight another day," is the guiding principle of the general of modern times.

Now this triple menace, striking not only on the front but on both sides and menacing the roads by which a defeated army must retreat, seriously weakens the defense which an army within a

fortress can make. It was just such an operation or series of operations that carried the tremendously strong fortress of Antwerp in record time, that accounted for the surprising fall of Namur in two days, and that explains the rapidity with which a score of almost impregnable Russian fortresses in Poland fell before the rush of the German avalanche.

The triple Russian thrust at Erzerum was made from Olty, which had been captured as far back as August 3, 1915, along the Kars-Erzerum road by way of Sarikamish, the scene of the great Turkish defeat of the early days of the war, and from Melazghert and Khynysskala.

Erzerum was undoubtedly one of the strongest positions in the Turkish Empire, although the experience of the war had tended to detract from previous confidence in the strength of old-style concrete forts when attacked by concentrated big-gun bombardment. Opinions differ on the question of whether or not the Erzerum armament had been maintained up to a modern standard. But as regards the number of its guns, and the size and number of its individual forts, there are no two opinions.

Its eighteen separate positions encircling the city in two rings, defended by concrete forts, would, under ordinary conditions, have made it virtually impregnable. One count mentions as many as 467 big guns in the outer forts, 374 in the inner forts, and 200 more or less mobile fieldpieces scattered about the country intervening. Although this was an early Russian report, issued in the delirium of national joy that followed the capture of the fortress, and should be considerably discounted, nevertheless, Erzerum boasted a plentiful supply of big guns, few if any of which were taken away by the fleeing Turkish army, although the majority of them were probably rendered useless at the last moment. According to Entente information, among these guns were 300 of the very latest pattern Krupp pieces, but on the other hand, according to German information, the fortress boasted no guns less than twenty years old. Arguing from the known shortage of big guns in Turkey and the fact that of late years other fronts have been of prime importance and have undoubtedly received what fresh ordnance the army was able to purchase and

secure, it does not seem likely that much modern equipment was found in the Caucasus fortress by the Russian victors.

Quickly the three Russian forces converged upon Erzerum. Finally, driving outlying Turkish forces before them, in the second week of February, 1916, they were in touch with the outer defenses of the great fortress. It was rumored at this time that both Von der Goltz and Liman von Sanders, the two high German commanders, lent by the kaiser to Turkey, were in Erzerum superintending the defense and, furthermore, that huge Turkish reenforcements were covering the 200 miles from the nearest railway head by forced marches in an effort to arrive at the fortress and prevent its encircling and isolation by the Russians. Both of these reports, however, ultimately were proved to be figments of the active imaginations of local correspondents.

The Turkish plan of campaign for the defense of Erzerum, according to official Russian sources, was as follows: The Third Army Corps, which had been ordered up to replace the losses in the Caucasus front of the previous nine months, was moved out of Erzerum and took up a position between that town and the Russian front. The Ninth and Tenth Corps moved out toward Olty to form an offensive ring, while the Eleventh Corps was to hold the Russian offensive on the Kars-Erzerum road. In case the Russians in the last named region were too strong for the Eleventh Corps to hold, it was to fall back slowly on the fortress of Erzerum, drawing the army of the Grand Duke Nicholas with it. When this movement had progressed sufficiently, the Ninth and Tenth Corps were to attack energetically on the flank.

Unfortunately for the success of this plan, although the Eleventh Corps performed its function and drew the Russian army with it in its retreat toward Erzerum, the Ninth and Tenth Corps suffered a reverse and were compelled to fall back also. Similarly, the Third Corps was compelled to yield before superior numbers and barely escaped envelopment.

Naturally, there is considerable difference of opinion as to the question of numbers involved in these operations. It seems to be fairly well established, however, that the Russians used, roughly, eight army corps, or slightly more than 300,000 men. Eight

corps are known to have been at the disposal of the grand duke, but a small portion of his force was at the same time engaged in an expedition into northern Persia, so that the round figures given would seem to be conservative.

Although but four Turkish corps are mentioned, it is known that the Ottoman command had at its disposal considerable numbers of Kurds, Persians, Arabs, and other irregular troops, as well as several units not specifically mentioned in the official accounts. Thus the estimate of 180,000 to 200,000 men would not seem to be out of the way.

While the thrusts from the northeast and southeast were fighting their way toward the flanks of Erzerum, the Russian troops advancing along the Kars-Erzerum road, driving the Eleventh Corps before them, made a fierce frontal assault upon the outer forts of the town.

In this connection it would be well to examine more minutely the conditions that confronted the Russian commander. Erzerum is situated on a plateau some 6,000 feet above sea level, and the key forts had been placed on high ground commanding the surrounding country. However well the Russian transport department had done its work, the Russian supply of heavy artillery could not have been overwhelming in the sense that heavy guns were overwhelming on other fronts. There could, therefore, have been no condition of affairs where the infantry was called upon simply to occupy positions previously shattered by gunfire. Indeed, the best opinions agree that little or no real damage was done by the artillery to the Erzerum forts and that the infantry had to advance against practically intact defenses. Yet, after five days of fierce assault, the hardy Siberian troops of General Judenich's army carried nine of the outlying forts and forced the evacuation of the entire fortress.


There can be but one explanation of this astonishing result. It is hardly possible for any troops to take a position like Erzerum by direct assault. The fortress successfully resisted all Russian attempts to capture it in the Russo-Turkish War, although then far less strong than in 1916. Some foreign military critics have tried to explain the puzzling facts by claiming that the well-

known bravery and tenacity of the Turk on defense, shown all through his history and never more evident than in the Gallipoli campaign, was, for some unknown reason, totally lacking at Erzerum. Such claims, however, do not hold water.

Erzerum was evacuated simply because of a menace to the Turkish lines of communication and the danger of isolation. However well provisioned the fortress might have been—and its stores were vast, for it was the chief supply and provisioning center for the whole Turkish military organization in Asia Minor—it could not hope to withstand an indefinite siege. The Turkish high command would not view with equanimity the bottling up of close upon 200,000 of its first-line troops. With the example of Przemysl, and Metz in 1870 in its mind, it decided upon a, perhaps, temporary abandonment of the position immediately it became apparent that the Russian advance from the northeast and southeast could not be successfully opposed by the troops available.

Furthermore, the defense of the fortress was weakened by the condition of the country over which the Turkish army had to retreat in any retirement from Erzerum. It is no simple matter to transport a defeated army, with its supplies, enormous guns, ammunition, and other impedimenta, even with an efficient railway organization at its back. It is comparatively easy, then, to imagine some of the difficulties that confronted the Turkish command. From Erzerum to the nearest railhead is something like 200 miles. A blinding snowstorm was raging and the temperature was hovering around 25 degrees below zero. Few roads, and those almost impassable at that season of the year, must supply all the needs of scores of thousands of men and thousands of animals, carts, trucks, guns, carriages, etc.

The retreat of the Turkish forces from Erzerum, resembling a rout in its inevitable haste and confusion, had to be made in the face of a victorious enemy and, menaced by superior forces on both flanks, under terrific weather conditions and through roadless and highly broken country. After a preliminary artillery bombardment of the Turkish forts on the southeast front of the city, the Russian infantry began to assault Fort Kara Gubek.



THE RUSSIAN ADVANCE ON TURKEY IN ARMENIA

Finally this was carried and then fell in quick succession Forts Tafta and Chobandede, six miles south on the commanding and important Deyer Boyum Heights. By February 15, 1916, the Russians were masters of the city and fortress.

At first it was supposed in the allied countries that the Turkish army had been trapped in the fortress and more or less authoritative accounts spoke of the surrender of 180,000 Turkish troops. These accounts were circumstantial enough. Several days before the news of the fall of Erzerum came through there appeared stories of the envelopment of the city. It soon became known, however, that less than 17,000 troops had been taken with the abandoned forts—merely a rear guard left behind to delay the onward sweep of the Russians and give the retreating Turkish army a chance to put a few miles between it and its pursuers.

If the country to the west of Erzerum was rugged and difficult for the retiring Turk, it also followed that it was not only difficult for the pursuing Russians, but also offered many opportunities for a stern resistance. Thus it was not astonishing to learn that the Russians had little chance of following up their success at Erzerum. The Turkish army, largely intact, made good its escape across Armenia, followed by the troops of the Grand Duke Nicholas, much to the chagrin of allied public opinion, which had hoped for a smashing victory such as the fall of Przemysl, or Metz in 1870, or Plevna in 1877.

The grand duke decided to advance with the right of his army on Trebizon, the Turkish supply base on the Black Sea. Turkey was known to be hurrying reinforcements to this town in the hope of preventing its capture by the Russians. It became a race across difficult country and, although Petrograd and London reports confidently predicted the success of the Russians, in the end the Turks were able to bring up strong enough forces to prevent its capture, for the time being at least.

It is difficult to measure with any accuracy the political results of the success of the Russians at Erzerum, for the political results far outweighed the military. In a general way it can be said that it had little or no effect upon the Balkans, and upon Mohammedan opinion throughout the East, merely serving to

offset in a small measure the effects of the allied withdrawal from the Dardanelles. On the other hand, it had a tremendously important effect upon the situation in Persia. In that kingdom, just prior to the Russian offensive, there were many evidences that affairs were ripe for a rising of the local tribes against the Russians in occupation of the northern zone of influence. Indeed, at the very time the grand duke gave his orders for the advance upon Erzerum he was compelled to detach troops for operations in Persia. This force advanced against a body numbering about 2,000, made up of Turks, Persians, and some Germans, and finally, after some small fighting, occupied the Persian towns of Hamadan, Kurn, and Kermanshah.

Even with these successes there was great difficulty in controlling the Persians, who had gained courage through the defeat of the British in Mesopotamia and in Gallipoli. However, the capture of Erzerum and the rout of the Turks had a quieting effect, for the time being at least.

PART II—ITALY IN THE WAR

CHAPTER V

REVIEW OF PRECEDING OPERATIONS— ITALIAN MOVEMENTS

A RETROSPECT of the Austro-Italian struggle, taken from the vantage point afforded by nine months of fighting, revealed what was intended to be a campaign of invasion as developing all the characteristics of trench warfare. Following shortly on the declaration of war by Italy, General Cadorna deployed the whole of the Italian Third Army on the right bank of the Isonzo between Tolmino and Monfalcone, and carried out a vigorous offensive in order to gain a secure footing on the left bank—an antecedent condition to further operations eastward. Italian troops crossed the river at five different points, Caporetto, Plava, Castelnuovo, Gradisca, and Monfalcone. Considering the immense strength of the Austrian defenses this was considered a good start. Along the thirty-mile front from Tolmino to the sea there is a continuous wall of defensive works, flanked on the north by the fortified position of Tolmino, and on the south by the formidable Carso Plateau, while Gorizia constitutes the central Austrian *point d'appui*, having been converted into a modern fortress with a girdle of exterior forts supplemented by advanced batteries provided by armored cars on which the latest types of howitzers are mounted. All that military science could do to render this iron barrier impregnable had been done, and the Italians from the first had a hard struggle in their attacks on it.

While regular siege operations were being carried on against Tolmino and Gorizia, the Italians were putting forth great efforts

to secure possession of the Carso Plateau, which dominates the rail and carriage road between Monfalcone and Trieste, as well as the Isonzo Valley up to Gorizia. The plateau had to be completely occupied before any advance could be made along the coast road into Istria and before Gorizia could be attacked from the south. Two months after the declaration of war the Italians, who by that time were in possession of the bridgehead at Sagrada, stormed with great gallantry several lines of trenches on the summit of the western face of the plateau, and captured two thousand prisoners with a large quantity of war material. They followed up this success by an infantry attack, supported by a large number of heavy and field guns. Farther north another army operated against Tarvis along two routes, one of which goes over the Pontafel Pass and is traversed by the railroad running between Vienna and Venice, while the other is a coach road leading from Plezzo over the Predil Pass to the Save Valley. The progress of the Italian columns was checked at Malborgeth, where the Austrians had constructed a chain of permanent forts, while along the coach road an equally strong group of forts covering the Predil Pass blocked the way. A further offensive was directed across the Carnic Alps by way of the Kreuzberg Pass down the Seoten Valley to Innichen and Toblach on the Pusterthal railway. Formidable works had been constructed at Seoten and Lambeo, covering the approaches to the railroad, and on these the Italians opened a furious bombardment for the purpose of clearing a way into the Drave Valley. The object aimed at here was very clear to the Austrians, for when the railroad was reached communication along the Pusterthal between the Adige and Isonzo would be cut, and the Austrian position on the Trentino turned. This was the position in August, 1915, when the Italians were exerting pressure on the Austrians for the further purpose of diverting troops from the Russian frontier, where was being carried on the greatest offensive known to history.

During August, 1915, a continuous night and day battle was waged on the Isonzo frontier for the possession of the Carso Plateau. Gorizia, with its circle of outlying forts, proved itself practically unavailable from either the north or west, for two

fortified heights, Monte Sabatino, on the right bank, and Monte Gabrielle on the left bank, of the Isonzo River, stood sentry over the town on the north, while the plateau of Podgora, which is a perfect labyrinth of deep, intercommunicating trenches, barred the approach to the town from the west. A determined and carefully prepared attack was made by a large Italian force on Podgora, but though ten regiments were sent against the position they failed to get through. In another movement the troops of General Cadorna were successful in obtaining a firm footing on the western face of the Carso Plateau, occupying Sdraissima, Polazzo, Vermegbano, and Monte Sei Bussi, which overlooks Monfalcone. Finding, however, that the Austrians had been strongly reenforced, General Cadorna abandoned his storming tactics, and began advancing along the plateau by the slower methods of siege operations. From the beginning, both Italians and Austrians recognized the Carso Plateau as the key to Gorizia, and around it have been waged some of the bitterest conflicts of the war.

During September, 1915, General Cadorna was able to report progress all along the front occupied, and especially on the Trentino frontier, where Italian troops moved along the three main routes which converge on the Adige Valley from the Italian plain. The route taken was through the Val Giudicaria on the western face of the Trentino salient, up the Adige on the south side, and along the Val Sugano on the eastern front. The Val Giudicaria is the highway into the Tyrol from Brescia, and on either side of it are fortified positions nearly the whole way to Trent. During the first week of the war the Italians, taking the Austrians by surprise, seized Condino by a coup de main, and compelled the Austrian garrison to fall back on the second line of defense higher up the valley. Then the Italian troops began to secure the position gained by constructing defensive works covering the road approaches to Brescia, and linking these up with other defensive positions extending along the entire front from the Stelvio pass to Lake Garda. Simultaneously with the occupation of Condino, an Italian force, based on Verona, moved up both banks of the Adige, crossed the Austrian frontier near

Borghetto, and seized Ala with hardly any opposition. Continuing their offensive the Italians then seized Monte Altissimo and its northern spurs, which command the railroad between Riva and Rovereto, and at the same time occupied the important position of Gori Zugra, which is four miles north of Ala, and flanks the Rovereto road. From there on advance was subsequently made to Pozzachio, an unfinished fort eight miles from Rovereto, which was abandoned by the Austrians as soon as the Italian offensive began to develop. Another force then moved up the Val Astico from Asiero, and succeeded in storming the Austrian positions on Monte Maronia, whence the Italians threatened the main defenses of Rovereto on the Lavaone-Folgaria Plateau. Rovereto is at the junction of three mountain roads leading into Italy in this locality, and has a strategical importance second only to that of Trent. Its occupation was recognized from the start as a necessary preliminary to advanced operations up the Adige. The third Italian column, directed against Trent, moved up the Brenta along the Val Sugana, and in September, 1915, its advanced guards, operating right and left of the valley, reached Monte Salubion on the north and Monte Armenderia on the south of Borgo. These heights command the town of Borgo, but as the inhabitants are all Italians, the place was not occupied lest this should lead to its bombardment by the Austrian artillery. The Austrian commander, however, did not spare the town, which had been repeatedly bombarded by the guns north of Ronegno. Borgo is only eighteen miles from Trent and its investment by Italian troops brought them almost within striking distance of the great Tyrol fortress.

During November and December, 1915, a series of most desperate attempts were made by the troops under General Cadorna to storm the bridgehead of Gorizia and establish a firm footing on the Doberdo Plateau. This plateau, which acts as the citadel for the more extended position of the Carso, rises from 350 to 650 feet above the level of the valley, and dominates all the approaches to Gorizia. Monte San Michele, which is a ridge on the north side of the plateau, and rises in one place to 900 feet above sea level, is the key to the whole position; and round it there was a con-

tinuous sanguinary hand-to-hand fight, the Italians sometimes gaining the advantage, and at other times the Austrians. Against this position General Cadorna concentrated 1,500 guns, some of them 14- and 15-inch howitzers, and naval guns. A tremendous artillery duel, interspersed with infantry attacks, thus set in, and for a long time the fate of Gorizia trembled in the balance. But the advantage of position and the systematic preparation of long years told heavily on the side of the Austrians, who had defended the town with a determination and courage equal to that of their adversaries. General Boroevich had all along had general charge of the Isonzo defenses, while the Archduke Joseph, who held the Dukla Pass for so many weeks against the Russian attacks, succeeded to the command of the corps holding the Doberdo Plateau. Meanwhile the Italian troops were achieving successes elsewhere. They occupied during the month of November, 1915, Bezzecea in the Ledro Valley, and took possession of Col di Lava (8,085 feet) in the Dolomite district.

This was roughly the position from the military point of view on the various Austro-Italian fronts toward the close of the year, when the obstacles facing the Italian forces began to be appreciated by the outside world. It was by that time generally recognized that, though the Italians outnumbered the Austro-Hungarian troops, and but few reserves were available to reenforce General Boroevich, the Austrian defenses were enormously strong, and could only be captured after a heavy sacrifice of life and an unlimited expenditure of artillery ammunition. No mere study of the map can convey any true idea of the difficulties to be overcome before the Austrian positions in the Dolomites and Carnic Alps could be captured. For such a survey could give no indication of the huge guns mounted on the very summit of snow-clad peaks, or the lines of armored trenches stretching uninterruptedly from the Stelvio to the Isonzo. In the mountain warfare that had to be undertaken amidst the terrific heights, progress by either side could all but be reckoned by yards. The convoys had to plod up and down precipitous mountain sides. Instead of the fighting taking place in valleys and passes, as many thought, the positions and even the trenches were revealed as

frequently on the very summits of almost inaccessible peaks and crags, often above the snow line. At high altitudes the few observers admitted on either side saw artillery of a caliber usually associated with defensive works at sea level. The intrepidity required in operations over such a terrain is illustrated by the Italian capture of Monte Vero, when a battalion of Alpini ascended barefooted the precipitous face of the mountain in the middle of the night and stormed the Austrian position on the summit. In such enterprises youth and enthusiasm were found the best assets. The Alpine troops of Italy are recruited from mountain populations, whose hearts and lungs, accustomed to high altitudes, can well bear the strain of mountain fighting.

On the lower Isonzo front the character of the operations has somewhat recalled the aspect of the fighting area and the troop movements in France. Here low foothills and undulating plains predominate. There was on the Isonzo front, however, an absence of the horrors of war in the shape of devastated towns, villages, and countryside, with which the world has become familiar in illustrations from Belgium and northern France.

Over no field of operations was the veil of official secrecy more securely held than over the events proceeding on the Austro-Italian front. Newspaper men were rigorously excluded from the area over which martial law prevailed and the official communiqués seldom erred on the side of perspicuity. This procedure gave rise to a widespread impression that the Italian forces had been largely marking time. The brilliant dash into the Isonzo Valley and the capture of Austrian positions in the Trentino which were chronicled during the months of June and July, 1915, marked an advance which was not equaled by any achievements in the months that followed. Nevertheless, a detailed study of the changes in position during that time show that the Italians were drilling their path forward with unflagging determination.

CHAPTER VI

ITALY'S RELATIONS TO THE OTHER
WARRING NATIONS

MEANWHILE, events of a most startling character were taking place close to the Italian frontier, every one of them big with consequence to Italy's vital interests. The conquest of Serbia by the forces of Germany and Austria-Hungary under General von Mackensen was begun and completed in two months. On October 14, 1915, Bulgaria declared war against the Allies and immediately attacked Serbia from the south, cooperating with the Austro-German forces with whom direct communication was established toward the end of November, 1915. A belated French-British expedition landed at Saloniki for the purpose of lending aid to harassed Serbia, but the forces, which were united under the command of the French General, Sarrail, were capable of achieving little. After coming into contact with the Bulgarians they began on November 27, 1915, to retire to their base at Saloniki, with Irish troops covering their retreat. The conquest of Montenegro followed that of Serbia. The much-coveted strategic position of Mount Lovcen, commanding the Bocca di Cattaro, was captured by the Austrians on January 10, 1916, while the capital, Cettinje, was likewise occupied three days later. Farther east, the ill-starred Dardanelles venture was coming to a disastrous end. Evacuation of the Gallipoli Peninsula by the forces of Britain and France began in December, 1915, the last soldiers of these two powers leaving Sedd-el-Bahr on January 7, 1916.

It was expected that Italy would take a prominent part in the series of events which had taken place on these various fields. More than once the message was sent round the world that a well-equipped Italian expedition had left for the Dardanelles. It was considered certain that Italy would lend her assistance to the forces landed at Saloniki, and thus aid in preventing the overrunning of Montenegro, which could not but constitute a direct

menace to herself. Apart from the landing of a number of troops at Avlona in Albania, Italy kept aloof. This rigid abstinence, coupled with the appearance of deadlock on Italy's two main frontiers, set in motion an undercurrent of criticism among the friends of the Allies. A further source of uncertainty was found in the relations still maintained between Italy and Germany. "Why did not Italy declare war against Germany as well as against Austria?" was a query that was continually put. In the face of this attitude of doubt the Italian Government still continued what it considered its sound and well-matured policy of concentrating its forces for the protection of its own frontiers against Austria, and looking on every other enemy as secondary.

As regards the Balkans, it has to be recalled that it was Italy who first suggested that Serbia receive the assistance of the Allies against the superior Austrian forces. This suggestion was at that early time taken into but slight consideration by France and Great Britain. A battery or two was lent to Serbia by Great Britain, but little more was done until the spectacle of invasion became imminent. While Italy recognized that her interests were of a paramount character in the Balkans, she was convinced that the war would be decided in the main theatre, and not on any of the side theatres that Germany might decide to choose. Nor was Italy under any misapprehension as to what would be her fate were the Austrians to succeed in breaking through the lines of defense on her northern frontier. These considerations decided her against participating in any over-sea adventure unless she was absolutely compelled to do so.

Italy's interest in the problem as to who was to dominate Constantinople and the Dardanelles was less than that of either England or Russia. The apologists of her policy of abstention maintained, indeed, that jealousy of Russia was Great Britain's main motive in deciding on the expedition to Gallipoli. Italy had a more important work to do than to lend her aid in playing off one ally against another. Any aid given to that expedition had, necessarily, to be of a comprehensive character if success was to be achieved. This would have meant a serious depletion of the

Italian forces and might have opened up a way that would have enabled the enemy to strike at the very heart of Italy.

When the possibility of Bulgaria taking the side of the Central Powers loomed into the domain of actuality, Italy with her nearer intuition in Balkan affairs called attention to the impending dénouement. In this she was seconded by Serbia, who asked the aid of the Allies in striking a blow which would have prevented what proved from the allied point of view to be a calamity. Italy's suggestion was that Sofia be at once occupied before Bulgarian mobilization could be got under way. The policy of hoping against hope took the place of energetic action. Then action on the part of the Allies followed when the blow had fallen. Yet Italy knew that Serbia was doomed the moment Bulgaria declared war.

Bitter as the admission might be to Italy, it was convinced that Montenegro was in the like case with Serbia. Montenegro had as little hope of coping with the combined forces of Germany, Austria, and Bulgaria as Serbia. A mere consideration of the alternative plans of rendering aid to her small neighbors revealed the most promising of them as entailing a useless sacrifice. It would have meant the taking over-sea of some hundreds of thousands of men and large guns during the worst period of the year. The passage to the Montenegrin port of Antivari would have required the protection of the entire Italian navy, thus leaving the coasts of Italy exposed to the attacks of the enemy. And what would have been the main purpose of the expedition? To save the celebrated Mount Lovcen, which indeed dominates the Bocca di Cattaro, but does not dominate the Bocca di Teodo, where at the time of the combined attacks of Montenegrins and French from Mount Lovcen months before, and of the French and English from the sea, the Austrian navy was safely sheltered. What Italy could wisely do she did so. She succored the retreating Serbian and Montenegrin soldiers, gave them food, clothing, and shelter, and brought them in safety to the different places to which they had been assigned.

Even before hostilities commenced between Italy and Austria the Italian Government accomplished a *tour de force*. Against

the tacit opposition of Austria she transported a considerable body of troops to the port of Avlona, which, with Brindisi, commands the entrance to the Adriatic. A glance at the map will immediately reveal the vital importance of this strategic position as a base for expeditionary forces in Albania and the Balkans, while its naval possibilities make it inferior to no port on the Adriatic. The fly in the ointment was in the Austrian hold on the Bocca di Cattaro. Thence Austrian submarines could menace Italian shipping, even though no Austrian surface craft dare approach the Strait of Otranto. To this has to be added the further peril arising from the strong current that is supposed to descend from the head of the Adriatic. While transporting troops from Brindisi to Avlona, more than one Italian vessel fell victim to floating mines borne down by this current.

Such in general outline was Italy's position at the end of the year 1915, and such the tenor of those who sought to vindicate her policy in the Balkans and elsewhere. It was maintained by Italian publicists that the Italian fleet had fought with the fleets of France and England on several occasions against the Turks. It was pointed out that that fleet was on continual patrol duty in the Mediterranean with those of the Allies. Italian troops had also been landed with French troops on the island of Corfu, and, according to report, had cooperated to some extent with British troops in Egypt and North Africa. Nevertheless, political and military reasons all combined to make the Austro-Italian frontier the one battle ground where Italy could hope for an enduring victory and fight for it with all her strength.

In regard to the absence of a declaration of war between Germany and Italy, the attitude of the Government of King Victor Emmanuel was thus explained: First of all, the treaty of the Triple Alliance did not consist of a single document, but of three separate agreements: one between Germany and Austria, another between Germany and Italy, and another between Austria and Italy. When Austria declared war on Serbia, Italy registered her protest against the policy of Austria in which she claimed to recognize a violation of that country's treaty with herself. The pourparlers thus gradually turned for subject matter to the time-

honored grievances which Italy cherished against her present ally, but old oppressor. In these negotiations Germany rendered continued aid to Italy, who sought by peaceful means to secure the return of the provinces to which she had an immemorial claim. These negotiations failed, and Italy, denouncing her treaty with Austria-Hungary, declared war against her. But except in so far as she was the ally of Austria-Hungary, Italy had no grievance against Germany. She broke off diplomatic relations with both empires, and she expected that Germany would declare war against her. Germany did not do so, and there the matter remained.

Italy had undoubted historic grounds for this procedure, which was likewise in full agreement with the national feeling. For well over a century feeling in Italy against Austria has been deep and widespread. Toward Germany, on the other hand, the feeling is largely neutral, tinged with a certain awe of German efficiency. German investments in Italy are also said to total something like \$3,000,000,000, and the economic domination which that vast sum denotes was bound to be felt through every channel of the national life. But neither the respect felt for German ability nor the secret influence of German finance has hampered Italy in the conduct of the war. Besides breaking off diplomatic relations with the kaiser, she treated the Germans within her gates exactly as she treated the citizens and subjects of other enemy countries. She formed a commercial alliance with France, Great Britain, and Russia, an alliance the chief aim of which was the removal of German economic domination in Italy. She, moreover, requisitioned German merchant ships that had taken shelter in Italian ports; and finally she broke off commercial relations with Germany, and took measures to prevent Germany from obtaining through Switzerland any goods necessary for the welfare of the population or the prosecution of the war. Germany allowed the serious measures taken by Italy to pass unchallenged, and so Italy was content to let the relations between the two countries continue on that basis.

But beneath all these surface movements ran a deeper current of influence that was partly hidden from all except those who

were active participants in affairs of southeastern Europe. There was, for example, the rivalry between Italy and Greece, a factor that may yet be discovered to have had a deciding influence in the war. For it was the entrance of Italy into the war, with the assumed pledge of territorial profits in the Balkans and in Asia Minor, that forced Greece into maintaining her neutrality at a time when the alignment of forces in the Balkans was still in complete doubt. A well-informed and well-conducted diplomacy, steering skillfully amid the eddies of Balkan affairs, might have brought the combined strength of Italy, Bulgaria, and Greece to the side of the Allies. But Greek jealousy of Italy was allowed to smolder and even to be fanned into flame by the awakened pretensions of the Italian press, whose ambitions in the East became inflated at the prospect of a victorious war, out of which Italy was mirrored as issuing as an imperial state holding a hegemony over the lesser lands on her extended border. While hesitation and doubt held sway in the councils of the Allies, Bulgaria struck, and at one stroke brought disaster on Serbia and Montenegro, and stiffened Greece into an attitude of unshakable neutrality.

CHAPTER VII

PROBLEMS OF STRATEGY

MEANWHILE, with more than half a year's fighting behind them, the Italian commanders had come to certain well-defined military conclusions. The plans of General Cadorna had involved three separate campaigns—one in the Trentino, the other in the Carso, and a subsidiary campaign in the Carnic Alps to the north, along the main watershed of the mountains. A general offensive in the Trentino had been tested and found well-nigh impossible. Trentino is indeed a military paradox—a sharp salient jutting into Italy, which is strong by reason of its being a salient. This is because it is inclosed on eight sides by

great walls, the batteries of the main Alpine chain. A salient is weak as a strategical situation in proportion to the possibility of crushing in its sides and threatening the lines of retreat of the forces occupying the point. Where the sides cannot be successfully attacked, it becomes a position of strength and remains a constant threat. This was the situation in the Trentino. The main Alpine chain is not impassable. It is indeed conceivable, under exceedingly favorable circumstances, that one or more of the passes on the east or west side might be taken and an advance down the valleys to the Adige turn the positions of the defenders. But ordinary foresight on the part of the defense would make this impossible. The valley of the Adige is the only avenue through the Trentino, and this avenue, which is at best only a narrow road, was heavily guarded by the strong fortress of Trent. Moreover, there could be but little result accruing to Italy if the Trentino were forced. The Adige leads only to the main chain of the Alps, and farther on, across the mountains by the easiest of Alpine highways, is the Brenner Pass. Modern defensive power is so great that its development to the point where this highway would be impregnable, except against overwhelmingly superior numbers, would be a matter of great simplicity. Along the northern frontier, in the Carnic Alps, the situation is similar. There is only one pass across these mountains, and this the Austrians could block with the same facility and certainty with which they could block the Brenner Pass.

On the other hand the presumption that the Isonzo sector had a degree of vulnerability was found correct, and along the Isonzo line the real Italian offensive from the beginning continued to be directed. The Isonzo is roughly about three miles into Austria, beyond the political boundary. But it is the true military boundary between Italy and Austria, and it was always regarded by the Austrians as their first line of defense. For almost its entire length, as far south as Salcaro, about four miles north of Gorizia, the Isonzo River runs through a deep gorge and is easily defended. From Salcaro to the sea it issues from the gorge into a more level country—the plateaus of Gorizia and of Carso—although even the southern part of the line is domi-

nated by a series of elevations in supporting distance of each other. Until the line of the Isonzo was forced, Trieste and the entire Istrian Peninsula might be regarded as safe.

Although the line of the Isonzo was, as has been shown, the only feasible line on which Italy could advance, no serious offensive could be attempted until the outlets from the Trentino were thoroughly and effectively stopped up. For Italy to have advanced in the Carso, with her rear open to attack by the Austrians coming through the Tyrolean passes, would have been foolhardy. Italy's first step, therefore, was to start a simultaneous forward movement through every pass from Stelvio on the west to the pass near Pontebba on the north. These movements naturally were of an offensive nature, although they were really for a defensive purpose. No attempt was made to advance any distance through the western passes. The Italians were content to take the fortifications guarding the entrance and to seize heights commanding the approaches.

On the south and east of the Trentino, however, the operations took on a more extended and, for the Austrians, a more serious aspect. On the south the principal efforts were directed against Riva and Rovereto. The operations against Riva, which is situated at the head of Lake Garda, were directed along the valley of the Ledro and thence along the Tonale River, a small stream connecting Lake Ledro and Lake Garda. At the same time the Italians pushed with energy down the Val Sugana, which leads directly to Trent. The advance was pushed to a point where there was no possibility of the Austrians coming through, and there the Italian forces rested.

Well up, toward the north, in the Dolomites there followed considerable fighting, in the Cordevole Valley particularly, for the Col di Lona, the loftiest of the mountain tops in that region. The Cordevole unites with the Val Forsa some twenty miles east of the Adige Valley, the Val Forsa connecting with the Adige at the town of Lavia, six miles north of Trent. To cut in behind the Austrians south of Trent would, of course, have created havoc with the entire Austrian forces in the Trentino, but, as stated, the defensive possibilities of the situation are so formid-

able that success would appear almost beyond the realms of actuality.

On the Isonzo front the fighting all along continued on a large scale. An idea of the immensity of the struggle is suggested by the Austrian estimate in January, 1916, that Italian casualties had passed the million mark. Exaggerated as this number was regarded in allied circles, it showed Austria-Hungary's opinion of the severity of the fighting in what was considered a subsidiary theatre of the Great War.

The railroad situation on the Isonzo front is, as in practically all modern military situations, of primary strategic importance. The Istrian Peninsula is served by three lines, each of which runs to Austrian bases of supply. One runs up the valley of the Isonzo, through Gorizia and Tolmino and through the Hochein Tunnel to Vienna. At Gorizia a branch leaves this line, running southeast, and connects Gorizia with Trieste across the Carso Plateau. The second line comes from the east from Laibach through San Pietro, where a branch runs south to Fiume, and the third comes north from the Austrian naval base at Pola. Gorizia is served by the northern road from Vienna, from Trieste by the main line, and by the branch just described. Supplies from Vienna would be stopped by cutting the road anywhere north of Gorizia. But to shut off Trieste as a source, both of the southern rail communications must be cut. Early in June, 1915, the Italians forced a passage of the Isonzo at Plava and at Monfalcone, and cut the railroad at these two points. Gorizia then continued to be supplied only by the Trieste branch. Nor was Trieste itself cut off, as the road from Laibach through San Pietro continued open. The only way to isolate Istria was to take the San Pietro junction, and this was the ultimate aim of the operations at that region.

The Italian objective in Istria was, of course, Trieste. In order to advance on Trieste the Italians must be secured from a flank attack, and Gorizia, which is a strongly fortified bridge-head, would be directly on their flank. Therefore, it must be either captured or masked before an advance to the south could be started. Gorizia, too, was important for another reason. It

was the point which the Austrians had chosen to be the center of their first main line of defense. If it fell, not only was the way open for an advance on Trieste, but the entire Austrian line to the north and south was jeopardized through the fact that, with the center pierced, both wings were exposed to flank attacks, and would have to retreat or be rolled up and defeated in detail. In other words, the fall of Gorizia would uncover Austria's entire Isonzo line, and, although there might be some subsequent resistance in the mountains to the north, the giving way of the line would be inevitable.

Gorizia, however, as has been shown, stands in the front rank of strong natural defensive positions. The foothills of the Julian Alps descend sharply to a plain near where the Isonzo issued from the gorge which it has cut through the mountains. The line between the plain and the mountains is sharp and clearly marked. There is no gentle tapering off of one into the other. This line between the hills and plain is somewhat irregular in shape and incloses a pocket in which Gorizia is situated. It is not unlike a huge elliptical stadium. At the north end, level with the ground, is Gorizia, with the Julian Alps mounting on all sides. The southern bank is constituted by the plateau of the Carso, in which is situated the town of Doberdo. Thus the plain of Gorizia is surrounded on three sides by elevations which serve as admirable watchmen for the city beneath. Just across the Isonzo from Gorizia are the town and spur of Podgora, which absolutely command the city and prevent an Italian attack from that side. With Podgora completely in Italian hands, it is difficult to see how Gorizia could hold out. From Podgora the depots, barracks, and supply houses of Gorizia are within artillery range of guns of all calibers, and the environs of Podgora have changed hands several times.

To the north of Podgora, at a distance of between two and three miles, is a second series of heights—the heights of Oslavia, which also dominate the bridgehead. These the Italians rushed in December, 1915, so the heights northwest of Gorizia continued in Italian hands. To the south, on the Carso Plateau, the Italians also pushed forward. The heights on the edge of the plateau—

San Michele and San Martine di Carso—came into Italian hands. The fortifications of Gorizia—temporary field fortifications—are not at all like the more modern fortifications of Europe, which, previous to the shelling of Liege and Namur, were considered almost impregnable. They are more nearly like the little town of Ossowetz on the Bobr River, which held out against the German 42-centimeter guns for over six months, and was then evacuated only because its defenders were flanked out. There was very little concrete in the Gorizia defenses, which were mostly earthworks formed into terraces on which the guns were mounted. Many of these gun positions have been destroyed, but Gorizia has continued to hold out despite the desperate attacks of the besiegers.

Because of the natural defensive strength of the line less men have been used by Austria on this front than in any other theatre of the war. When war between Italy and Austria broke out the Austrians had already commenced the vast operations which flung Russia from the Carpathians and behind Lemberg. The men were therefore not available in sufficient numbers to defend the line of the Isonzo, otherwise it is likely it would have remained intact from the outset, and the Italian forces would never have been able to force their way through Flava and Monfalcone. That Austria harbored little anxiety regarding her Italian frontier likewise appears from her relinquishment of the Russian offensive to begin operations in the Balkans. Whether a real Italian offensive at any time was among her military plans will remain doubtful till events make the situation clear. Austria would appear to have little to gain from a conquest of Italian provinces in which her former rule brought her the deep and ordained resentment of the Italian people.

During the month of January, 1916, the southern theatre of war was comparatively quiet. The forces under General Cadorna maintained their offensive on the Isonzo without any decisive revolt taking place. There was considerable bombardment of the bridgeheads at Tolmino and Gorizia. In the Gorizia sector the Austrians attacked the Italian positions at Oslavia, capturing 900 men and inflicting severe losses in killed and wounded.

Determined attacks by the Italian troops followed, and the positions were again transferred to Italian hands. At the end of this month an official résumé covering Italy's entrance into the war and the operations of the Italian army in the intervening months was issued at Rome. In this official communiqué it was estimated that 30,000 Austrian prisoners, 5 guns, 65 machine guns, and a large quantity of war material had so far been captured by the Italians from the Austrian forces. Twenty-five Austrian divisions, totaling about 425,000 men, were said to have been massed along the Italian frontier at the beginning of the war.

CHAPTER VIII

MOVE AGAINST GERMANY

A ROYAL decree was issued at Rome on February 11, 1916, prohibiting the importation into Italy or transit through Italy of all German and Austrian merchandise, as well as the exportation of all merchandise of German or Austrian origin through Italian ports. This was the formal recognition of a policy that had been followed out with increasing strictness since hostilities commenced, but which had never been officially declared. The declaration of war by Italy against Austria carried with it the prohibition of trading with Austro-Hungarian subjects, and announcement had been made in the Italian press of prosecution of persons on the charge of trading with the nation's enemy. The coupling of the German Empire with Austria-Hungary in this royal decree was the first formal act on the part of Italy in the way of making it clear that all commercial relations with Germany were suspended. This was in accordance with the general policy of cooperation among the Allies, whose disjointed action had hitherto seriously hampered the conduct of the war.

It was also decided by the Italian Government on February 16, 1916, that warmer commercial relations with the allied nations

THE ALLIES OCCUPY THE GREEK PORT OF SALONIKI

VIEWS FROM THE DARDANELLES, GALLIPOLI AND
SALONIKI, ALSO THE BLACK SEA PORT OF TREBIZOND



British soldiers are watching an air duel as if it were for their entertainment, in spite of the fact that shells from the aeroplanes burst close by



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Embarking the stores at Suvla Bay, Gallipoli, two days before the British and French forces evacuated their positions at this part of the peninsula and removed the troops to Salónica



Copyright, American Press Association

A dugout shelter at West Beach, Gallipoli. These men enjoyed a well-earned rest in safety, though shells were falling all through the night



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Landing British troops at Saloniki, the Greek port occupied by the Allies
as a base for their Balkan operations



French stores of corn and hay at Saloniki: On the eastern fronts the armies are often compelled to use ox-drawn carts instead of modern motor trucks for transportation

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Indian troops spreading mud on the tent roof of a British field hospital station at Salónica. The mud cover is meant to conceal the tent from hostile airmen



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Turkish shells bursting near the wreck of the British destroyer "Louis," in the Dardanelles, but missing their mark. An English officer with a telescope is nonchalantly watching the poor gunnery of the enemy. The "Louis" ran on rocks and broke in two.



The Black Sea port of Trebizond, Turkey, an important objective for the Russian armies in their advance toward Constantinople from the east

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should be cultivated. In pursuance of this policy a program was mapped out covering the following five years, during which period machinery, raw materials, and manufactured articles destined for the development of existing industries or the creation of new ones could be imported free of any duty if their origin was in allied or friendly countries. In this way it was aimed to disintegrate the commercial domination of Germany which had been built up by the efforts of a generation. It was felt that by this method efforts on the part of Germany and Austria-Hungary to recapture lost Italian import trade would be rendered futile. During this same month announcement was made regarding the third Italian war loan. This was declared to have reached on February 6, 1916, 3,000,000,000 lire, which, together with former loans, showed that altogether 5,000,000,000 lire had been contributed. Considerable satisfaction was expressed at this result. It was conceded that in the realm of finance, in which Italy had been considered weakest, the country had done remarkably well. Considering that Italy not long ago was considered one of the poorest nations of Europe, bearing taxes out of all proportion to her wealth, and that even now she had been enjoying but half a century of national independence, the showing was full of promise for the future. In general, it was held that Italy had revealed herself in a character different from that which had been made traditional by the criticisms of foreigners.

Not only on the declaration of war had the traditional "Latin temperament" shown itself to be surprisingly calm and self-possessed, but various other traits were revealed that militated against the conventional view. When hostilities began on the Austro-Italian frontier the stroke of the fateful hour found Italy prepared to the last button and the last man. An organization that was the fruit of years of toil had been built up, ready for action on any frontier. That such action would be first needed on the frontier of a former ally could not have been foreseen. But within a very short time Italy was mobilized, and her prompt efficiency made it possible at once to carry the war on to Austrian territory, where it has since been waged.

On the last day of the month of February, 1916, Italy took still another step which showed her prepared to burn all her boats as far as Germany was concerned. On that date the Italian Government requisitioned thirty-four large German steamers interned in Italian harbors. A total of fifty-seven German and Austrian vessels were in Italian ports at the beginning of the war. The Austrian ships were seized by Italy when war was declared on the Dual Monarchy. No action had, however, been taken in regard to German vessels. Their status in the ports of Italy had been regarded as parallel to that of German vessels which remained in American ports after war began. This led to a certain amount of heartburning among the friends of the Allies, who pointed out that it was in line with the Italian policy of maintaining commercial relations with Germany as far as they could be maintained. Rumors had also been rife regarding alleged secret agreements that had been made with the German Government.

These rumors were gradually dissipated by the successive measures taken by the Italian Government and the requisitioning of the German interned vessels revealed her as in full co-operation with the Allies. There were also other considerations that weighed with Italy. The submarine had revealed itself as a powerful destructive weapon, and the toll taken by it of allied ships was a heavy one. It was seen that the transfer of German vessels to the flag of Italy and their use by the Allies would do much toward relieving the congestion of goods at American docks which were awaiting shipment to the allied countries. The loot of German vessels then in Italian ports and their tonnage formed a formidable total. They were as follows: At Ancona, *Lemnos*, 24,873 tons; at Bari, *Waltraute*, 3,818; at Cagliari, *Spitzfels*, 5,809; at Catania, *Lipari*, 1,539; at Genoa, *Hermesburg*, 2,824, *König Albert*, 10,484, *Moltke*, 12,325, *Prinz-Regent Luitpold*, 6,595; at Girgenti, *Imbros*, 2,380; at Leghorn, *Amalfi*, 1,756, *Termini*, 1,523; at Licata, *Portfino*, 1,745; at Naples, *Bayern*, 8,000, *Marsala*, 1,753, *Herania*, 6,455; at Palermo, *Algier*, 3,127, *Catania*, 3,000, *Tunis*, 1,833; at Savona, *Bastia*, 1,527; at Syracuse, *Albany*, 5,882, *Ambria*, 5,143, *Barcelona*, 5,465, *Katter-*

turm, 6,018, *Mudros*, 3,137, *Sigmaringen*, 5,710, *Italia*, 3,498; at Venice, *Samo*, 1,922, *Volos*, 1,903; at Massowah, *Aspemfell*, 4,361, *Borkum*, 5,645, *Choising*, 1,657, *Christian X*, 4,956, *Ostmark*, 4,400, *Persepolis*, 5,446, *Segovia*, 4,945, and *Sturmfels*, 5,660. All these were at the end of February, 1916, put into the service of the Allies, compensating in some degree for the losses suffered by each of these nations from mines and the deadly submarine.

CHAPTER IX

RENEWED ATTACKS—ITALY'S SITUATION AT THE BEGINNING OF MARCH, 1916

DURING the month of February, 1916, the war on the Italian front continued with bitterness but without decisive result. Early in the month the Austrians attacked the heights of Oslavia northwest of Gorizia, capturing 1,200 men and several trenches. Several days later the Italians achieved some results after weeks of hammering in the Sugana Valley. They captured the mountainous region of Collo and also occupied the towns of Roncegno and Romchi. By this new acquisition of territory the Italians came almost within striking distance of one of their chief objectives in the war—the city of Trent—which lies, protected on the northeast and north by a line of forts, fifteen miles west of the conquered terrain. Meanwhile several aerial attacks, which had been fitfully chronicled since the beginning of the war, brought anxiety to the coast towns of Italy. Venice with its arsenal was visited more than once. In February, 1916, hostile aeroplanes bombarded the town of Setio, fifteen miles from Vicenza, killing six persons, wounding many others, and doing considerable material damage. The aerial attack on Setio was the third reported in one week on Italian cities, following raids on the districts of Ravenna and Milan. Setio is in northeastern Italy, fifteen miles south of the Austrian border, and fifty miles northwest of Venice. On February 14, 1916, Austrian aeroplanes

dropped bombs on Rimini, but were chased to the east by the fire of antiaircraft batteries.

In the last week of February, 1916, a report that Durazzo, an Albanian port on the Adriatic Sea, had been evacuated by the Italian troops was confirmed. The Italian brigade stationed there had been withdrawn, it was officially declared. The Italian troops were drawn back in company with Serbians, Montenegrins, and Albanians. Men and horses were gathered together, revictualed, and transported with light losses in the midst of grave difficulties, by the combined action of Italian and allied warships and Italian troops along the Albanian coast. When the evacuation was completed by the departure of the Albanian Government from Durazzo, the Italian brigade assigned to the city began a retreat, which was accomplished according to plan despite serious attacks from the Austrian forces, which advanced as far as the isthmuses to the east and north of Durazzo. The fall of the city of Durazzo resulted from the defeat of the Italian and the Albanian forces under Essad Pasha, the provisional president. A strong line of outer defenses for the city had been constructed and the indications were that a spirited resistance would be offered. The Austrian and German forces attacked at daybreak. The defenders were soon ejected from their positions at Bazar Sjak. Soon afterward the Italians on the southern bank of the lower Arzen were forced to abandon their positions. The Austrians crossed the river and proceeded southward. At noon a decisive action east of Bazar Sjak drove the Italians from strong positions. The same fate was suffered by the defenders of Sassa Baneo, six miles east of Durazzo. By the evening of February 23, 1916, the entire outer girdle of defenses was taken. The attackers, advancing to the inner line positions, established the fact that the Italians were embarking their troops hurriedly. The final result was that the only position held by Italian troops in the Balkans was Avlona in Albania. The situation was viewed with much concern in Italy, where the ambition was to make the Adriatic an Italian sea. It was an unsatisfactory result of a series of operations in which Italian interests were vital, but in which Italians had taken but a

negligible part. The conquest of most of the territory north of Greece had left the Austro-Germans with a large army released for work elsewhere. French and British were intrenching strongly at Saloniki, backed by a powerful fleet. The Italians still held Avlona. Greece remained neutral, but was filled with resentment against the Allies, who were repeatedly violating her territory. Bulgaria, flushed with victory, now held her strong army in leash. Serbia and Montenegro had gone down before the invader. Rumania was resisting every effort whether by threat or force or cajolement to lead her into war. The situation called for the most serious consideration from Italy and her allies.

During February, 1916, M. Briand, the French Premier, was the guest of the Italian Government in Rome, where he had gone with the object—the words are M. Briand's—"of establishing a closer and more fruitful cooperation between the Italians and their allies." Political cooperation was complete, he declared, but military cooperation on their part had been admittedly less so, and that was the supreme want of the moment. Italy rightly hesitated to embark on adventure, but in order to secure her political aims her primary object was identical with that of her allies, namely, to break down the military strength of the Central Powers. For this purpose it was necessary to strike together, and strike at the enemy's heart. The world knew what Italians wanted, and meant to get—the Italian Trentino and Trieste; but frontal attacks were costly, as General Cadorna had discovered, and the Italian strategist had not yet said his last word.

The fate of Trieste might perhaps be more quickly decided on the Danube than on the Isonzo. There was a general agreement that an error had been committed by the Allies in letting the Central Powers cross the Danube into Serbia. Except along the 250-mile gap between the Adriatic and the Serbo-Rumanian frontier, the Central Powers were blockaded either by ships and soldiers or by neutral territory. Opinions differed as to where the Allies should strike to reach the heart of Germany, but there were many who thought that the first offensive should be to close the gateway into the Balkans by reconquering Serbia and cutting the com-

munications between the Central Powers and their allies. Time would show what the allied Governments meant to do, but if this intention was to get back to the Danube half a million men would be required at Saloniki with an equal force in reserve.

It was generally admitted that the territorial ambitions of Italy had been seriously checked by the development of Austrian strength. The war as originally planned on the Austro-Italian frontier was to be one of swift movement in the direction of Trieste and Dalmatia; with the gradual cooperation of the Balkan nations and a general invasion into the interior of Austria. Until, therefore, decided headway could be made on the Isonzo front and Gorizia had fallen, a feeling-out movement would appear the best to be followed. The Italian people were learning to accept the delay with philosophic resignation. The axiom of Napoleon was recalled that it was always the unsuspected that happened in war, and events in the other fighting areas enabled them to grasp the difficulties of the situation on their own border.

Already in February, 1916, the conquest of Montenegro and the capture of Mount Lovchen, long the nightmare of Italian statesmen, by the Austrians, began to be less a subject of anxiety. Serious blow as it was to Italian prestige, it did not appear irreparable. Even before, Austria had already a magnificent series of natural harbors in the Adriatic. But it was argued that Austria had not a sufficiently strong fleet to take advantage of the new wonderful natural harbor now entirely in her possession. The chief perils lay in the formidable obstacle to naval activity formed by Mount Lovchen, with 305-mm. guns mounted on its summit and in the facile use of the Bocca di Cattaro as a submarine base from which to harass the Italian fleet. Italy, it was recognized, was contending with geographical disadvantages everywhere, but in the Adriatic more than elsewhere, owing to the peculiarly tame configuration of her coast line. As compared with that on the eastern side of the Adriatic the contrast was great.

Nature had, indeed, been lavish in her gifts to Austria in this direction. Deep water inlets forming natural harbors, which

at the present time are invaluable as harbors for warships or as submarine bases, are to be found all along the Dalmatian coast.

Tajer, Zara, Lesina, Lissa, Curzola, Maleda, Sabbioncello, Grayosa, and Sebenico are almost in themselves sufficient to counterbalance any numerical disparity between the Austrian and Italian fleets. Several of these natural harbors have of late years been transformed, at enormous expense, into naval ports and strongly fortified. Millions have been spent on Sebenico, and it has been so fortified as to be absolutely impregnable from the sea, even the rocks facing the harbor having been cased in ferroconcrete and turned into forts. The claim of Venice to be mistress of the Adriatic belongs to a remote age; it has long since been ousted by Pola, which has gradually been developed into one of the strongest naval arsenals and ports in the world. Similarly the whole coast line of Dalmatia is fronted by a chain of islands, round which submarines can receive supplies and lurk in absolute security. In the rear of these islands is a succession of navigable channels through which a war fleet can pass under cover from Pola to Cattaro. The Italian coast line is the very antithesis of the Austrian. Between Venice and Brindisi, the whole length of the Adriatic, there is not a single natural harbor. But, said the Italians:

“What is the good of a fine stable without horses?” Italy had the ships, Austria the harbors: it remained to be seen which would win out.

The bearing of all this on the question of Italy’s cooperation with the Allies in the Balkans is apparent. It had been frequently remarked that the Dalmatian coast line was likely one day to bring on a European war, for its possession is of vital interest to Italy. Austria, with twelve naval bases and all the natural advantages of coast line in her favor, is in a far stronger position than Italy. How can Italy hope to occupy the Dalmatian coast? There was and is a considerable diversity of opinion in Italy as to the wisdom of an over-sea expedition in addition to the occupation of Avlona in Albania. At one moment it was suggested that in view of the preponderating call on the military resources of the country in the areas of operations on the Isonzo,

in Carnia, Cadore, and the Trentino, it would be wiser to withdraw for the time being from Avlona. But it would seem as though Italy is bound to see the thing through. The place has been put into a state of comparative impregnability. Italy is well aware that her line of communication must remain more or less at the mercy of the Austrian fleet operating from Pola and the naval bases along the coast. She would need very material assistance from the allied fleets, and her part in the Balkan operations would appear therefore to depend on cohesive action among the allied admirals. The loss of Avlona would inflict a blow on the prestige of the Allies paralleling that of the Gallipoli débâcle. Yet at the end of February, 1916, the Austrians, advancing along the coast in conjunction with Bulgarians coming from Monastir, would appear to be making Avlona their objective. Austrian success would make the Adriatic a *mere clausum* to the allied fleets and cripple Italy in one of her chief arms of defense and offense.

PART III — CAMPAIGN IN MESOPOTAMIA


CHAPTER X

OPERATIONS AGAINST BAGDAD AND AROUND THE TIGRIS

THE British campaign in Mesopotamia during the first year of the war had been generally successful. After the capture of Basra in November, 1914, the Delta country was cleared of the enemy and the safety of the oil fields assured. A period of quiet followed, broken only when the Turks took the offensive, which failed, in April, 1915. Late in May the British won a decisive victory over the Turkish troops at Kurna. In July, 1915, the ill-fated expedition against the enemy forces guarding Bagdad was planned. Later, after the failure in the Dardanelles, it was necessary to attempt something spectacular that would restore British prestige in the Orient, and this could be accomplished by the capture of Bagdad.

The British position in regard to Persia had become difficult. It was known that the German Ambassador at Teheran, Prince Henry XXXI of Reuss, was scheming with Persian tribes and Persian statesmen and politicians, and also trying to win over the armed police and their Swedish officers. Russia and Great Britain had established this police system to protect the highways from brigands, and Swedish officers had been chosen to command them because they might be counted on not to favor Russian or British interests.

The mountain tribes on the Turko-Persian border were in a state of unrest and seemed to be only waiting an opportunity to show their hostility toward the foes of Germany and Turkey.



THE BAGDAD RAILROAD

The Swedish-led gendarmerie were also more than suspected by the British of having been won over by German agents. The Russian army in the Caucasus meanwhile was accomplishing little or nothing, while the Turkish forces in part were extending toward the Persian highlands, with the purpose, it was suspected, of joining with the Swedish-led rebels and mountain tribes. The Turks and intriguers in Persia evidently thought the time ripe for a quick conquest of Persia, as the main Russian armies in Poland were not in a position to interfere. It seemed to the Turks and their German advisers that the hour was propitious to send forward an army that would drive the British-Indian Expeditionary Force out of Mesopotamia.

Sir John Nixon had no adequate forces at his command for the proposed task of capturing Bagdad, having only at his disposal one division of Indian and British troops, and a brigade or so in reserve with which to attack the Turkish army that was daily increasing in numbers.

The most implacable foe that the British troops had to contend against was the climate. It was found impossible to march more than eight miles a day and after sundown. The heat in the tents at times varied between 128 and 130 degrees Fahrenheit. With burning sand underfeet, and scorching rays of the sun from above, blood dried up in the body, the brain became inflamed, followed by delirium, coma, death. It was impossible for the white soldiers to perspire unless they were near marshes where they might quench their intolerable thirst in the brackish waters. Owing to the lack of fresh vegetables and improper food, the rations of bully beef and hard-tack, and the assaults of blood-sucking insects, many deaths occurred. Even the Northwest Indian troops, accustomed to the desert and life in a hot climate, suffered intensely in Mesopotamia. It is necessary to consider the climatic conditions the British forces had to contend with in this country to understand why their progress was necessarily slow, and why so many men fell by the way.

The attempt to capture Bagdad was much criticized when projected, and since, as being foolhardy, and likely to fail, and in any case not worth the great loss of men it must entail. But the

British-Indian Expeditionary Force was in a position where it must take a gambler's chance and stand to win or lose. To capture the city of the Caliphs would in the first place greatly impress the Mohammedan population and restore British prestige, which had sadly suffered through the Dardanelles failure. And it was necessary that the British troops should act promptly and without counting the possible cost, for every hour's delay permitted the Turks and their allies to grow in strength.

To the British, Bagdad was of importance. It was needed as a base at the head of navigation. It would enable them to prevent Turkish troops from traveling over Persian highways, and, most important of all, it would afford the British opportunities to check Mohammedan organization and subdue attempted risings.

General Townshend, who commanded the division that was sent forward to attempt the capture of Bagdad, had all the odds against him. His small force, consisting of two-thirds Indian and one-third British troops, was hopelessly inadequate for the projected campaign. It was known that the Turks were well equipped with guns of superior power, and that they were directed by German officers, assisted by German engineers; that the very able German officer Marshal von der Goltz was in charge of operations. When it is considered that the Turkish force was three times as strong in numbers as General Townshend's, the British general's advance on Bagdad seemed foredoomed to failure. His only hope lay in delivering a swift defeat to the Turks before their reenforcements could arrive from the Caucasian front, a movement which began about the middle of September, 1915.

Before an advance could be made on Bagdad it was necessary for the British to defeat a large Turkish force at Nasiriye and at Kut-el-Amara, where the British captured fourteen guns and about 1,000 prisoners, losing in killed and wounded 500 officers and men. The Turkish trenches were destroyed and within a small area about 900 Turkish dead were counted.

The British troops, having fought in an atmosphere of 130 degrees, were thoroughly exhausted when they encamped in Nasiriye. Like most Arab towns, the place was in such a filthy condition that it required weeks to clean it up and make it habitable

for Europeans. Meanwhile the British troops lived in tents and enjoyed a much needed rest. It was stated that fully 95 per cent of the men were in such a state of exhaustion as to be quite unfit for active service. If the Turkish commander in chief had known of this, the reinforcements he had dispatched from his base at Kut-el-Amara might easily have compelled the British force to retire. Fortunately for the British, the Turkish reinforcements encountered on the way the routed Turkish army of the Euphrates and evidently heard such tales of the fighting powers of the British and Indian soldiers that they joined the fugitives in their retreat.

At the close of August, 1915, Nasiriye had been made habitable by the British engineers and a large part of the force departed for Amara on steamers and barges, most of the soldiers wearing only a waist-clout and still suffering from the intense heat, as they crouched under the grass-mat shelters that had been provided. The garrison left in the town to keep the Arabs in order suffered from swarms of flies, heat, fever, and dysentery, and would have welcomed a Turkish attack if only that it might afford some variety to their monotonous life.

During this time General Townshend, from his base at Amara on the Tigris, was moving his heterogeneous collection of vessels up the river and had begun friendly negotiations with the powerful tribes of the Beni Lam Arabs, who held most of the land between the Tigris and the northern mountains, and much territory on the southern side of the river. Here stretched out a desert waste between Amara and Kut-el-Amara, occupied by powerful confederations of fighting Bedouins, the Abu Mohammed tribes, known by their black tents, who moved about the British base on the river; the Makusis tribes, who fought as light cavalry on the side of the Turks, and the Abu Dir Diraye Arabs, who were ready to fight on any side that promised the most booty. For religious reasons their priests urged the Arabs to fight against the infidels, but the Britons had enjoyed considerable prestige in Mesopotamia; thousands of Arabs calling themselves English subjects and claiming the help of the British Consul in Bagdad when they were in difficulties.

A fighting league with the great federation of Beni Lam was greatly to be desired by the British, for it would enable them to use freely a considerable stretch of the Tigris, and secure safety from attack from both banks. The Beni Lam by siding with the English, whose recent victories had not failed to impress them, hoped to gain new grazing territory from their rivals who fought with the Turks, so an alliance was formed and ratified by the Sheiks of the confederation, and Sir John Nixon, Commander in Chief; Sir Percy Cox, British Resident in the Persian Gulf, and General Townshend commanding the troops at Amara.

The British were under no illusions regarding the Arab character, having learned from some bitter experiences just how much the wily nomads were to be trusted. As long as the British were victorious they might count on the Arabs' allegiance, but in case of defeat he was more than likely to turn about and fight with the enemy. The alliance between the British and the Beni Lam Arabs was of problematic value, but it was worth while under the circumstances. It was better to secure their friendship even temporarily, for the Arabs had been a constant source of trouble from the time the British Expeditionary Force entered Mesopotamia. Fighting to them was a pastime rather than a serious business, and whenever the struggle became deadly they would very likely disappear. A veritable nuisance to the British force were the Arabs who hung around the skirts of the expeditionary force and amused themselves by reckless sniping.

Conflicts with mounted bands offered no difficulties, for having no artillery they would disappear among the dunes to be located later by British aeroplanes, and could then be hunted down by columns of infantry. When aeroplanes were not available, it was impossible to follow their movements. Having perfect mounts they could afford to laugh at a cavalry charge.

"They would simply melt away into thin air," wrote an officer at the front, who had led a charge against these sons of the desert. "They are a quaint mixture," he adds: "some of them being distinctly gallant fellows, but the greater part are curs and jackals and will never take you on unless they are at least three, or four, to your one. Incidentally, they have the pleasant

habit of turning on the Turks (for whom they are nominally fighting) and looting and harassing them as soon as they (the Turks) take the knock from us, and as a consequence the Turk does not much care about having a real scrap with us."

Sometimes the Arabs led the British into desert wastes where they could get water from hidden springs known only to themselves, and where the British soldier, who literally traveled on his water bottle, suffered tortures from thirst under a heat that dried up the blood in his veins. In some of these attempts to round up Bedouin marauders the British lost a number of men because the water supply gave out. These conditions will explain why in so many dispatches sent by General Townshend from the front, it was stated that he had to fall back on the Tigris because his troops lacked water. In such parts of the country where it was possible to employ armed motor cars and even the best Arabian steed could be run down, the Bedouins found their old tactics of little account and were inspired with a wholesome fear of the British soldier. Portable wireless apparatus used by airmen and troops, and scouting aeroplanes, made difficulties for the elusive Bedouins whose methods of desert warfare had not changed in centuries. So it happened that in proportion as British fighting methods and British resources became known and feared by the Arab in Mesopotamia he grew more and more wary of running into danger, unless the odds were altogether in his favor. What the German and Turkish officers endured from their Arab allies will probably never be known, but on more than one occasion when the British won a victory and the Turks were in retreat, the Arabs were active in despoiling the fugitives and then made off with their loot, and with the new rifles and equipment they had been supplied with by the Turks or Germans.

Being accomplished robbers, the Arabs were constantly making raids on British stores under cover of the night and were generally successful. On one occasion a party of eight got by the pickets and crawled into the regimental slaughterhouse. But they had not counted on modern science. There were mines planted outside the door and every Arab who was a robber was killed.

CHAPTER XI

ADVANCE TOWARD BAGDAD—BATTLE OF
KUT-EL-AMARA

THE advance toward Bagdad was begun in the middle of September, 1915, but owing to the constantly changing conditions in the bed of the Tigris, which hindered the progress of vessels, and the necessity for constant reconnaissances of the river region, it was not until the last of the month that the British force, consisting of only four brigades, reached the vicinity of Kut-el-Amara.

Nuredin Pasha's troops occupied a strong position near the Kut, with carefully constructed intrenchments protected by large areas of barbed-wire entanglements and supported by considerable heavy artillery. The British camp was about ten miles away from the Turkish position. They were weaker in men and in guns than the enemy. The heat was overpowering. The British lost some men on the way to this camp and others continued to drop out from heat exhaustion.

On September 23, 1915, two British brigades advanced to within sight of the Turkish tents, while their principal camp was pitched on the south bank of the Tigris. The British steamers took up a position between the two armies in readiness to shatter a surprise attack. It was discovered when the two brigades made a demonstration against the enemy on September 25, 1915, that the Turks had thoroughly mined all the southern bank of the river, which caused the British commander to alter his plans of attack.

On the night of September 27, 1915, the two brigades, leaving their tents standing to deceive the Turks, crossed the Tigris by a flying bridge. It is said that this dummy camp which a Turkish division was facing was the direct cause that enabled the British to win a victory. If the Turks had concentrated all their forces on the north bank of the river the British attack would undoubtedly have failed. It was the absence of the divi-

sion facing the empty tents from the real battle field that caused them to lose the day.

In order to understand the magnitude of the British victory it is necessary to describe the seemingly impregnable character of the Turkish defenses. There were twelve miles of defenses across the river at right angles to its general direction at this point—six miles to the right and six miles to the left. The works on the right bank had been strengthened by the existence of an old water cut. The banks at this point were from ten to twenty feet high and afforded excellent facilities for viewing the deployment of troops advancing to attack. A strong redoubt on the extreme right opposed any flank movement that might be attempted in that direction. On the left bank the line of defenses was separated by a heavy marsh about two miles wide, so that from the left bank of the river there were, first, two miles of trenches, then two miles of marsh, and then two miles of defenses. It was evident that much labor had been expended in preparing these defenses, showing the skilled hand of German engineers. Each section of the successive lines of trenches was connected by an intricate network of communication trenches. Along these complete lines of water pipes had been laid.

It was known that the Turkish army holding this strong position had been largely reenforced by the arrival of fresh troops from Nasiriye, and the Turkish commander in chief, Nuredin Pasha, may well have believed that victory would crown his arms that day and that the British expeditionary force would be annihilated. There was no lack of confidence in the British camp either, though it was known that the Turks were vastly superior in numbers to their own army. For, despite some hard lessons learned from the enemy, the British soldier considers himself a superior fighter to the Turk, and is always eager for an opportunity to prove it.

If the Turks had made their position almost impregnable on land, they had neglected nothing to prevent the British from gaining any advantage on the Tigris. The river was blocked at different points by lines of sunken dhows, while across the water,

and a little above it, was stretched a great wire cable. Special care had been taken to protect the Turkish guns from being destroyed. Each one of them was placed in such position that nothing less than a direct hit by a howitzer shell could damage it.

On September 26, 27, and 28, 1915, a column under General Fry, by ceaseless effort day and night, had managed to work its way up to within four hundred yards of the Turkish barbed-wire entanglements, round what was known from its shape as the Horseshoe Marsh. The troops went forward slowly under continual shell fire and hail of rifle bullets, digging themselves in as they advanced. The British guns in the open could not check the Turkish artillery, which increased in intensity as the British troops continued to advance. The nature of the ground was decidedly to the advantage of the attackers, for at intervals there were deep, firm-bottomed trenches that afforded excellent cover. If the Turks had been provided with good ammunition the British would have lost vastly more men than they did. It is said that the Turkish shrapnel was of such poor quality that the British troops passed unscathed through it, only being wounded when they were hit by cases and fuses. All told, the British suffered ninety casualties in this attack on the enemy round the Horseshoe Marsh. The main object of this operation was to hold the Turkish attention at a point where they hoped to be attacked while more important work was going forward elsewhere.

A second column under General Delamain, which had crossed the Tigris from the south side, marched all night of September 27, 1915, and reached their new attacking position on a neck of dry land between two marshes where the Turks were intrenched at five o'clock in the morning of September 28, 1915. Advancing cautiously for a mile between the two marshes, Delamain's column came in sight of the enemy's intrenchments. Before the fight opened General Townshend directed General Houghton to lead a detachment of Delamain's force around the marsh to the north and make a flank attack on the Turkish intrenchments. That Nuredin Pasha should have left his northern flank exposed to a turning movement appeared to some of the British officers at the time as a piece of incredible stupidity;

but it developed afterward that the Turkish commander knew perfectly well what he was about. The open road around the marsh was a skillfully prepared trap. A carefully concealed Turkish brigade that had escaped the observations of the British airmen lay behind the ridges near the most northern marsh. But the Turkish surprise did not come off as they expected, for General Houghton's column moved forward so swiftly through the dark around the marsh that, at 8.20 a. m., he was ready to send a wireless message to his superior officer announcing that he had reached the left rear of the Turkish lines. Everything now being ready for a general attack, General Townshend proceeded to give battle. Since sunrise on September 27, 1915, the fleet on the river, consisting of armed steamers, tugboats, launches, etc., had been firing on the main Turkish position. Attempts made by H. M. S. *Comet*, leading a flotilla to get in near to the shore at the bend of the river and bombard the Turks at close range, were a failure. For the enemy quickly noted this movement and dropped shells so fast on the British vessels that they were compelled to retire. Some boats had been struck by Turkish shells, but the damages were not serious. Later some armed launches were able to creep near to the Turkish field batteries, and about noon their guns were silenced and the gunners killed or dispersed. The British shore batteries did some effective work, but the Turks succeeded in getting in one shot that killed two gunners and wounded a number of others. It was the only shot, and the last, that caused any British loss of life.

During most of the long hot day General Fry's brigade occupied a position in front of the Horseshoe Marsh, subjected to a constant shower of shells from quick-firing guns. It was evident that the enemy artillery was manned by Germans, for the firing showed speed and accuracy. It was an advantage to the British that the enemy had no airmen to scout and spot for them, and consequently there were few casualties as the result of the almost continuous deluge of shells poured forth by the Turkish guns. Early in the morning the Turks discovered that the British camp was a dummy, and a division crossing the Tigris by means of a flying bridge dashed into the fight. A counterattack was

made against General Delamain by the greater part of this fresh division.

The British column which was operating between what were known as the Suwada Marsh and Circular Marsh started its assault between eight and nine o'clock in the morning. The British had concentrated all their available artillery between the marshes, and under the protection of the guns and the supporting fire of Maxims and musketry a double company of the 117th Mahrattas made a headlong charge on the Turkish trenches. The daring Indians suffered great losses, not more than half the number who had set out reaching the Turkish trenches, into which they dashed intrepidly and bayoneted their way along them, causing heavy losses to the enemy. A double company of Second Dorsets was now sent against the Turkish trenches, and after meeting with desperate resistance they succeeded in entering the enemy's deeply dug line. The rest of the battalion followed a little later, joining their comrades in the captured position.

General Houghton's leading troops now came into action around the rear of the Circular Marsh. The Turks' northern flank had been stormed, but they still held desperately to their southern flank, from which they poured a devastating stream of shells against the British troops that caused many casualties.

General Houghton's troops had had little rest since the previous day, but they were cheered by the prospect of success, and with the Oxfords leading they entered the fight, and after four hours of continuous struggle surrounded and destroyed or captured the enemy force. The Turkish troops, concealed in deep ditches protected from the scorching rays of the sun by grass matting, fought on with dogged determination and were with difficulty dislodged. The British troops exposed to the pitiless heat, and exhausted from lack of sleep and from having had no water since the previous day, suffered terribly and could not possibly have held out much longer if the Turkish resistance had not collapsed.

General Delamain, commanding the victorious columns, had made a night march from the dummy camp on the Tigris, and

his soldiers and horses also suffered from thirst, having been forced into action before it was possible to renew the water supply.

In the afternoon of the same day, September 28, 1915, General Houghton's exhausted troops were furiously attacked by the Turkish division that had crossed the Tigris at nine o'clock in the morning, while a force of Turkish cavalry at the same time attempted an outflanking charge.

The British troops beat off the Turkish horsemen and infantry and endeavored to reach the river, which was over a mile to the rear of the Turkish intrenched forces at Horseshoe Marsh. Exhausted with weariness, consumed by a feverish thirst, the gallant troops were swept by showers of shrapnel from heavy Turkish batteries stationed near the Kut just when they were nearing the longed-for river that promised relief for their sufferings. It was impossible for them to continue in that unprotected position, and reluctantly the troops turned back from the inviting waterway and struggled back to the Suwada Marsh, where General Delamain's force was concentrated. The filthy marsh water was undrinkable, but it could be used to cool the superheated jackets of the guns and thus keep them in a condition for action. After nearly fourteen hours of continuous fighting and marching the troops at last had an opportunity to take a short and much-needed rest.

At 5 p. m. a wireless message was received from General Townshend ordering a combined attack on the Turkish lines around Horseshoe Marsh. General Delamain's column was ordered to move forward to the rear of the enemy's position, while General Fry's column, which had been moving toward the Turkish center, was directed to hold back until Delamain had reached the appointed place.

Behind Nuredin Pasha's main position the two brigades under General Delamain and General Houghton, skirting the Suwada Marsh, struggled once more to gain the river. Suddenly, out of the dust clouds that obscured the view for any distance, appeared a Turkish column about a mile to the west marching almost parallel with the British force, but a little behind it. It

is related by one who was present that this sudden appearance of the enemy so close at hand, and marching in the open, had such a stimulating and heartening effect on the exhausted and thirst-stricken British troops that they forgot for a time all about the river toward which they were eagerly pressing, and, dashing forward, charged the Turks with the bayonet and routed them before they had time to recover from their surprise or could fire more than a few wild shots. The British captured all the enemy guns and pursued the enemy fleeing toward the river, shooting them down as they scattered, and only ceasing their destructive work when darkness fell and the few living Turks had escaped over their bridge of boats on the river.

The combat here had not lasted more than an hour, and the British brigades, now that the excitement was over, were too exhausted to proceed any farther and bivouacked on the ground near the scene of their victory.

It was hopeless now to attempt to continue the encircling movement, which was started at five o'clock, owing to the darkness and the condition of the men. Some time during the night Nuredin Pasha, having evacuated his fortified position, moved his troops across the Tigris to the southern bank and, by forced marches, reached Shat-el-Hai. From there he proceeded to Azizie, where, for the defense of Bagdad, extensive fortifications had been constructed. It was evident from the rapidity of his movements that the Turkish commander was afraid of being overtaken by the British forces, for in two days he had marched his men sixty-five miles toward Bagdad.

The Turkish forces made good their retreat, and so General Townshend, who had accomplished some remarkable successes at the beginning of the battle, was deprived of a decisive victory. He had evidently planned the battle on the impulse of the moment and when it was impossible to secure an adequate water supply. His men fought with courage and determination, but tormented by thirst and worn out from loss of sleep it was physically impossible for them to accomplish more than they did. It was a bitter blow to General Townshend that the Turks had been able to retreat in good order. The importance of such a vic-

tory could not be overestimated. It meant the conquering of entire Mesopotamia as far as Bagdad, and the moral effect of such a success on the Arabs and tribesmen would have greatly raised British prestige in that region.

An attempt was made to give chase to the fleeing Turks on the river during the night, when Lieutenant Commander Cookson, the senior naval officer, with his ship, the destroyer *Comet*, and several other smaller vessels set out after them. The Turks fired on the boats from the shore, and the *Comet*, which had steamed in close to the bank, was assailed with hand grenades by the enemy. A strong, thick wire had been stretched across the river, attached to sunken dhows, and it became necessary to remove these obstructions before an advance could be made. A vivid description of the heroic death of Lieutenant Commander Edgar Christopher Cookson, D. S. O., R. N., who won the Victoria Cross for his bravery at this time, is given in a letter home by one of his crew of the destroyer *Comet*: "Just as it was getting dark our seaplane dropped on the water alongside of us and told Lieutenant Commander Cookson that the Turks were on the run, but that a little farther up the river they had placed obstructions across, so that we could not pass without clearing it away. This turned out to be the liveliest time that I have had since we began fighting. It was very dark when we started off, the *Comet* leading, and the *Shaitan* and *Sumana* following. When we got around the head of land the Turks opened fire with rifles, but we steamed up steadily to the obstruction. The Turks were then close enough to us to throw hand bombs, but luckily none reached the deck of our ship.

"During all this time we weren't asleep. We fired at them with guns and rifles, and the *Shaitan* and *Sumana* were also blazing away. Our troops ashore said it was a lively sight to see all our guns working.

"We found that the obstruction was a big wire across the river, with boats made fast to it. An attempt to sink the center dhow of the obstruction by gunfire having failed, Lieutenant Commander Cookson ordered the *Comet* to be placed alongside and himself jumped on to the dhow with an ax and tried to cut

the wire hawsers connecting it with two other craft forming the obstruction. He was shot in seven places and when we dragged him over his last words were: 'I am done; it is a failure. Return at full speed!' He never spoke afterward. We had six wounded, but none seriously."

The adventure which had cost the British the loss of a brave officer was not a failure, as this writer concludes: "We must have frightened the Turks, because on going up the river again about daybreak (after we had buried our commander) we found the Turks had cleared out and retired farther up the river. So we steamed up after them and when we reached Kut-el-Amara we found the army there." The friendly but keen rivalry that existed between the two services is amusingly shown in the seaman's final comment, "This is the first place that the army has got ahead of the navy."

A little later the gunboats were ordered to pursue the fleeing Turks. The *Shaitan* and the *Sumana* grounded on uncharted mud banks and were unable to proceed, but the *Comet* continued on its way and forced the Turks to leave several dhows behind them laden with military stores, provisions, and ammunition.

Kut-el-Amara, the Arab town which General Townshend was to make famous in history, was occupied by the British troops on September 11, 1915. It is situated on a bend of the Tigris and is 120 miles from Bagdad by road, and 220 miles by water. The retreating Turkish army made a stand a little to the west of Azizi, which is forty miles to Bagdad by road and about four times that distance by water. The object of the Turks in taking up a position at this place, it was discovered later, was to enable their engineers to prepare near Bagdad the most elaborate and scientifically arranged system of fortifications that had so far been constructed in Mesopotamia.

When the British Expeditionary Force began to threaten the "City of the Caliphs," it was evident that the Turks had found it possible to extend the Bagdad railway line, by means of which Nuredin Pasha received fresh troops to reenforce his army, brought hurriedly down out of Syria. For when the British force reached Azizi on October 13, 1915, it was known that the Turkish

commander had recently received some thousands of fresh troops. Their presence in that part of Mesopotamia, at that time, could only be explained on the ground that with the aid of German engineers the Turks had been enabled to complete railway communications, an important fact that seems to have been unsuspected by the British military authorities, and which might lead to serious consequences for the already outnumbered British force. Until the beginning of November General Townshend's division remained here, part of the Turkish force being intrenched about four miles up the river. While it was expected that at any hour the Turks would attack, they did not attempt the offensive with any strong force, but skirmishes between the opposing troops were of frequent and almost daily occurrence. The British infantry were busy many days digging intrenchments, and every preparation was made by the British general to make his position impregnable. With shore batteries and a number of armed steamers and armored boats on the river, it was hoped that the Turks would make a grand attack. Why they did not when they had four times the number of men as the British was inexplicable. Some such move was necessary if they hoped to restore the confidence of their Arab allies, which was said to be wavering. The recent British victory had, perhaps, made the Turkish commander doubtful of his troops, for no serious offensive against the British position was attempted.

About the middle of October, 1915, General Townshend received some reenforcements who had fought their way along the river, constantly harassed by Bedouins and hostile tribesmen, reaching the British position in a thoroughly exhausted condition. Even with the arrival of the reenforcements General Townshend's force numbered little more than a complete division, and a small reserve. During the stay at Azizi it was rumored that a large contingent of troops was on its way from India to strengthen the force at this place.

As time passed and nothing more was heard of these promised reenforcements the small British army settled down with grim determination to make the best of their situation, but there was a general feeling among them that the Government

had not acted fairly by them in not sending help. It was evident that the Indian and British Governments were imperfectly informed as to the strength of the enemy's forces and of the means whereby they could fill up the ranks when depleted by battle. This is the only explanation or excuse that could be made. At no time did General Townshend's force number more than four brigades, which, under the circumstances, was wholly inadequate to accomplish the conquest of Bagdad.

General Townshend being thrown on his own resources proceeded to act with extreme caution, for the whole fate of the British Expeditionary Force hung in the balance. It was not a time to take venturesome risks, for he could not spare a man. The Turks, fortunately, showed no disposition to attack in force, but they resorted to methods of guerrilla warfare.

The Turks had only left one brigade to hold their advanced position, the remainder joining the forces established in the new fortifications near Bagdad.

The rear guard remaining near Azizi did not allow the British to forget their presence. They were well equipped with guns and at frequent intervals sent shells into the British camp without, however, doing much damage. Along the river they were strong enough to hold back the British gunboats. For a time General Townshend pursued the policy of watchful waiting, but one dark night toward the close of October, 1915, the opportunity arrived for an operation which promised success. Two brigades were sent out to make a long detour, with the object of getting behind the Turkish position. This, it was expected, would take most of the night. At sunrise it was proposed that another brigade should make a frontal attack on the enemy. The Turks, however, were not to be caught napping. Their outposts, far flung into the desert, soon gave warning of the attempted British enveloping movement, and they were in full retreat with most of their stores and guns before the British force could reach their main position. The Turkish retreat in the face of superior numbers was the logical thing to do under the circumstances, and from the manner in which the movement was conducted it was evident that it had been prepared for in advance. The brigades


of British and Indian troops that had been sent forward to make a frontal attack on the Turkish position now embarked on the miscellaneous flotilla of boats on the river to pursue the retreating foe. The attempt was not successful, for, owing to the condition of the river which abounded in mud banks not down on the chart, the British boats were constantly sticking fast in the mud or grounding on shoals. Such slow progress was made that the pursuit, if such it could be called, was abandoned.

British seaplanes and aeroplanes meanwhile had been scouting around Bagdad and keeping a watchful eye on the Turkish lines of communication that extended up the river toward the Caucasus heights, and across the desert in the direction of Syria. The difficult task set before the small British force was to break its way through to Bagdad, where it was hoped it would be joined by the advanced columns of the Russian army in the Caucasus. Early in November, 1915, General Townshend knew that a Russian advanced column was rapidly forcing its way down the border of Persia by Lake Urumiah. In a more southerly direction a second column was on the march to the city of Hamadan, 250 miles from Bagdad. It was hoped that the small British force would smash the Turks at Bagdad and the Germano-Persian Gendarmes Corps be vanquished at Hamadan, after which it would be no difficult task for the troops of Sir John Nixon to link up with the army of the Grand Duke Nicholas. These far too sanguine hopes were not destined to be fulfilled.

CHAPTER XII

BATTLE OF CTESIPHON

GENERAL TOWNSHEND having captured the village of Jeur on November 19, 1915, marched against Nuredin Pasha's main defenses which had been constructed near the ruins of Ctesiphon, eighteen miles from Bagdad. Ctesiphon at the present time is a large village on the Tigris, once a suburb of ancient



THE RUSSIAN ADVANCE THROUGH PERSIA

Seleucia, and the winter capital of the Parthian kings. The vicinity is of great historic interest. About thirteen centuries ago Chosroes, the great Persian emperor, erected a vast and splendid palace, said to be the greatest on earth in that period, and of which the ruins are still standing near the marshy edge of the river. Neither the ravages of time, nor the devastations of the destructive Mongols who swept the country in ages past could obliterate this palatial memorial to the genius of Persian architects. The ruins of the palace at Ctesiphon contain the greatest vaulted room in the world, and its battered walls, grand in decay, stand to-day an enduring monument to the invincible power of Islam in the days of Mohammed. For one of the first of the well-known achievements of the army of the Arabian prophet was the capture of Ctesiphon and the burning and despoiling of the palace of the Persian kings.

Nuredin Pasha was well aware when he selected his defensive position near the ruins of this memorial to the valor of Islam in ancient days, that every Turk, Arab, and tribesman of his troops was familiar with the story, and he doubtless hoped that its memory might inspire the descendants of the Prophet's army to fresh deeds of valor for the honor of Islam.

Around this ruin the Turks had constructed their position, on the right bank of the river and on the left. For miles around the country was perfectly flat and devoid of cover of any description. A network of deep and narrow trenches stretched back to within a short distance of the River Dialah, six miles to the rear, which flows into the Tigris at this point. The earth from the trenches had been carried to the rear, and there were no embankments or parapets of any kind. Along the entire front a thick barbed-wire fence had been set up.

The hard-fought action at Ctesiphon must rank as one of the greatest battles in which the Indo-British army has ever been engaged. The troops were in an emaciated condition through constant fighting, first in excessively hot weather, and afterward suffering intensely from the cold, which made the nights unendurable at this time of the year in Mesopotamia. In such a physically weakened condition did the Indo-British troops engage

the vastly stronger forces of Nuredin Pasha at Ctesiphon. An officer who participated in the battle describes in a letter home some of the striking incidents of that important action.

"Morning of the 22d of November, 1915, found the troops in readiness to attack, stretched out on the wide plain facing the Ctesiphon position, the troops detailed for the frontal attack nearest the river. As soon as dawn broke the advance commenced. The left of the columns marching against the enemy's flank were faintly visible on the horizon. The gunboats opened fire against the enemy's trenches close to the left bank. The field artillery drew in and pounded the ground where they imagined the trenches must be, but there was no reply, nor any sound of movement at Ctesiphon until the lines of advancing infantry got within 2,000 yards of the wire entanglements. Then, as by signal, the whole of the Turkish line broke into a roar of fire, and we knew that the struggle had commenced.

"Under the heavy artillery fire the attack pushed in toward the enemy with a steadiness which could not have been beaten on parade until effective rifle range was reached, where a pause was made to build up the strength. The fight for the trenches from now on until the British succeeded in reaching the first line of trenches baffles description. The gallant advance across the open ground, the building up of the firing line, the long pause under murderous rifle fire, while devoted bodies of men went forward to cut the wire, the final rush and the hand-to-hand fighting in the trenches, are stories which have been told before. No description could do justice to the gallantry of the men who carried it out.

"Meanwhile, the flank attack had crushed the enemy's left and driven it back on its second line a mile or so to the rear. Courage and determination carried the day, and by the afternoon the whole of the front Turkish position, and part of the second line was in the hands of the British. The intensity of the fighting, however, did not abate. The Turks pressed in counterattacks at several points from their second position on which they had fallen back. Twelve Turkish guns were captured, taken again by the enemy, recaptured by the British, and retaken finally by the Turks, and

so the fighting went on until a merciful darkness fell, and, as if by mutual agreement, the fire of both sides, too weary for more, died away."

Nuredin Pasha's forces were numerically far superior to the British. General Townshend had only four brigades, while the Turkish commander had four divisions, and was much stronger in artillery.

The Turkish commander, who was well informed as to the strength or weakness of the British force, may well have looked forward to an easy victory. But the many successes gained by British arms during the campaign in Mesopotamia had not failed to impress the Turkish troops and the tribesmen, their allies, with a wholesome respect for British valor. If General Townshend had been reenforced by another division that might easily have been spared to him from the army that had been in training in India for ten months previous, he could have smashed the Turks at Ctesiphon and conquered Mesopotamia. As it was, the British victory was all but complete. An entire Turkish division was destroyed. They took 1,600 prisoners and large quantities of arms and ammunition. But these successes had been dearly won. Some of the British battalions lost half their men. According to the best authorities the British casualties totaled 4,567, of whom 643 were killed, 3,330 wounded, and 594 men not accounted for. According to the Turkish accounts of the Battle of Ctesiphon, which emanated from Constantinople, the British had 170,000 men in action, and their losses exceeded 5,000. This estimate of General Townshend's strength was far from the truth. At no time did the British commander's troops number more than 25,000, and 16,000 men would be a liberal estimate of his striking force.

A graphic description of what followed the battle is furnished by a letter home, written by an officer who participated in the struggle.

"The cold of the night, want of water, the collecting of the wounded, gave little rest to the men, though many snatched a few hours' sleep in the trenches among the dead. Dawn of November 23, 1915, broke with a tearing wind and a dust storm

which obscured the landscape for some hours, and then the air, becoming clearer, allowed us to take in the scene of the fight. Whatever losses we suffered the Turks must have suffered even more severely. They had fought desperately to the end, knowing that to attempt to escape over the open ground was to court instant death. The trenches were full of their dead, and here and there a little pile of men showed where a lucky shell had fallen. Ctesiphon loomed through the dust before us, still intact for all the stream of shell which had passed it, for our gunners had been asked not to hit the ancient monument.

"The early part of the morning was occupied in clearing to the rear the transport which had come up to the first line during the night. At about ten o'clock the air cleared and the enemy's artillery began to boom fitfully. Their guns from across the river began to throw heavy shells over us, and as the light grew better it developed into an artillery duel which lasted throughout the day. General Townshend during the afternoon parked his transport two miles to the rear, and while holding the front line of the Turkish position swung his right back to cover his park. In the late afternoon the artillery fire briskened, and long lines of Turkish infantry could be seen in the half light advancing against the British. The first attack was delivered against our left just after dark with a heavy burst of fire, and from then until four o'clock the next morning the Turkish force, strengthened by fresh troops that had arrived from Bagdad, flung themselves against us and attempted to break the line. On three separate occasions during the night were infantry columns thrown right up against the position at different points, and each effort was heralded by wild storms of artillery and infantry fire. The line held, and before dawn had broken the Turks had withdrawn, subsequently to reform on their third position on the banks of the Dialah River."

By November 24, 1915, the casualties had been evacuated to the ships eight miles to the rear. The British force remained on the position which they had won for another day and then withdrew toward Kut-el-Amara.

General Townshend's force reached the Kut on or about December 5, 1915, having fought some rear-guard actions on the

way, and lost several hundred men. The news had been skillfully spread about the country that the Turks had won a great victory at Ctesiphon, in proof of which it was known that the British were retreating, and that the Turkish forces were in pursuit. These facts had the usual effect on the Arabs, who had been friendly to the British, and who now deserted them to join forces with the Turks. For the wily nomads are ever ready to go over to the side which seems to be winning, for then there is promise of much loot. There is no profit in aiding lost causes or the weaker side.

An officer describing General Townshend's retreat on Kut-el-Amara through a country swarming with hostile Arabs has this to say: "It speaks well for the spirit of the troops under his command that, in the face of overwhelming numbers the retirement was carried out with cheerfulness and steadiness beyond all praise, and not even the prisoners, of whom 1,600 had been captured at Ctesiphon, were allowed to fall into the hands of the enemy. The country around is perfectly flat, covered with short grass or shrub, though here and there old irrigation channels make it difficult for carts or motor cars to negotiate. The operations above the Kut were carried out by land, though ships bore an important part in bringing up supplies and the thousand and one things required by an army in the field. An enemy report was published to the effect that the Turks had captured one of our armored trains. It will not be giving away a military secret when I say that no railway of any sort exists south of Bagdad."

How closely General Townshend was pressed by the enemy in his retreat to Kut-el-Amara is evident from an officer's letter: "We found the Turks in camps sitting all around us. We had to fight a rear-guard action all day and marched twenty-seven miles before we halted. After lying down for two or three hours, we marched on fifteen miles more to within four miles of the Kut. Here we had to stop for a time because the infantry were too tired to move."

CHAPTER XIII

STAND AT KUT-EL-AMARA—ATTEMPTS
AT RELIEF

KUT-EL-AMARA, where General Townshend and his troops were so long besieged, stands on the left bank of the Tigris, almost at the water's level, with sloping sand hills rising to the north. The desert beyond the river is broken here and there by deep nullahs which, when they are filled with water after a rainfall, are valuable defensive features of the country. Five miles from the town, and surrounding it on all sides but the waterside, is a series of field forts of no great value against heavy artillery. Had the Turks been equipped with large guns such as the Germans employed in Europe these fortifications would have been shattered to pieces in a few hours. But the forts proved useful.

The spaces between them were filled with strong barbed-wire entanglements and carefully prepared intrenchments. To the southeast the position was further strengthened by a wide marshy district that lies just outside the fortified line. General Townshend was holding a position that was about fifteen miles in circumference, to adequately protect which it would have been necessary for him to have twice as many men as were at his disposal. For one of the lessons that has been learned in the Great War is that 5,000 men, including reserves, are required to the mile to properly defend a position. General Townshend's occupation of the Kut was therefore precarious, and he could only hope to hold out until the arrival of reenforcements which had been held back by the Turks when they were within sight of the British general's position.

The Turkish success in checking the British advance and in bottling up General Townshend's troops in Kut-el-Amara had inspired them with hope and courage and the town was subjected to almost constant bombardment. Confident of the outcome the Turks fought with considerable bravery.

It was known to the Turks that reinforcements had been sent to the relief of the British commander, and they hoped to capture the Kut before these arrived. On December 8, 1915, they shelled the British position all day; the bombardment was continued on the 9th and they made some desultory attacks on all sides. From the British point of view the attitude of the Arabs at this time was satisfactory. General Townshend received encouraging news that a relieving force was pushing its way rapidly to his aid.

On December 10, 1915, the Kut was again heavily bombarded by the Turks and an attack was developed against the northern front of the position, which however was not pressed. On the day following the bombardment was continued. Two attacks made on the northern front of the British position were repulsed, the enemy losing many men.

December 11, 1915, the bombardment was renewed. The Turks reported the capture of Sheik Saad on the line of retreat, twenty-five miles east of the Kut. They also gave out a statement that the British had lost 700 men in this fight.

Heavy musketry fire marked the Turkish offensive on December 12, 1915. They attacked on the same day a river village on the right bank of the Tigris, but were repulsed with heavy casualties. It was estimated by the British commander that the Turks lost at least 1,000 men during this abortive attack.

British losses at the Kut since their return totaled 1,127, including 200 deaths, 49 from disease. Reinforcements were constantly joining the Turkish besieging army, and it was estimated that in the first weeks of December, 1915, they had been strengthened by 20,000 men. Every day the enemy's ring of steel became stronger, while the British were in such a position that if the Kut became untenable they could not retreat with any hope of success. If forced out into the open, there would be nothing left for them to do but surrender.

A sortie of British and Indian troops was made on December 17, 1915, who surprised the enemy in the advanced trenches, killed 30, and took 11 prisoners and returned without suffering any casualties.

On or about this date, on the Sinai Peninsula, a British reconnoitering party routed a hostile band of Arabs near Matruh, losing 15 men killed and 15 wounded, 3 of whom were officers. The Arabs had 35 killed and 17 taken prisoners.

On December 24, 1915, the Turks having made a breach in the north bastion of one of the Kut forts succeeded in forcing their way in, but were repulsed, leaving 200 dead. On Christmas Day there was fierce fighting again at this point, when the Turks once more entered through the breach and were driven out with heavy losses.

The garrison consisting of the Oxford Light Infantry and the 103d, being reenforced by the Norfolk Regiment and 104th Pioneers, drove the Turks back over their second line of trenches and reoccupied the bastion. The total British losses in the fighting on Christmas Day were 71 killed, of whom three were officers, one missing, and 309 wounded. It was estimated that the enemy lost about 700.

The Turks continued to bombard the Kut almost hourly, but the only serious damage effected by their fire was when on December 30, 1915, shells burst through the roof of the British hospital and wounded a few men.

General Aylmer's leading troops under General Younghusband of the British force sent to relieve the besieged army at the Kut left Ali Gherbi on January 4, 1916. Following up both banks of the Tigris, British cavalry came in contact with the enemy on the following day. These advanced Turkish troops were on the right bank of the river and few in number, but farther on at Sheik Saad, the enemy in considerable strength occupied both sides of the river. On January 6, 1916, the British infantry attacked and then dug itself in in front of the Turkish position on the right bank. In the morning of the following day by adroit maneuvering, the British cavalry succeeded in getting around to the rear of the enemy's trenches on the right bank and destroyed nearly a whole battalion, taking over 550 prisoners.

Among the number of captives were sixteen officers. Several mountain guns were also taken. The British casualties were heavy, especially among the infantry.

The remainder of General Aylmer's force having advanced from Ali Gherbi, January 6, 1916, fought a simultaneous action on the left bank of the river while the action on the right bank just described was in progress.

Early in the afternoon of this day the British forces were subjected to heavy rifle and Maxim fire from the Turkish trenches 1,200 yards away. The hazy, dusty atmosphere made it difficult to see with any accuracy the enemy's defenses. Their numerous trenches were most carefully concealed. Toward evening the Turkish cavalry attempted an enveloping move against the British right, but coming under the fire of the British artillery, that move failed. Finding the resistance of the Turkish infantry too strong, the British troops abandoned any further offensive and intrenched in the positions they had won. Later in the evening the Turks suddenly evacuated their defenses and retired. A heavy rainfall hindered the British commander from pursuing, and a stop was made at Sheik Saad to enable him to get his wounded away. The Turks finding that General Aylmer did not pursue, fell back on Es Sinn, from which they had been ousted by General Townshend in September of the previous year. The Turkish version of the Battle of Sheik Saad estimated the British losses at 3,000.

On January 12, 1916, the Turks advanced from Es Sinn to the Wadi, a stream that flows into the Tigris about twenty-four miles from Kut-el-Amara. Here the British relieving force came in touch with the enemy on January 13, 1916, and a hotly contested struggle ensued that lasted all day long. The British force consisted of three divisions. One of these, occupying a position on the south bank of the Tigris, was being opposed by a column under General Kembell. On the northern bank General Aylmer's troops engaged two divisions in the neighborhood of the Wadi.

On January 14, 1916, the Turkish army began a general retreat and General Aylmer moved his headquarters and transport forward to the mouth of the Wadi. On the day following the whole of the Wadi position was captured by the British relieving force, and the Turkish rear guard again took up a position at Es Sinn. It was reported that German officers were with the Turkish force.

Further military operations against the Turks were delayed by storms of great violence that continued for about ten days. General Aylmer found it impossible to move his troops through the heavy mire, and not until January 21, 1916, could he advance and attack the Turks who after their retreat occupied a position near Felahie, about twenty-three miles from Kut-el-Amara. Here a brisk engagement was fought in the midst of torrents of rain that greatly hindered operations. The struggle was indecisive. Owing to the floods, General Aylmer could not attack on the following day, but took up a position about 1,300 yards from the enemy's trenches.

Mr. Edmund Candler, the well-known English writer, who was with the British troops operating on the Tigris, furnishes some striking details of the engagement. His picturesque description of what took place at this point in General Aylmer's advance to relieve the besieged army at the Kut, shows the desperate character of the Turkish resistance:

"The Turks were holding a strong position between the left bank of the Tigris and the Suweki Marsh, four miles out of our camp. It was a bottle-neck position, with a mile and a half of front: there was no getting around them, and the only way was to push through.

"We intrenched in front of them. On January 20, 1916, we bombarded them with all our guns and again on the morning of the 21st preparatory to a frontal attack.

"At dawn the rifle fire began, and the tap-tap-tap of the Maxims, steady and continuous, with vibrations like two men wrestling in an alternate grip, tightening and relaxing." It was not light enough for the gunners to see the registering marks, but at a quarter before eight in the morning the bombardment began. "The thunderous orchestra of the guns shook the earth and rent the skies. Columns of earth rose over the Turkish lines, and pillars of smoke, green and white and brown and yellow, and columns of water, where a stray shell—Turkish no doubt—plunged into the Tigris.

"The enemy lines must have been poor cover, and I was glad we had the bulk of the guns on our side. All this shell fire should

have been a covering roof to our advance, but the Turk it appears was not skulking as he ought.

"The B's came by in support and occupied an empty trench. They were laughing and joking, but it was a husky kind of fun, and there was no gladness in it, for everyone knew that we were in for a bloody day. One of them tripped upon a telegraph wire. 'Not wounded yet!' a pal cried. Just then another stumbled to an invisible stroke and did not rise. A man ahead was singing nervously, 'That's not the girl I saw you with at Brighton.'

"I went on to the next trench where a sergeant showed me his bandolier. A sharp-nosed bullet had gone through three rounds of ammunition and stuck in the fourth, during the last rush forward.

"I could conceive of the impulse that carried one over those last two hundred yards—but as an impulse of a lifetime; to most of my friends this kind of thing was becoming their daily bread. The men I was with were mostly a new draft. I could see they were afraid, but they were brave. Word was passed along to advance to the next bit of cover.

"The bombardment had ceased. The rifle and Maxim fire ahead was continuous, like hail on a corrugated roof of iron. The B's would soon be in it. I listened eagerly for some intermission, but it did not relax or recede, and I knew that the Turks must be holding on. The bullets became thicker—an ironic whistle, a sucking noise, a gluck like a snipe leaving mud, the squeal and rattle of shrapnel.

"I found the brigade headquarters. We had got into the Turkish trenches, the general told me, but by that time we were sadly thin, and we had been bombed out. At noon the rain came down, putting the crown upon depression. All day and all night it poured, and one thought of the wounded, shivering in the cold and mud, waiting for help. At night they were brought in on slow, jolting transport carts."


The writer met a boy, the only officer of his regiment who had come out of the trenches alive and unwounded, and who had a bullet through his pocket and another through his helmet. He was in a dazed state of wonder at finding himself still alive.

"It was a miracle that anyone had lived through that fire in the attack and retreat, but the boy had been in the Turkish trenches and held them for an hour and a quarter. Oddments of other regiments had got through, two British and two Indian. I saw their dead being carried out during the truce of the next day."

The boy officer's regiment had been the first to penetrate the enemy's trenches. As he dropped into the trench a comrade next to him was struck in the back of the head and dropped forward on his shoulder. "I saw eight bayonets and rifles all pointing to me," said the boy officer describing his experiences. "I saw the men's faces, and I was desperately scared. I expected to go down in the next two yards. I felt the lead in my stomach. I thought I was done for. I don't know why they didn't fire. They must have been frightened by my sudden appearance. I let off my revolver at them and it kicked up an awful lot of dust."

The British troops that had charged the Turkish trenches were not supplied with bombs, but the enemy were well equipped with them. Consequently the British were gradually driven down the trench from traverse to traverse, in the direction of the river, where they encountered another bombing party that was coming up a trench at right angles. The British were placed in a desperate position, being jammed in densely between these attacks, and literally squeezed over the parapet. In evacuating the trench they were subjected to a deadly fire in which they lost more men than in the attack.

The uniform flatness of the terrain in this region and entire absence of cover for the attacker, whether the movement be frontal or enveloping, was responsible for the heavy losses the British incurred in this engagement. Here there were no protecting villages, hedges, or banks. A swift, headlong rush that could be measured in seconds was impossible under the circumstances. At 2000 yards the British infantry came under rifle fire, and had no communication trenches to curtail the zone of fire. An armistice was concluded on January 21, 1916, for a few hours, to allow for the removal of the wounded and the burial of the dead. In forty-eight hours the Tigris had risen as



THE BRITISH CAMPAIGN IN MESOPOTAMIA

high as seven feet in some places and the country around was under water, which effectually prevented all movements of troops by land.

General Townshend meanwhile, besieged at Kut-el-Amara, continued cheerfully to repel attacks and to await the arrival of the relieving force. He was well supplied with stores, and there was no fear of a famine. He described his troops at this time as being in the best of spirits. Evidently he was not in a position to be of any assistance to the relieving force, whose advance had been delayed by the storms. At the close of January, 1916, he reported that the enemy had evacuated their trenches on the land side of the Kut defenses, and had retired to a position about a mile away from the British intrenchments.

The floods of January, 1916, were a distinct benefit to General Townshend, for the Turks, intrenched in a loop of the Tigris, were driven out by the deluge and compelled to seek higher ground.

In the first days of February, 1916, Sir Percy Lake, who had succeeded Sir John Nixon to the chief command of the British forces in Mesopotamia, dispatched General Brooking from Nasariyeh with a column up the River Shatt-el-Har, a branch of the Tigris, to make a reconnaissance. On February 7, 1916, on his way back, General Brooking was attacked by hostile Arabs near Butaniyeh. He was also attacked by tribesmen who had been considered friendly to the British and who issued from villages along the route. There was some sharp fighting in which the losses were heavy on both sides. The British had 373 men killed or wounded, while the Arab dead numbered 636. On the 9th a small punitive expedition was sent against the treacherous tribesmen, and four Arab villages were destroyed. The incident offered another striking proof that no dependence could be placed on the faith of the Arabs.

General Aylmer finding, after his failure at Felahie, that his force was too weakened physically to attempt to break through to relieve the beleaguered division at the Kut, decided to intrench in the position then occupied by his troops and to await the reinforcements which were on the way.

On February 17-19, 1916, hostile aeroplanes dropped bombs on the Kut, without doing any damage, General Townshend reported. For two and a half months the British army had been bottled up in this river town, and the Turks had tried every means to dislodge them.

On February 22, 1916, British columns under General Aylmer advanced up the river on the right bank to Um-el-Arak, occupying a position which commanded the Turkish camp behind their trenches at El Henna, a marsh on the left bank. At day-break the British guns opened a heavy bombardment on the enemy's camp across the Tigris, which at this point makes a sharp bend to the north. The Turks were evidently taken by surprise, for a lively stampede followed and there were many casualties. The confusion in the Turkish camp is thus described by an eyewitness: "A few seconds after the first shell burst among their tents a stream of transport animals—horses, camels, donkeys, and mules, some with riders and others riderless—came galloping across the plain to within 2,500 yards of the position, a marsh to the north curtailing their line of flight. Our gunfire executed heavy toll on the retreating horde. The Turkish guns opened fire on us, but were soon silenced. Our casualties during the day were insignificant.

"Just before daybreak, a British column encountered a small Turkish cavalry patrol which they rounded up in a bend of the river. Roused by the barking of the village dogs they made a gallant charge straight at our advanced guard of infantry, firing as they rode. They swerved at our rifle fire, and broke through the column farther to the left, leaving more than half their number on the field. We raided a hostile Arab camp which harbored them, and carried off sheep and grain."

On March 6, 1916, General Aylmer marched up the Tigris to the Turkish position at Es Sinn, which is only seven miles from Kut-el-Amara. This is a Turkish stronghold and was carried by General Townshend on his way to the Kut. The position had been greatly strengthened since that time, and General Aylmer could hardly have hoped to succeed in driving the enemy out. But the effort had to be made, and resulted in a failure. The

enemy lost heavily according to the British accounts, while their own casualties were unimportant. The Turkish version of the struggle was as follows:

"On the morning of March 8, 1916, the enemy attacked from the right bank of the Tigris with his main force. The fighting lasted until sunset. Assisted by reinforcements hastily brought to his wing by his river fleet, he succeeded in occupying a portion of our trenches, but the latter were completely recaptured by a heroic counterattack by our reserves, the enemy being then driven back to his old positions.

"In the trenches the enemy left 2,000 dead, and a great quantity of arms and ammunition. Our own losses were small."

Owing to the lack of water, General Aylmer was forced to fall back on the Tigris. On March 10, 1916, information reached the Tigris corps that the Turks had occupied an advanced position on the river. The following day a British column was sent to turn the enemy out. The British infantry daringly assaulted the position and bayoneted a considerable number of the Turks, after which the column withdrew with two Turkish officers and fifty men as prisoners.

General Townshend's position at Kut-el-Amara remained unchanged. For ninety days his army had successfully resisted all attempts of the besieging Turks to capture the town. The desperate efforts made by the relieving force under General Aylmer, and their almost constant repulses, when within gunshot sound of the Kut, must have given the besieged some anxious moments. General Townshend described his army at this time as being in cheerful spirits. He was constantly in touch with the British military authorities, and frequently British aeroplanes brought him small necessities, and even such luxuries as gramophone needles and garden seeds.

PART IV.—THE WAR IN AFRICA

CHAPTER XIV

THE CAMEROONS

DURING the months of 1915 the British and French forces in the Cameroons were pressing steadily forward toward Yaunde, where the Germans had established their provisional capital after Duala was evacuated in September, 1914.

The advance of the allied forces was necessarily slow, for the physical character of the country offered the enemy every advantage, and strongholds had been established with German thoroughness in difficult and almost inaccessible places. It was necessary also to proceed with caution because of the treachery of the natives, who at times displayed intense hostility toward the expeditionary force.

On October 9, 1915, a British contingent advancing from their base at Edea captured Wumbiagassen after a hotly contested struggle that lasted almost continuously for thirty hours. A French force that was pressing forward toward the capital of the colony, took Sende on the Durja-Yaunde railway on October 25, 1915, after a brisk fight in which they lost only a few Europeans. The casualties among the native troops in this engagement were 25 killed and 79 wounded. It was reported that the enemy had lost heavily. In this fight, and in the struggle at other places, it was common for the enemy to remove their dead and wounded from the scene while the action was going on, so that it was difficult at times for the allied forces to form a correct estimate of the German casualties.

The French force which had captured Sende continued to advance, and on October 30, 1915, Eseka was taken, and after re-

pairing the railroad here, which had been wrecked by the Germans, the French troops continued their advance toward Yaunde.

Anglo-French forces captured Tobati on November 3, 1915, driving out the Germans with considerable losses. Banyo and Bamenda were occupied a few days later, and a strong and almost impregnable position which the Germans held on a summit south of Banyo Mountain was stormed and taken by a British force after a very desperate struggle. A British officer, who participated in this exciting military exploit in which the expeditionary force displayed great heroism, has described in a letter, written just after the action, some of the dramatic scenes of that eventful day, when the German stronghold was stormed on November 6, 1915. It is the story of brave deeds, and though small forces of men were involved, the campaign in the African colonies affords no more striking example of the dogged persistence of the British soldier in the face of difficulties than this struggle in an obscure corner of the world. This officer's letter fails to specify any particular individual for special praise, perhaps because all the British troops fought with the same unity of purpose and bravery.

"The two columns under Major Mann and Brigadier General Cunliffe advanced on Banyo, respectively from Gashaka and Kentsha. To capture Gandua Pass, Major Mann's column had to surmount difficult physical obstacles, but the surprise and the successful rout of the enemy holding the pass created a great moral effect on the garrison of Banyo, and no doubt materially affected our success.

"After leaving Dedo, a perfect barrier of mountains lay before us. Climbing up a steep and narrow mountain path, it took us from 4.40 a. m. till late in the afternoon to reach the plateau. There we found an admirably prepared enemy position which could never have been forced except by a wide turning movement.

"The next few days our advance was across a series of open rolling grasslands, totally uninhabited; the few prepared enemy positions on isolated kopjes were successfully turned, and the

parties of the enemy opposing were driven back with no loss to our side. Eventually, nearing Banyo, we got into helio communication with Major Mann's column and made a simultaneous entry into Banyo itself.

"The whole garrison of Banyo (consisting of 23 Europeans and 200 natives and three Maxims) then took up their position on a range of rocky hills some three miles away; this range of hills culminates in a precipitous height, on the top of which was the main enemy position."

The fort at Banyo was well constructed, some 200 yards long and 120 yards wide, and could have been easily defended. Yet the Germans had made no effort to hold it. When the British troops occupied the fort a number of native chiefs came to pay their respects and to profess their loyalty.

"From Banyo," the officer writes, "the enemy's position on the mountain looked grim and stupendous, huge rocky boulders standing out prominently conspicuous up to the very top, and the sides of the mountain were bristling with strongly built 'sangars.'

"It seemed hard to ask brave British officers to lead their men against such a formidable position, but, notwithstanding, they and the troops were extremely eager to have a try.

"We commenced our attack early on the morning of November 4, 1915. The infantry advancing from four different directions, covered by the fire from our three guns, worked their way up slowly and doggedly foot by foot; climbing over rocks and tearing their way through the thorny scrub and long grass under a heavy rifle fire and Maxim gunfire, from the enemy's 'sangars' and the concealed snipers among the rocks.

"By the evening most of the companies had managed to struggle half way up the steep, there getting what shelter they could from the incessant fire of the enemy, aided by the light of fire-balls and rockets. Officers and men, exhausted and drenched by the rain, hung on determinedly to the ground gained."

At daybreak of November 5, 1915, the British troops resumed their upward climb and reached a position directly under the fire line of the enemy's "sangars." Here they were not only sub-

jected to a hot rifle fire and Maxim gunfire, but the enemy threw down great rocks and dynamite bombs. The latter exploding with terrific report, caused more consternation than serious damage. Throughout the day the British continued their climb toward the summit, capturing a small stone redoubt and here and there a "sangar."

The British were short of gun ammunition, and could not afford their men the covering artillery fire that they needed. Fortunately, a convoy arrived before the day was over, bringing more artillery ammunition, and after that the gunfire became more intense. As the British troops approached the summit, it became dangerous to continue the fire, and the last stages of the upward climb was made by them entirely unaided by the guns.

It was dark at 5 p. m., and a few hours later a terrific storm broke over the mountain. Heavy firing, and the explosion of bombs and fireballs continued. It seemed doubtful whether the British, exhausted by their steep climb, and from lack of sleep, would ever reach the summit. The 6th of November, 1915, dawned mistily. The enemy's fire had become intermittent. As the mist scattered before the sun, a white flag could be seen fluttering from the top of the summit.

"The Germans occupying such a strong and well-prepared position," writes this officer, "believing no doubt that the place was invulnerable, had put up a strong resistance and contested every yard of the ground.

"Intelligence received and confirmed shortly afterward informed us of the fact that the enemy, completely demoralized by the advance of our men despite heavy losses, had during the night of November 5-6, 1915, broken up into small parties and scattered in several directions. Knowing the ground thoroughly, the majority of the enemy parties had managed to worm their way down the hill without being intercepted by our infantry, only to run up against the detached posts of our mounted infantry, who were guarding all the roads in the vicinity.

"These enemy parties, on running into our mounted infantry, fired a few wild shots and scattered into the long grass which

covers the whole country, and where it is difficult to follow up and capture them."

The Germans had built mud houses that were comfortably furnished, and had neglected nothing that would contribute to their welfare. There were two fine cement-built reservoirs of water; caves converted into granaries filled with mealies and guinea corn, and live stock and chickens in large numbers.

"This was clear and conclusive proof that the Germans believed the mountain was impregnable, and their intention to either make it a *point d'appui* in the case of a reverse of their troops in the south, or, at any rate, a position they meant to hold indefinitely, and from where they could continue to worry us.

"Every possible approach up the mountain is commanded by loopholed 'sangars' and the whole defense of the position carefully thought out and arranged for. It is only due to the defective shooting of the enemy that our losses have not been far heavier."

We have quoted at some length from this description of the British operations in this part of the Cameroons because it illustrates the very great difficulties the Expeditionary Force had to contend with in the conquest of the colony. This engagement was typical of the struggle that was afoot elsewhere. The Germans contested the ground with great bravery, but their native allies, on whose assistance they were forced to rely, were not always to be trusted, especially when there were rumors abroad of British victories.

In this attack on the mountain just described, the British lost 3 officers killed and 2 wounded, while 51 of the rank and file were wounded. The enemy lost 3 officers, among whom was the commander of the German force, Captain Schipper. Two officers were wounded, and 13 captured. Of the rank and file 70 were killed on the day that the mountain summit was evacuated. Several Maxim guns were taken by the British, and quantities of rifles, ammunition, and equipment.

From the north, allied forces continued to press forward, dispersing the enemy as they advanced. From the southeast the French troops were slowly working their way toward Yaunde,

and British forces advancing from Edea were on the march for the same stronghold.

On January 1, 1916, a British force under Colonel Gorges occupied Yaunde, the capital, and the long and arduous campaign of the allied forces in the Cameroons was practically ended. German Government officials had succeeded in making their escape from Yaunde and had fled to Muni. This last refuge of the Germans on the shores of the Atlantic is the mainland of Spanish Guinea, a small rectangular enclave, washed by the ocean on the west and hemmed in by German Guinea on the three other sides.

Allied forces were at once dispatched south, west, and southwest, with the object of capturing the enemy before he could escape into Spanish territory.

On January 3, 1916, the main British column with a French column under Colonel Mayer was directed on Ebelowa, 100 miles south of Yaunde, while a strong column under Colonel Haywood moved south toward Widimenguee.

On January 8, 1916, the British commander reached Kolmaka, on the Njong River, which had been hastily abandoned by the enemy. Here Colonel Haywood found and released a number of allied prisoners that the Germans had left behind in their flight. Among the number were three French officers and noncommissioned officers and seven civilians.

On January 10, 1916, the French commander, General Aymérich, dispatched a column to reinforce General Haywood, and the advanced troops under Brigadier General Cunliffe and commanded by Colonel Webb Bowen were ordered from Yaunde to Edea.

A French column commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Faucon, on January 18, 1916, occupied Ebelowa, meeting with but slight resistance. On the same date a British column under Major Coels fought the Germans at Elabe, about twenty miles to the northeast, and driving back the enemy with considerable losses, captured thirteen prisoners.

Fighting was also reported farther south about this time at points close to the Spanish-German border, where two French

columns advancing from the coast and from the French Congo were trying to prevent the escape of the German troops into Muni.

The power of German resistance, however, was broken throughout the colony; the Germans only fought now when forced to, and then in a discouraged and half-hearted way. All their efforts were now concentrated on making good their escape into Spanish territory.

Lieutenant Colonel Haywood reached Ebelowa on January 24, 1916, and pursuing the fleeing enemy, captured Mafub seventeen miles to the south, losing twenty-two men during the engagement. On the same day a French contingent came in contact with the enemy at Ngat and lost fourteen killed and wounded.

The former German commander in chief, Zimmermann, and the former German governor, Ebermaier, about this time had made good their escape from the Cameroons and reached Muni.

On February 6, 1916, it was reported that 900 Germans and 14,000 natives had entered Spanish territory, where they were disarmed and interned. The conquest of the Cameroons by the Anglo-French forces was now complete. General Aymerich telegraphed to General Dobell on February 16, 1916, that the French had closed the frontier up to Ngoa and all the territory east of that place. The Campo column had still a few miles to traverse to close the line from the sea. Active operations were now practically ended. On Mora Hill in the north a company of natives commanded by three or four German officers were cut off from the world by a besieging force of French and British. Occupying an inaccessible position, they had been blockaded for a year and a half. This band might have held out indefinitely, for they had found no difficulty in getting provisions while they were in a position that defied attack, but learning that the Germans had given up the fight and evacuated the colony, they surrendered on February 18, 1916.

On the previous day the Governor General of Fernando Po requested Major General Dobell, commander in chief of the

Anglo-French forces in the Cameroons, to telegraph to Berlin on behalf of ex-Governor Ebermaier, informing the German Government of the latter's evacuation of the colony. This message was as follows:

Minister of Colonies, Solf.

Want of munitions compels me to leave the Protectorate and cross over into Spanish territory with all troops and staff. All the sick and wounded are in safety. The troops began to cross the frontier on the 4th. The first detachments reached the coast yesterday. The Spanish Government desires to transport to Fernando Po all those coming from the Protectorate. Negotiations on the details of internment are not completed. This report is written *en route*.

EBERMAIER.

Thus the campaign in the Cameroons was ended. It began with the advance of the British force across the border from Yola in Northern Nigeria on August 25, 1914. To the vast area already wrested from the Germans in Africa the Cameroons, with its area of 291,950 square miles, must now be added. This conquest had begun very badly for the British; Colonel Maclear's column invading the Cameroons from Nigeria had been half destroyed within a month of the outbreak of the war; but later the British more than redeemed their first failures.

General Aymerich, the commander in chief of the French forces, had shown himself to be a skilled African fighter, and his troops had displayed devotion and heroism throughout a long and arduous campaign. Nor was the Belgian contingent a negligible force. They had fought numerous engagements and furnished river gunboats, which were of great service to the Allies.

In the earlier operations the British Royal Navy had played a prominent and efficient part. One of the most remarkable of its many services during the campaign was the transport of a large French gun over a thousand miles of waterway from Morocco to batter down the forts of Garua. For the same purpose a British naval gun was taken several hundred miles by river from the Bight of Biafra and reached the scene of action in time to be of

effective service to the Expeditionary Force. With the loss of the Cameroons the Germans retained now only an uncertain hold on one colony, that of East Africa, where they were being desperately pressed by the allied forces.

CHAPTER XV

GERMAN EAST AFRICA

MEMORIES of the recent South African rebellion were revived August 10, 1915, when Colonel Maritz, one of its leaders, and indeed its guiding spirit, was captured with a few of his followers in the Portuguese colony of Angola. Maritz had been captured by the Union of South Africa forces late in February, 1915, but had escaped from prison at Windhoek a month later and fled to Portuguese territory.

General De Wet, a much less important figure in the rebellion, who, because of his reputation and international fame acquired during the British-Boer War had without reason been thrust into the foreground, was released from prison on December 21, 1915. The grim old warrior had played a really unimportant part in the rebellion, his brief campaign, if such it could be called, having barely lasted a month, in which he did little harm to anyone. His release was considered a wise measure by Boer and Briton, and likely to have a good influence in the interest of general peace in the Union. With General De Wet 118 others, who had been imprisoned for high treason, were released after paying the heavy fines imposed. By the terms of their release they were forbidden to attend or take part in public meetings, or to leave the district in which they lived without receiving permission from the authorities. This was the last chapter in the story of the abortive South African rebellion, which, but for General Botha's and General Smuts's vigorous action, might have attained formidable proportions, and imperiled British power in her African colonies and protectorates.

In German East Africa the fighting during the fall months of 1915 was of a desultory character. There were few important engagements, but many skirmishes and hotly contested struggles in which a few hundred men took part. The most bothersome foes that the British and South African troops had to contend against were German-armed native snipers, who, during an engagement, hidden in trees or stationed behind some natural or cunningly devised shelter, could do a great deal of damage with small risk to themselves.

The East African Mounted Rifles, which was made up principally of young settlers and coffee planters, suffered many losses through these invisible foes. A real fight was relished by these hardy young soldiers from the British colonies, but constant vigilance was necessary for them to escape the attentions of the snipers who, knowing the nature of the country perfectly, could appear and disappear with astonishing facility, and were difficult to locate and silence.

Of the character of the fighting in German East Africa at this time a young British colonial signalman gives a graphic description: "War as waged out here is not the hell that war in the European area is, but it is a nasty, cold-blooded business when you shoot at a man on the plain just as you shoot at a buck, and exult when you kill him because it was a good shot. The King's African Rifles are wonderful. They marched twenty miles, climbed a precipice, fought a hard battle that included a bayonet charge, and marched back, some of them wounded, and all this on a water bottle and without food.

"They are always cheerful, do not know what fear is, and no wound can depress them. I myself saw a man shot through the leg limp down the hill to his horse, feed it, and see to the girths before he thought of looking at his wound. These men all fought like demons, but the place is a natural fortress and the Germans had dug themselves in."

In other letters written home from the fighting area by these young men from the colonies the same cheerful spirit is expressed. Though death might be waiting for them behind any bush or tree, they seemed to find a certain grim joy in the cam-

paign which roused all their fighting blood. It was desperate game, in which death was too often the winner, and where the advantages were generally on the side of the enemy, but the odds did not dampen their ardor.

During the first week of September, 1915, there was some sharp fighting between the British and German troops along the boundaries of German East Africa and French Sudan. On September 11, 1915, a German force was routed with heavy casualties by a Belgian contingent in the vicinity of the Rusisi Delta. Sporadic skirmishes were numerous at this time and served to keep the British and their allies prepared and alert.

One of the most desperately contested fights of this campaign was the attempt made by a German force to capture the fort of Livingi, which was attacked at 5.30 a. m. on September 27, 1915. The Belgian garrison consisted of three Europeans and 180 native soldiers with one gun, supported by two native companies with eight Europeans and eight guns. The German force numbered 150 Europeans with 600 regular soldiers and a large number of auxiliary askari (natives), and a strong equipment of Maxim, Hotchkiss, and field guns.

The Germans and their allies fought with bravery and determination and encountered the most stubborn resistance. For nineteen hours the battle raged with varying fortunes, when the Belgians finally drove off the enemy and remained masters of the fort.

The Belgian casualties were light considering that they were greatly outnumbered by the enemy. They lost one officer killed and one wounded, with twenty-nine soldiers killed and forty-six wounded.

The Germans lost heavily, but it was impossible to make a correct estimate of their casualties, for they are said to have removed many dead and wounded from the field during the course of the struggle. The Belgians found and buried one white officer and sixty-six soldiers of the enemy's force. They also captured machine guns, rifles, ammunition, and equipment. The German troops under cover of the darkness dispersed, and the Belgian force was in too exhausted a condition to pursue.

On November 14, 1915, General Jan Christian Smuts, Minister of Defense of the Union of South Africa, who had performed loyal service to the British cause in aiding General Botha to suppress the rebellion in the Union, was appointed to the command of the expeditionary force sent to East Africa. General Smuts was unable at the time to accept the appointment, which was consequently awarded to General Smith-Dorrien, who had distinguished himself in the British campaign in Flanders. The minister of defense meanwhile began the work of recruiting for the expedition, and there was immediate and gratifying response from the men of the Union. On December 5, 1915, General Smuts was able to announce that he had all the men he required, a force of 25,000 having been raised in an incredibly short time.

There was much opposition to the expedition in some quarters. Malcontents led by General Hertzog, who had favored and encouraged the rebellion, and who were always in opposition to Generals Smuts and Botha, tried ineffectually to hamper the work of the Government in recruiting for the expedition to East Africa. It was claimed by the opposition that it was not the business of the South African Union to wage war outside the Union, whose troops should only be employed in defense of their own territory. Much the same argument had been advanced when Botha formed the expeditionary force that invaded and conquered German Southwest Africa. But the majority of the people were with General Smuts.

The party of opposition found their views so generally unpopular that they made no further attempts in public to hinder the work of recruiting for the projected expedition. General Smuts was able to convince the majority of the people that it was imperative for the safety of the Union of South Africa that German East Africa should be invaded, because the Germans were arming the natives and had fomented among them a holy war, which had for its object nothing less than the extermination of the Christians.

On December 6, 1915, a German force in East Africa which had occupied for some time the post of Kusigan, hastily fled before

the advance of a British contingent which took possession of the place.

Lake Tanganyika, the great equatorial lake between German East Africa and the Belgian Congo, was the scene of a spirited naval battle in miniature on December 26, 1915. Early in the morning of that day two British motor boats sighted the German armed steamer *Kingani* and dashed forward to attack. Fire was opened at 2,500 yards, the German guns failing to hit. The second British shot carried away the enemy's wireless apparatus, and the third hit her on the water line.

The armed steamer then turned and fled, but the motor boats being much faster quickly overhauled her. The German captain who had belonged to the *Königsberg* was killed by the fifth shot fired by the British guns. Several German officers were also killed and the vessel was surrendered. The entire engagement had lasted only twenty minutes. The speedy capture of the vessel was due to the fine gunnery of the British, who fired fifteen shots while going at full speed in a choppy sea, and hit the objective twelve times. Though in a sinking condition when captured, the *Kingani* was fully repaired within a week, and proved a valuable auxiliary to the other British vessels on the lake.

In the first weeks of January, 1916, the British forces in East Africa were successful in a number of encounters with the enemy. On January 5, 1916, a hostile party was driven off while attempting to set explosives on the Uganda railway. Two days later a British patrol came in touch with a German patrol near Maungu and forced it to retire with some losses. On the coast about the same period British troops engaged an enemy force and drove it back to the main body.

Two hostile camps near Voi on the Uganda railway about fifty miles from the German frontier were successfully attacked by two British aeroplanes, which caused much damage to the enemy.

On January 10 and 11, 1916, another German bombing party which was attempting to destroy the Uganda railway was attacked and driven off by a British patrol. In this encounter some Germans were wounded, but the British had no casualties.

Early in February, 1916, General Smith-Dorrien, commander in chief of the British and South African forces in German East Africa, was compelled through ill health to resign his position. He was succeeded by General Jan Christian Smuts, who had previously declined the command, and who now entered on his duties with the temporary rank of lieutenant general. The appointment of the minister of defense of the South African Republic was made by the British Government, and gave great satisfaction in England as well as to the majority of the people of South Africa.

On February 12, 1916, a reconnaissance in force was carried out by the British against Salaita Hill, in order to locate the enemy and ascertain his strength.

The hill was found to be strongly held, and it was discovered that the main German reserves were but a short distance away. During the engagement that was fought here the British casualties amounted to 172, of whom 138 belonged to the Second South African Brigade, which in this encounter had their first experience of bush fighting.

The post of Kachumbe was attacked on February 18, 1916, by an enemy force consisting of four Europeans and about two hundred native soldiers. The post was defended by two Europeans and about thirty-five native soldiers. During the short but obstinately contested engagement the enemy were driven off with the loss of four Europeans and fifty-three natives. The British did not lose a man.

Early in March, 1916, General Smuts began an enveloping movement around Kilimanjaro Mountain that was entirely successful. Advancing at two points from British East Africa, one force went east to the mountain and the other moved along the western side. The advance was so rapid on March 8, 9, and 10, 1916, that large numbers of the enemy in the foothills were cut off.

On March 11, 1916, an action began against the German prepared positions on the Kitovo Hills, west of Taveta, and a fiercely fought and obstinate struggle ensued that continued with wavering fortunes until midnight.

The Germans were in a strong position on hills thickly wooded and steep. Portions of these heights were taken and retaken by the British several times without any decisive results being gained. The British made a final attack with the bayonet between nine o'clock and midnight, and two parties, one led by Lieutenant Colonel Freeth of the Seventh South African Infantry and the other by Major Thompson of the Fifth South African Infantry, secured a foothold which they were able to maintain until reenforced on the following morning. Then it was seen that the German native troops were in flight toward Kahele in a southwesterly direction.

While this engagement was being fought at Kitovo, one of General Smuts's brigades was actively engaged in clearing the foothills to the northeast of Kilimanjaro Mountain where the enemy's forces had been cut off from their main body by the rapid British advance of a few days before.

Simultaneously with these actions, the strong column under Major General J. M. Stewart, moving forward from the direction of Longide, appeared on the Arusha-Moshi road in rear of the main German concentration. The Germans consequently fled southward toward the Usambara railway with the British forces in close pursuit.

On March 13, 1916, British troops occupied Moshi and then proceeded to advance on Arusha, which was believed to have been evacuated by the Germans. The numerous rivers in that part of the country were a great hindrance to the British pursuit of the enemy, who, retreating rapidly southward, was greatly assisted in his movements by being in possession of the Tanga railway.

Time revealed that the Germans had lost heavily when the British stormed the wooded heights at the Battle of Kitovo. Search of the bush-covered slopes discovered a large number of dead, and some machine guns which the enemy had abandoned in their sudden retreat.

The Germans were not strong enough numerically to cope with the allied forces in East Africa, even with the swarm of tribal auxiliaries they had raised, which included Arabs and Masai.

The British estimate of the entire German fighting force engaged in the East African campaign was 4,000 whites and about 30,000 natives, and it was impossible for them to get reenforcements. The capture by the British of Kilimanjaro Mountain, the highest summit in Africa and one of the highest in the world, must have been a blow to German pride, for it was the kaiser's mountain, and he gave his name to one of the peaks. The manner in which this great mountain came to be a German possession is not without historic interest.

When the boundaries of the new colony that had been ceded to Germany were being marked out in 1886, the present German Emperor, then only crown prince, insisted that Kilimanjaro Mountain and the region around should be included. Lord Salisbury, the most courteous of statesmen, was quite willing to do the prince this favor. In order to include this mighty mountain in the boundaries of the German colony it was necessary to make a wide loop, for a straight line would have cut the mountain in two, leaving the highest peak within British territory.

By March, 1916, the British and allied forces had every reason to feel gratified with the progress they had made in the campaign, but they were still a long way from the capital, Dar-es-Salaam, and the trunk railroad that connects that city with Tabora, which the Germans had transformed into a stronghold, and where they had mounted heavy naval guns taken from the *Königsberg*. At this stage in the campaign it was a question whether the Germans would give up the fight as they did in the Cameroons while they still had a large fighting force, or whether their offensive would develop into a long and wearisome guerrilla warfare, which in a country of the orographic and topographic character of German East Africa might be carried on indefinitely.

CHAPTER XVI

SUEZ—EGYPT

SIR JOHN MAXWELL, commander in chief of the British forces in Egypt, continued to enlarge and strengthen the defenses around the Suez Canal during the summer and fall of 1915. The Turks did not again attack the canal in force, though it will be remembered that early in the year they penetrated to the banks of the waterway and launched pontoons on its surface only to be driven out by the British on the following day.

After this brief, but memorable experience, the British defense lines were so disposed that it would be impossible for the enemy to attack the canal save on three narrow fronts. The first of these crosses the canal at El Kantara and follows the old caravan route traversed by Napoleon in his advance into Syria. The twenty-five miles between Port Said and El Kantara were flooded.

A gap of less than two miles between the Ballah lakes and the southern end of the flooded zone was protected by an intricate system of intrenchments and barbed-wire entanglements, stretching out into the desert and covered by batteries of heavy artillery reenforced by some long-range naval guns. South of the Ballah lakes the Ismailia gap had a flanking of flooded land that would present a serious obstacle to an attacking force. Another effective barrier to the canal was Lake Timsah, and between this body of water and the Bitter Lakes the gap was crowded with more intrenchments, and wide fields of wire entanglements. From Little Bitter Lake to Suez there were more carefully constructed intrenchments. Among the low sandhills east of the waterway, advanced defenses were prepared, and the intermediate ground was strengthened by intrenchments, wire labyrinths, and land mines. With a strong army at his disposal and such lines of defenses, Sir John Maxwell and his troops were eager for the promised Turkish advance, which often seemed imminent during the fall of 1915, but did not materialize.

The British force operating against the Senussi in western Egypt had been concentrated at Mersa Matruh since the closing days of November, 1915. As most of the operations against the Turks and Arabs were directed from Mersa Matruh, it may be of interest to note that this British base is a railway terminus, on the Mediterranean coast, about 150 miles east of the Tripoli border, the frontier force having withdrawn there in order to avoid conflict with the tribesmen who were in a state of unrest and inclined to become aggressive.

December 13, 1915, a British-Indian force under Colonel Gordon operating near Mersa Matruh on the coast, encountered a hostile Arab force commanded by Gaafar Pasha. It was estimated that his fighting strength numbered about 1,200 tribesmen, and was well equipped with machine guns. In the conflict that raged for some hours the British drove the enemy off with heavy losses. The victory cost the British five officers and eighteen other ranks wounded, four Indian officers, and other ranks killed and fifteen wounded. Night falling, the British did not attempt to pursue the routed enemy, but returned to Mersa Matruh.

On Christmas Day, near Mersa Matruh, the British drove back a hostile Arab force numbering about 3,000. They were completely routed, and lost in killed and prisoners about 500. Sporadic attempts were made by the Arabs to attack the British force during the closing days of December, 1915, and in the first week of January, 1916, but in every case they were routed with considerable losses. On January 13, 1916, the Arabs pursued their old tactics of trying to raid the British camp, but met with disaster and left behind them 100 camels and much live stock.

It was evident that all was not well between the Arab tribesmen, and that only fear of what their rivals might do kept them from making peace with the British. They had been severely punished on so many different occasions when they encountered the British forces, and instead of finding the warfare profitable, they had lost camels, cattle, and supplies.

On January 23, 1916, General Wallace's column, which had been operating in the northwest of Egypt toward the Tripoli (Italian Barbary) frontier, where the tribesmen had been in a

state of revolt, won a decisive victory over the Arab hordes that had been raiding peaceful inhabitants.

General Wallace's force, made up of British, Dominion, and Indian troops, and consisting of two columns, marched from Mersa Matruh on January 22, 1916, to engage the enemy Arabs of the Senussi sect who had been located by aeroplane reconnaissance. The weather conditions were unfavorable for military operations, a heavy rainfall having made the ground heavy and difficult for transports. The British force bivouacked for the night at Birshola and continued the march in the morning of January 23, 1916, in two columns. At ten o'clock in the morning the enemy was encountered. After two hours' brisk fighting the Arabs were routed, being driven back to their camp at Hazalin which was occupied by the British about noon of the same day. The Arabs then retired in a westerly direction, and the British troops bivouacked three miles westward of Birshola after burning the enemy's camp and stores. About eighty tents were destroyed and large quantities of equipment and supplies.

The British losses in this engagement were not heavy, considering the strength of the force opposed to them. The Arabs numbered about 4,500, and had three or four guns, and as many more machine guns and fought with courage and were well handled. Ten British and Dominion soldiers were killed, and eighteen Indian soldiers, and 274 of all ranks were wounded. The enemy casualties were estimated at 150 killed, and about 500 wounded. The moral effect of the British victory could not be overestimated, for it strengthened British prestige in the northwest of Egypt, and served to keep the Arabs quiet for a time, while they were not so eager to continue their raids against inoffensive people in that region.

In the first week in March, 1916, the British won another important victory over the Arabs that had a far-reaching effect. General Lukin's column, consisting of South African troops, yeomanry, and territorial artillery, attacked the enemy commanded by the Turkish officers Nuri Bey (brother to Enver Pasha) and Gaafar Pasha, at a point about fifteen miles southeast of Barani. The engagement began early in the morning and at 8.30 p. m.

the Arabs were completely routed, fleeing in all directions in scattered parties, closely pursued by the British cavalry. British aeroplanes located the enemy eight miles south of Agagia, and the pursuit was continued, causing heavy losses to the enemy.

General Peyton, who directed the attack on the Turkish position, reported that the charge of the South African Infantry was completely successful, and the attack of the Dorsetshire Yeomanry "brilliant and effective."

Nuri Bey was at first reported killed, but, later, witnesses reported that they had seen him escaping from the field. Gaafar Pasha was wounded and taken prisoner. The Turks left more than 200 killed and wounded on the battle field. Several Turkish officers of high rank and a machine gun were captured. This British victory discouraged the Turks and for the time, at least, the backbone of their resistance was broken.

On March 14, 1916, Major General Peyton reoccupied Sollum, which had been evacuated by the British in December, 1915. The enemy had blown up their ammunition stores on the previous day and retreated in the wildest disorder. The pursuit of the fugitives was a very brilliant affair. The Turks were pursued by an armored-car contingent commanded by the Duke of Westminster. When aeroplane reconnaissance revealed the fact that the enemy camp was deserted, orders were given to move forward in pursuit "with reasonable boldness." From the reports of British officers who participated we have this account of the armored-car raid:

"The going was bad for the first eight miles. After that, however, the cars struck the Dernia road, and the pace was increased, reaching nearly forty miles an hour. The cars passed some hundreds of Bedouins flying westward, many of them being armed, but no notice was taken of them. The main camp was seen about a mile south of the road and twenty-five miles west of Sollum. Direction was immediately changed and all but two of the cars advanced in line. These latter went about two miles farther along the road before turning south, acting on a pre-concerted plan.

THE CAMPAIGNS
IN THE
ANCIENT LAND OF MESOPOTAMIA
ALSO
VIEWS OF AUSTRIAN AND ITALIAN TROOPS AND
TRANSPORTS ON THE TYROLIAN FRONTIER



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Firing a heavy Italian mortar which is effectively concealed in a forest. Indirect firing, where the gunners see nothing of their target, is usually directed by telephone



Copyright, T'ress Illustrating Co.

A view in the Tyrolian Alps—the picturesque but difficult country that forms part of the Austro-Italian frontier. Hardy mountain troops from both countries occupied this border.



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Soldiers and munition transports resting on a mountain road through the Tyrol, where cold is added to the difficulties incident on steep and rough roads



A bicycle squad of the picturesque Italian Bersaglieri, after reconnoitering the country
near the Austro-Italian battle lines

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
Copyright, Press Publishing Co.

A morning scene on the **mountain frontier**. A group of Hungarian Hussars and Austrian infantry have stabled their horses in a shed and built a small fire for their own comfort



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Hungarian officers taking observations from trenches. Although this position was strong and well defended, the Hungarian troops carried it by storm



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Bagdad, toward which English armies advanced from the Persian Gulf, and Russian armies through the passes of the Caucasus mountains



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Turkish artillerymen coming from the mountain country into Mesopotamia. They are moving their guns under difficulties in order to execute a flanking movement against the British troops who have occupied Kut-el-Amara

"As the cars approached, one gun, and two machine guns came into action. These were smartly handled by the enemy, but the whole gun teams were shot down, while the cars were 400 yards away. The cars then dashed into the camp. The hostile forces scattered in every direction and the pursuit was carried on. After about ten miles there was danger of the petrol supply giving out. It was found when the cars had again concentrated that all the enemy's artillery had fallen into our hands. This amounted to three guns and nine machine guns, with twenty-four spare barrels, and some forty revolvers and large quantities of ammunition. We were able to release ninety-one shipwrecked sailors who had been prisoners in the hands of the Senussi."

These were survivors from the *Tara* and *Moorina*, British boats that had been wrecked by enemy submarines in the Bay of Sollum in November, 1915. The shipwrecked sailors had landed on the Cyrenaica coast and had fallen into the hands of the Senussi. They had suffered many hardships during their captivity, and the delight of the poor men in finding themselves surrounded by friendly British faces can well be imagined. As they had long been given up as lost there was an agreeable surprise in store for their families at home.

The small British force engaged in this successful raid consisted of eight officers and thirty-two men of other ranks. One officer was wounded slightly, but there were no other casualties. The enemy lost fifty killed, and it was known that many wounded had escaped or been removed from the field during the progress of the fight.

This action brought to a satisfactory conclusion a little campaign that had been directed with skill and foresight. In less than three weeks General Peyton's force had captured the hostile commander, and killed or captured at least 50 per cent of the Turkish subordinate commanders, and had driven the scattered remnant of the Turkish force far beyond the Egyptian border, and had taken all his artillery and machine guns. During these operations the British force had advanced 150 miles.

The Senussi, who had given the British so much trouble at this time, are a sect of Mohammedans, which is very powerful in the

interior of the Sudan, though less so in the eastern than in the western Sudan. They have no natural sympathy for the young Turks, whose orthodoxy is more than suspect, but the Italian occupation of the coast line of Tripoli had antagonized them toward the infidels.

After the British victories around Sollum, the Bedouins were in sorry straits.

It was well known to the British authorities that there was trouble in the camp of the Arabs who were cooperating against them on the western frontier of Egypt, and that the truce between the Tripolitan Arabs and those dwelling more to the east was broken, owing to the behavior of the former toward the latter. Bodies of local Bedouins fleeing from the enemy, entering the British camp at Mersa Matruh, reported that the eastern and western Arabs were in open revolt.

A petition signed by five sheiks of one of the Aulid Ali tribes was brought to Matruh, appealing to the Egyptian Government for protection against their hereditary western enemies. They declared that they had been illtreated at the instigation of Turkish officers who incited the Tripolitan Arabs to maltreat their Egyptian neighbors and temporary allies. The Aulad Ali had been forced to bear the brunt of the British attacks, and the refugees complained not only of their harsh daily treatment, but of the proportionately heavier losses they had been forced to sustain. This convinced them that they had made a mistake in joining the Tripolitans, and that they had been made merely a stalking horse for Turkish intriguers. Some of the refugees were in a pitiable condition. Some had cooperated against the British, but after a short experience had deserted in disgust. The western Arabs had prevented many others from coming in, depriving them of food and illtreating them and their families. Some of the victims had even been executed for trivial disputes. From the refugees' account of the condition of their comrades left behind it was evident that only their numerical inferiority and lack of opportunity prevented them from deserting in a body.

Refugees and Bedouins, situated to the east of Matruh, and who showed no disposition to follow the example of some of their

fellow tribesmen to join the forces of the enemy, were accommodated by the British in special areas in the Hammam district. Here they were given an encampment, and a market was established to supply their wants under the supervision of the British military authorities.

On March 11, 1916, a committee consisting of a representative of the general officer commanding in Egypt, a representative of the finance minister, and a representative of the ministry of the interior, was appointed to take over from the military administration, on behalf of the Government, all the Awlad Ali (children of Ali) and other Bedouin tribesmen now surrendering. The headquarters of the committee was established at Hammam.

It was gratifying to the British military authorities that such numbers of Arabs were inclined to be friendly and had broken away from their Tripolitan allies, but the latter were still strong in the land and showed no signs of desiring peace.

With the occupation of Sollum on the western frontier by the British, the Turco-German attempts to engage the Grand Senussi's adherents in an Islamic attack on the English infidels in Egypt had met with disastrous failure. Sheik Harun, east of Mersa Matruh, surrendered to a British force early in March, 1916, and the head men of the Arabs continued to seek pardon of the British military authorities. Since the capture of Gaafar Pasha in his ill-chosen raid on the Egyptian border the sons of the desert were converted to the belief that it was best to join the winning side, and by the middle of March, 1916, it seemed that the British were complete masters of the situation.

PART V—THE WAR IN THE AIR

CHAPTER XVII

DEVELOPMENT OF THE STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF AIR FIGHTING

THE student or observer of the Great European War inevitably must be impressed with its impersonal character. Everywhere masses and organizations rule supreme, and men and material are thought of and used as aggregations rather than as individuals and units for destruction and defense. The individual, save as he gives himself up to the great machine, everywhere is inconspicuous, and while no less courage is demanded than in the days of the short-range weapons and personal combat, yet the heroic note of personal valor and initiative in most cases is unheard, and the individual is sunk in the mass. One is almost tempted to believe that chivalry and individual heroism no longer bulk large in the profession of arms, and that in the place of the knightly soldier there is the grim engineer at telescope or switchboard, touching a key to produce an explosion that will melt away yards of trenches and carry to eternity not tens but hundreds and thousands of his fellows; there are barriers charged with deadly currents; guns hurling tons of metal at a foe invisible to the gunners, whose position is known only by mathematical deductions from observers at a distance.

All of this and much more the engineer has brought to twentieth-century warfare, and the grim fact remains that trained masses are used, made and destroyed in vain attempts at an object often unknown to the individual.

Accordingly, when we turn to the work of the aviators we pass back from the consideration of the mass to the individual. Whatever may be the airman's convictions as to the ethics of the Great War, always his duty and his adversary are well defined, and it is his personal devotion, his skill and daring, his resourcefulness and intrepidity that are to-day playing no small part on the battle fronts of Europe. He too is an engineer with scientific and technical knowledge and training that control the most delicate of machines ever at the mercy of the elements, and engineer and scientist have supplied him with instruments and equipments embodying the results of refined research and investigation. Withal, he is a soldier, yet not one of a mere mass aggregation, but an individual on whose faithful and intelligent performance of his duty mid extreme perils the issue of a great cause may depend. But not entirely a free-lance, for experience in aerial warfare has shown that in the air, as on the ground, harmony of action and plan of operation avail and contribute to success. Consequently, with the development of military aeronautics during the course of the war, the work of the flying corps, with training and practical experience, gradually became more systematic and far more efficient.

While many of their achievements were distinctly sensational, involving extreme personal daring and heroism, yet usually the general operations were as methodical and prearranged as other forms of military activity carried on by the different armies on the ground below. No longer were single aeroplanes used exclusively, but large numbers of machines were brought to bear, with the pilots drilled not only in the manipulation of their individual machines, but to work with others in military formations and groups, while increased attention was paid to weapons and the protection of vulnerable parts.

The flying craft cooperated constantly with the intelligence departments of the various staffs, observing the enemy positions, the distribution and movement of troops, and photographing the territory, and their observations were not only useful but essential to the artillery engaged so extensively in indirect fire. As their work became more practical and understood, it was the

more appreciated and its volume increased. Indeed, by the summer of 1915 the aviation corps of the various belligerent armies in Europe had settled down to more or less of a routine of observation, reconnaissance, and patrol, enlivened by bombing expeditions against the enemy and frequent aerial combats. What once would have been considered feats of usual intrepidity and skill on the part of the aviators, long since had become commonplace, and the standard of operation developed to a degree that at the beginning of the war would have been considered phenomenal.

Reconnaissance was actively in progress on all of the battle fronts, combats in the air were more frequent, bombing expeditions were conducted across the frontiers, and with a constantly increasing supply of new and improved machines, and freshly trained aviators, the work progressed, so that before the end of 1915, on the part of the Allies at least, there was probably ten times as much flying as at the beginning of the year. Even when the heavy fogs pervading the battle fields of western Europe in the early part of 1916 prevented other operations, reconnaissance was actively carried on, and this, with the routine work of determining ranges, positions, etc., for the artillery, in active progress, gave little quiet to the airmen. With the development of the war there was a constantly increasing demand on the skill of the aviators.

Many of the places from which it was necessary to begin flights did not furnish good starting, and often the same condition held as regards the landing places. Furthermore, flying was attended with much greater danger, with a corresponding increase in fatalities, on account of the improvements in the antiaircraft guns and ranging apparatus and the skill of the gunners. Withal, all official reports agree in stating that the proportion of casualties was smaller in the air service than in other branches of the service. There has been an ever-increasing number of combats in the air. Often when aeroplanes were observed in reconnaissance the enemy would make an attack upon them in force and endeavor to destroy the machines. Indeed, this was a marked tendency of the war, and the record from the first of August would show not only an increased number of duels be-

tween individual machines, but of skirmishes between air patrols, and contests in which a number of machines would attack in force opposing aeroplanes.

As the war developed there was an increased tendency toward the tactical maneuvering of a number of aeroplanes, a greater frequency of bombing raids, and these attempts naturally led to reprisals as well as to defensive efforts. Often the aeroplanes designed for dropping bombs were heavy and powerful machines, not armed primarily for attack, but depending for protection upon one or more fighting aeroplanes of greater maneuvering power which accompanied them and carried machine guns and other weapons. In these bombing raids the tendency was to use a number of machines. In the raids of October 2, 1915, on the stations of Vosiers and Challeranges, sixty-five machines were employed. A few days later a fleet of eighty-four French aeroplanes made a raid on the German lines, starting from an aerodrome near Nancy. Since then raids by large flocks of aeroplanes have become common.

One important objective of such attacks was the destruction of the enemy's communication, and the bombing of railway trains bringing up supplies or reinforcements, became a most important feature. Often this involved considerable daring on the part of the pilot and his companion, as to insure a successful dropping of bombs the aeroplanes had to descend to comparatively low levels. The British Royal Flying Corps on several occasions dropped bombs from a height hardly more than 500 feet, and in the operations at the end of September, 1915, within five days, nearly six tons of explosives were dropped on moving trains with considerable damage.

The most striking feature, perhaps in the work of the aeroplanes, was the increased height of flight which developing conditions made necessary. At the beginning of the war it was assumed that overhead reconnaissance could be carried on in safety at a height of from 4,000 to 6,000 feet above the surface of the earth. At such altitude it was assumed that the aeroplane was safe from terrestrial artillery on account of offering so small a target, as well as on account of its speed and the difficulty of

determining its range, but this condition of affairs did not long remain. Both armies, and particularly the Germans, acquired experience in the use of their antiaircraft guns, and improved weapons were placed at their disposal, so that it was not long before the gunners could cause their shrapnel to burst with deadly effect some three miles in vertical height above the ground, and up to 10,000 feet their shooting compelled the admiration of the aviators of the Allies.

Such efficient gunnery practice, of course, contributed to the loss of life among the aviators and the destruction of machines, notwithstanding the constantly increased height of flying. In some cases aeroplanes managed to reach the ground safely with as many as 300 bullet holes, but in other cases a single bullet sufficed to kill the aviator or to hit a vital part, and this was a compelling reason for armoring the aeroplanes and protecting their engines and controls.

All of this naturally produced a higher standard of skill in the European armies than was ever before realized, and the training of new aviators, especially in the light of war experience, was carried on in large part by convalescent members of the aviation corps who had seen actual service in the field, so that the quota of recruits was not only maintained but supplied, trained to a high degree of efficiency.

The progress of the war marked changes in the tactics of the aerial services of the various armies. The French and English believed that in the course of the war the Germans had lost a number of their most skilled and intrepid aviators, and that the expert pilots were held in readiness for more serious effort rather than being sacrificed for any contests of doubtful outcome. The Germans for a time became more cautious in their flights over the French lines, and in the summer and autumn of 1915 seldom crossed. This probably was due in large part to the increased number of aeroplanes at the disposal of the French and English. Apparently for a number of weeks there was a decrease in the reckless flights on the part of the Germans and desire to give battle, and more attention was paid to developing tactical efficiency and securing military results. Often their aeroplanes

operated in connection with the artillery, and in many cases their object was to draw the Allies' machines within range of the German antiaircraft artillery, which was efficiently served.

A complete chronicle of the flights and air battles of the period of the war under review would contain a record where hardly a day passed without some flight or contest of greater or less significance. A duel between two hostile airmen might be of less importance than an exchange of shots between members of opposing outposts, yet it might involve heroic fighting and a skillful manipulation of aeroplane and machine gun, when one or both of the contestants might be thrown headlong to the ground. So for these pages we may select some of the more significant of the battles in the air with the understanding that many of those ignored were not without their vital interest.

CHAPTER XVIII

ZEPPELIN RAIDS—ATTACKS ON GERMAN ARMS FACTORIES—GERMAN OVER-SEA RAIDS

THE second year of the war opened with a spirited combat between the German and French aeroplanes, on August 1, 1915, when six attacking German machines engaged fifteen French machines over Château Salins. This fight, which at the time was widely discussed, lasted three-quarters of an hour, and as the French reenforcements came the Germans retreated to their own lines, though it was reported that several of the French machines were disabled and forced to land. Regarding this contest the opinion was expressed that the French were inadequately armed to fight the Germans, and that the latter were not driven back until armed scouts had joined the French. Furthermore, it was believed that the German aeroplanes were more heavily armed than those previously employed, and represented a new and more powerful type of machine. If the French suffered in this battle for lack of armament, the lesson was taken to heart, for the fol-

lowing week a French squadron of thirty-two units, including bombing machines convoyed by a flotilla of armed scouts (*avions de chasse*) made an attack on the station and factories of Saarbrücken.

There was air war over sea as well as over land. On August 3, 1915, a squadron of Russian seaplanes attacked a German gun-boat near Windau and forced her to run ashore, while the same squadron attacked a Zeppelin and two German seaplanes, one of which was shot down. The Russians the following day attacked Constantinople and dropped a number of bombs on the harbor fortifications. That the advantage was not entirely with the Allies at this time was shown by the report that on August 10, 1915, a Turkish seaplane attacked an ally submarine near Boulair. The Russian seaplanes were again successful on August 10, 1915, when they participated in the repulse of the Germans off the Gulf of Riga, where they attempted to land troops. The Russians had merely small sea craft such as torpedo boats and submarines in this engagement, but their seaplanes proved very effective, and the Germans retired with a cruiser and two torpedo boats damaged.

After the attack by German Zeppelins on the east coast of England in June, 1915, there was a lull in the activity of the German airships. Count Zeppelin had stated early in the spring that in August fifteen airships of a new type capable of carrying at least two tons of explosives would be available, and accordingly, when a squadron of five Zeppelins were sighted off Vlieland, near the entrance of the Zuyder Zee, pointed for England, it was realized that attempted aerial invasion was being resumed in earnest. These airships bombed war vessels in the Thames, the London docks, torpedo boats near Harwich, and military establishments on the Humber, with the result, slight in its military importance, of some twenty-eight casualties and a number of fires due to incendiary bombs. This attack encountered resistance and counterattacks from the British aerial services, not without effect, but lacking in positive achievement. One Zeppelin was damaged by the gunfire of the land defenses, and upon her return an Ally aeroplane squadron from Dunkirk attacked

the disabled airship and finally blew her up after she had fallen into the sea off Ostend.

It was realized, particularly by the British, that the best way to meet the Zeppelins was by aeroplane attack, yet on the raid just described, the great airships entirely escaped the British aviators. This Zeppelin raid was followed by a second on the night of August 12-13, 1915, which was directed against the military establishment at Harwich. Six people were killed and seventeen wounded by the bombs, and the post office was set on fire by an incendiary bomb. Aside from this, damage was limited. On August 17 and 18, 1915, a squadron of four Zeppelins again attacked the English east coast, and their bombs killed ten persons and wounded thirty-six. Once again the airships were able to escape the British air patrols and made their escape apparently without damage, though one, the *L-10*, while flying over Vlieland, Holland, was fired upon by Dutch troops.

An important effect of the Zeppelin raids was to bring the war directly to the experience of the British public, and the effect on recruiting as well as in arousing an increased national spirit for defense was marked. On the other hand, in Germany the Zeppelin raids produced great elation, and the German populace anticipated that the aerial invasion of Great Britain would contribute materially toward the conclusion of the war.

In the early summer of 1915 there had been rather less activity on the war front in eastern France and Flanders, especially on the part of the Germans, and as later developments proved, they apparently were engaged in experiments with new types of machines and engines. There was also in this time a manifestation of increased skill on the part of the German air pilots, so that when the new machines were brought out they were handled with skill and ease, especially when climbing to the upper air and dodging the shells from antiaircraft guns of the Allies.

In the meantime, and especially during August, 1915, the French began to develop bombing attacks against German arms and ammunition factories, railway junctions, and other military establishments, on a scale never before attempted in aerial warfare. Toward the middle of the month as many as eighty-four

French aeroplanes were assembled for a flight over the German lines, and so carefully were these aviators trained that in less than four minutes the eighty-four aeroplanes were in the sky, arranged in perfect tactical formation. On this particular occasion a reconnaissance was made in force, and the various evolutions and the distributions of the machines were carefully tried. With such practice, on August 25, 1915, a French aerial squadron, including sixty-two aviators, flew over the heights of Dilligen in Rhenish Prussia, thirty miles southeast of Treves, and dropped more than 150 bombs, thirty of which were of large caliber. This raid, while successful in many respects, was not without damage, for the French lost four aeroplanes. One fell to earth on fire near Bolzhen with the pilot and observer killed. A second was captured by the Germans, together with its occupants, near Romilly, a third was forced to land near Arracourt, north of Luneville, and was destroyed by German artillery, and the fourth landed within range of the German guns near Moevrungs, south of Nomeny, behind the French front. On this very day a second French squadron bombed the German camps of Pannes and Baussant, starting fires, and discharged bombs over other German stations and bivouacs. In Argonne stations were bombarded as well as the aviation park of Vitry-en-Artois. Allied fleets of French, British, and Belgian aeroplanes, both of the land and sea services, comprising some sixty machines in all, bombarded the wood of Houthulst and set a number of fires.

It must not be inferred that at this time there was any lack of individual effort or achievement. Often bombs were dropped at important stations on lines of communication, and on August 26, 1915, a poisoned gas plant at Dornach was bombed by a French aeroplane and ten shells dropped.

On the other side, during the month of August, 1915, and particularly toward the end, raiding expeditions were organized by the Germans, and on August 28, 1915, an attack on Paris was organized, in which six German aeroplanes were to take part. This furnished a striking test of the French aerial defenses, for none of the German aeroplanes was able to get near Paris, and in the attempt one was shot to pieces by a French gun plane

which overtook the German and riddled the machine with bullets, causing it to fall in flames with the pilot incinerated. The German aeroplanes were first discovered by the French scouts as they flew over the French battle front at so great a speed and height that attack from the ground from the parks near the battle lines was impossible. The alarm was given by telephone, however, while north of Paris the French patrol flotilla was found in readiness. The Germans were forced to retreat, and in addition to the aeroplane shot down, as already mentioned, another was fired upon after it had dropped five bombs on Montmorency.

On September 3, 1915, a raid nearly 150 miles from the French base was made by two French aviators on Donaueschingen and Marbach in Bavaria. On the same day in retaliation for the German bombardment at Luneville and Compiègne the French air service sent out a squadron of nineteen aeroplanes over the town of Treves, which dropped about 100 shells. The same squadron, after returning to its base, proceeded in the afternoon to drop fifty-eight shells on the station at Dommary and on Baroncour.

During September, 1915, the Germans resumed oversea raids, and naval airships attacked the city of London, with results considered generally satisfactory, as German bombs were dropped on the western part of the city, the factories at Norwich, and the harbor and iron works near Middlesbrough. In this raid, made by three Zeppelins on the night of September 8-9, 1915, the British reported as a result 20 killed, 14 seriously wounded, 74 slightly wounded. The Zeppelins flew over Trafalgar Square, one of the innermost places of London, and were clearly visible from the streets. They were attacked by antiaircraft guns, and by aeroplanes, but the latter were unable to locate the airships, whose bombs, both incendiary and explosive, fell on buildings and in the streets. Later in the month of September other Zeppelin raids occurred over various parts of the eastern countries of England.

On September 22, 1915, French aviators made a spectacular raid and shelled the royal palace and station at Stuttgart in the

kingdom of Würtemburg. This was partly in retaliation for the bombarding by the Germans of open towns and civilian populations, and in the course of the attack about 100 shells were dropped on the royal palace and the station, killing, according to German reports, four persons, and wounding a number of soldiers and civilians, but without doing important material damage. Antiaircraft opened fire on the French raiders and they were forced to retire. In this attack the French machines were painted with the German distinguishing marks, with the result that after their attack a German airman arriving at Stuttgart was fired on by the German troops until he was recognized as one of their own officers, fortunately landing unhurt near the town.

During the first three weeks in September, 1915, the Royal Flying Corps, with the British army in the field, was very active, and there were forty air duels in eighteen days. During the first three weeks four monoplanes were known to have been destroyed, and at least seven others sent heavily to earth, and all survivors were, of course, forced to retire to their own lines.

One notable contest by a British pilot took place one morning when he beat off the first four German machines that had come to attack him, one after the other, but by the time of the onslaught of the fifth, he had exhausted all of his machine-gun and revolver ammunition. The British airman proceeded to go through the motions of aiming and firing his revolver, and the German pilot not realizing that the weapon was useless, after firing a number of shots at him, retired, so that the British officer was able to finish his reconnoitering and return to his own lines.

On September 7, 1915, a furious battle in the plain sight of thousands of soldiers occurred in midair, and resulted in the destruction of a German aeroplane, which had been particularly active in ranging the German guns, and had circled and signaled above the British positions, apparently with considerable effect. A British aeroplane straightway went out and attacked the German at a height of 9,000 feet above the latter's lines, and the duel was in clear sight of the armies. Every form of maneuver known to the expert pilot was indulged in, and in the meantime,

both foes were shooting at each other as rapidly as possible. Finally the German aeroplane was seen to fall erratically at an angle, nose downward, that indicated its probable destruction.

On September 13, 1915, two German aeroplanes were brought down by the British within their lines, one of which fought a most thrilling battle before it succumbed. It was a large biplane of considerable speed, armed with two machine guns, one fore and one aft. Flying over the British lines, it was sighted by the English, and a similar type aeroplane attacked. A shot hit the German machine in the gasoline tank, putting the motor out of commission, and, notwithstanding their rapid fall, the aviators maintained their firing until the end. The machine crashed to the earth, and both pilot and observer were killed, but the aeroplane itself was not badly damaged. On the same day, September 13, 1915, a German aeroplane visited the coast of Kent and dropped bombs, which resulted in damage to a house and injured four persons before it was chased off by two British naval aeroplanes.

Regarding the British aviation service, Field Marshal Sir John French, in a dispatch to the secretary of state for war, said with special reference to the fighting on September 25, 1915, at Artois, "that the wing of the Royal Flying Corps attached to the Third Army performed valuable work, and not only in times of actual battle, but throughout the summer. They continuously cooperated with the artillery, photographing the positions of the enemy, bombing their communications, and reconnoitering far over hostile country." In the period under review by the field marshal, he stated that there had been more than 240 combats in the air, and in nearly every case the British pilots had to seek out the Germans behind the German lines, where their aeroplanes were aided by the fire of the movable antiaircraft guns, and that they were successful in bringing down four German machines behind the British trenches, and at least twelve in the German lines, as well as putting out of action many others more or less damaged.

While considerable has been made of the Zeppelins, the French airships were also active during the war. One of the latter craft of this type, the *Alsace*, having a capacity of 23,000 cubic meters

(30,000 cubic yards), on the night of September 30 and October 1, 1915, bombarded the junction of Amagne-Lucquy, and the stations of Attigny and Vouziers on the trunk-line railroad going through Luxemburg and the Ardennes, which was the main supply line for the whole German line from Verdun to the neighborhood of Novon. This airship made its journey and returned safely. However, three days later, in a cruise in the Reathei district, it was forced to land, and the crew were captured by the Germans.

On October 3, 1915, a group of French aeroplanes started out to attack Luxemburg, where the kaiser on his return from Russia had established his headquarters. The station was bombarded at the railroad bridge and also military buildings. The "group" that was used for this work consisted of three flotillas and a flotilla leader, that is, a total of nineteen aeroplanes.

CHAPTER XIX

ATTACKS ON LONDON—BOMBARDMENT OF ITALIAN PORTS—AEROPLANE AS COM- MERCE DESTROYER

ON the evening of October 13, 1915, one of the most noted of the Zeppelin raids over Great Britain occurred, with London as the objective. The airships flew very high to avoid searchlights and gunfire, thus interfering with the accuracy of the bomb dropping, and in only one case was damage done to property connected with the conduct of the war. The darkening of the city and the various protective measures required high flying, so that the dropping of bombs was more or less at random. The raid occurred in the early evening, and while hundreds of thousands of persons heard the bursting bombs and the guns, there was no panic, and the majority of the citizens took shelter as they had been warned officially. An investigation of the damage the next morning showed five distinct areas where bombs containing high

explosives had been dropped, and the principal damage was where the explosion of the bombs falling into subways containing gas and water pipes had ignited the former. In one case a number of bombs were dropped on a suburban area where there were no aerial defenses or searchlights, but in few cases were houses actually struck or seriously damaged. Most of the damage was done to people in the streets, and the effect on buildings, while serious, possessed no military importance, and fires produced by incendiary bombs were readily extinguished. The London police officials repeated the warning to the citizens to remain within doors during any subsequent air raids and advising them to keep at hand supplies of water and sand as a safeguard against incendiary bombs.

In the raid of German Zeppelins over the British Isles on the night of October 13-14, 1915, and the attack on London, forty-five were killed and 114 wounded. It was reported during November that Great Britain proposed to construct fifty dirigibles within two years to meet the Zeppelin menace, and to construct each year a sufficient number to secure complete mastery of the air for England. The attack produced a degree of indignation and irritation that was more than proportional to the damage done, and the Government was criticized for the inadequacy of the protective measures.

After these air raids on Great Britain there was a lull in such activities, but it was realized by the English that with the opening of spring these attacks probably would be carried on with greater vigor and determination, as there would be an increased number both of Zeppelins and Schütte-Lanz airships. The atmospheric conditions pervading the British Isles formed as important a defense against airship attacks for almost half the year as actual military measures. Several times fogs and high winds prevented attempts of this kind, and it was realized by the German air pilots that unless weather conditions were favorable flights should not be attempted. Therefore, during the late autumn and winter of 1915-1916, they concerned themselves with problems of construction and equipment, and the training of air pilots rather than actual attempts.

In the meantime the Germans suffered by the destruction of several Zeppelins. One was destroyed with its crew by colliding with a dummy on October 18, 1915, near Maubeuge, and the *Z-28* was lost near Hamburg, and a third, whose number was unknown, at Bitterfeld, Saxony. On December 5, 1915, the Russians brought down another Zeppelin near Kalkun on the Libau-Romin railway, locating it with a powerful searchlight and destroying it by artillery fire. The airship previously had escaped several attacks after being caught by the searchlights, but when it appeared for a second time over Kalkun, with its motors silent, it was hit by gunfire. Another accident at Tondern resulted in the destruction of the Zeppelin *Z-22* during the first week in December, 1915, this being the same station at which the *Z-19* was destroyed in the previous month. The *Z-22* had been in service only a few weeks, and was of the latest type, with invisible gondolas, platforms at the top of the envelope, and detachable rafts for use in case of accident while crossing the sea. Its destruction was due to the accidental explosion of a bomb while the airship was leaving the shed, and nearly all the forty members of the crew were killed or wounded. Still another Zeppelin was reported to have been destroyed by a storm in Belgium about December 12, 1915.

On November 15, 1915, two Austrian aeroplanes bombarded Brescia, killing seven persons and wounding ten, all of whom were civilians, and some of them women. None of the bombs hit any of the arms factories of the city, which is about fifteen miles west of the southern part of the Lago di Garda, while Verona, which was attacked by Austrian aeroplanes on the previous Sunday, is about the same distance east. The attack on Verona resulted in the death of thirty persons and injury to about twice that number, and was made possible in a degree by the fog which allowed the aircraft to approach close to the city before they were discovered. They flew as low as 4,500 feet, it is stated, each dropping five or six bombs. On November 18, 1915, the Austrians' seaplane squadron dropped bombs on the forts at San Nicolè and Alberoni, and also on the arsenal, the aviation station, gas works, railway station, and several parks at Venice. The

Italians attacked in turn, and there was a heavy fire of anti-aircraft guns, but the Austrian squadron retired in safety. On November 19, 1915, Austrian aviators threw fifteen bombs on Udine, Italy, killing twelve persons and wounding twenty-seven.

The activity of the Italian aero service developed in the course of the war, and there were many combats between them and Austrian aviators. On December 30, 1915, it was reported that during the naval engagement off Durazzo an Austrian seaplane was shot down by an Italian destroyer, while a fortnight later, January 12, 1916, when four Austrian aeroplanes were attacking Rimini with bombs with little success, one of them was brought down by fire from the main artillery and shells from the warships. On January 13, 1916, Italian aeroplanes dropped bombs on a barracks in the Breguzzo zone in the valley of the Giudicaria, with success. On January 15, 1916, an Italian air squadron made an extensive raid in the region of the East Isonzo and bombarded the enemy aviation camp at Assevizza, the cantonments at Cihapovano and Boruberg, and the railway stations at Longatica, Pegasina, and Lubiana. This squadron was under continuous fire by antiaircraft batteries, but returned in safety.

Reports from Montenegro during January, 1916, reported the activity of Austrian aeroplanes in bombing operations. On January 7, 1916, an Austrian aeroplane fell near Dulcigno, and the aviators were taken prisoners.

On November 28, 1915, the French were successful in three battles in the air and two raids. A French aeroplane in Belgium pursued a German squadron and brought down one of the German machines in the sea off Westende-Bains, between Nieuport and Ostend. On the same day ten French aeroplanes set fire to the German hangars in Habsheim in southern Alsace, and also damaged an aeroplane that was on the ground. Two German machines that attempted a pursuit of the French were repulsed, one being damaged by machine gunfire, and the other being capsized. On the same day, near Nancy, French aeroplanes shot down a German machine and put another to flight.

The Allies continued vigorously their attacks on various munition plants and aero stations of the Germans. How much damage

can be done by aeroplane attacks was indicated in an item in the annual financial statement of the Krupps, which was published during the year 1915 in a German paper. This item reads: "Claims and damages due to the war, ten million marks (\$2,375,000)," and deals with the effect of the raid over Essen by the airmen of the Allies.

The German aerodrome at Gits, containing fourteen machines, was attacked, and at La Chapelette the ammunition factory with nineteen machines was also the object of an attempt by the Allies. Some sixteen British aeroplanes bombarded a stores depot at Miramont in the Somme district, and the aerodrome at Hervilly. All of the machines returned safely, and considerable damage was believed to have been done at the above points.

The aeroplane as a commerce destroyer had a test on October 30, 1915, when three German machines attacked the steamship *Avocet* of the Cork Steamship Company. One of these, a large battle plane, discharged some thirty-six bombs, but none hit. With the supply of projectiles exhausted, the battle plane, handled with great skill, opened gunfire on the vessel, while the small planes crossed and recrossed, dropping their bombs, but without effect. The aviators and their observers also opened rifle fire on the steamer, but in the space of thirty-five minutes they were unable to do any serious damage, and none of the crew was injured. It was noted that the failure to fly low so as to get sufficient accuracy for dropping the bombs was responsible for the miscarriage of this attack.

The use of seaplanes to attack merchantmen and smaller warcraft became a feature of the Austrian and German campaign, and in November and December, 1915, several attacks were reported on steamers of the Allies. Two German aeroplanes dropped bombs on a British patrol ship off North Hinder Lightship in the North Sea on November 6, 1915, and set her on fire. The French steamer *Harmonie* was attacked in the Mediterranean by an Austrian aeroplane, but none of the six bombs which were dropped struck the vessel. Three German seaplanes attacked a British cargo boat aground off the coast of Belgium, but before they could succeed in destroying her with bombs, the

attempt was reported by the Allies' aero scouts, and a squadron of aeroplanes went to the rescue. The Germans were forced to retire, while French torpedo boats floated the British freighters.

One of the notable events of the year was the first seaplane battle between the British and German seaplanes near Dunkirk on November 28, 1915. The British were successful, as they were also in an attack on a large German seaplane by one of their aeroplanes patrolling off the Belgian coast. The German machine was hit and fell on the sea, bursting into flames and exploding on striking the water. No trace of pilot, passengers, or machine could be found. The British aeroplane, under command of Lieutenant Graham, was also damaged by gunfire and fell into the sea, but the officers were picked up and safely landed.

The Allies, and particularly the British, employed aeroplanes chiefly for patrolling their coasts, naval harbors and subsidiary fleet bases, as well as the principal shipping lanes, in order to keep them clear of the insidious action of hostile submarines. Of this silent and steady coast patrol work, which is deprived of any spectacular side, little has come to light, except where a reconnaissance also involved an attack upon forces of the enemy.

It was during such patrol flights, along the Belgian coast, that two German submarines were put out of action by aviators of the Allies. The first of these engagements occurred on August 26, 1915, when Squadron Commander A. W. Bigsworth of the Royal Naval Air Service destroyed a German submarine off Ostend by dropping several bombs on the but partly submerged vessel. The second German submarine was destroyed off Middelkerke, Belgium, on November 28, 1915, by a British seaplane, piloted by Flight Sublieutenant Viney, and carrying a French officer, Lieutenant Count de Sincay, as an observer. German submarines having been reported in the vicinity, the aviators were ordered to patrol the coast with the object of watching for the enemy. The aviators rose to an altitude of 3,000 meters, and had been up for half an hour when they sighted, four miles from the shore, two submarines side by side on the surface. The place was favorable for attack, the sea being shallow there, and the

aviators hoped that the enemy boats would be unable to escape by diving. The seaplane quickly dived to about 200 meters above the sea and attacked the submarines, one of which succeeded in escaping, the other boat, however, was hit by two bombs, which broke open its hull and caused it to sink in a few minutes.

Owing to the great range of vision afforded by a seaplane, both horizontally and vertically, owing also to its considerable speed and ease of maneuvering, marine aeroplanes have proven formidable foes for submarines, which they can easily overtake and destroy with bombs. Especially is this true when a submarine is steaming partly submerged, with only its periscope visible above the sea, for, whereas, the submarine's outline is easily detected from great heights, the periscope has but a limited range of vision horizontally, and none vertically.

Another instance of how aeroplanes can be used for attacking war vessels was furnished by the feat of a British aviator who attacked a Turkish army transport on August 12, 1915, in the Marmora Sea and sank the vessel with a heavy projectile, which, it is claimed, weighed over 200 pounds.

Although not yet sufficiently developed to fulfill the functions for which they are ultimately intended, i. e., strategical reconnaissance and offensive action against vessels of war and coast fortifications—seaplanes have played a very useful rôle in tactical operations, and particularly in convoying troop ships, as well as in “spotting” for naval guns. Whenever the comparatively limited range of seaplanes precluded their employment for long-range reconnaissances or bombardment, airships were called upon to carry out these duties.

In the matter of airships, Germany was markedly favored by the possession of the Zeppelin type, whose speed and endurance is still unequaled by the smaller, nonrigid dirigibles which constitute the chief bulk of the British, French, Italian, and Russian fleets of “lighter-than-air” machines.

Obviously, the employment of airships is fraught with even more danger, on account of the large hull exposed to enemy fire, than that of aeroplanes. A great number of Zeppelins have been

destroyed either by antiaircraft guns or by storms, although the gallant feat of the late Flight Lieutenant Warneford, who blew up single-handed a Zeppelin near Ghent, has not yet been repeated by aviators of the Allies.

An Austrian aviator, however, succeeded on August 5, 1915, in putting out of action the Italian dirigible *Citta-di-Jesi*, which was returning from a bombing raid on Pola. Soaring above the airship the aviator dropped several bombs on the envelope, which was damaged, the hydrogen being ignited thereby. The airship did not explode, but was forced to alight on the sea, her crew being captured by the Austrians.

CHAPTER XX

AIR FIGHTING ON ALL FRONTS—LOSSES

BY December, 1915, and January, 1916, the official reports of the war in the air contained a continued account of activity. Almost every day reconnoitering machines were sent out over one city or another, and attempts were made to interfere with their work or to bring on battle, and on December 19, 1915, the British War Office reported forty-four combats in the air, with two enemy aeroplanes brought to the ground within their own lines, and two brought down in damaged condition. On this day one of the British machines was missing.

Again, the report on December 29, 1915, from the British War Office mentioned an unsuccessful attack by the Germans on one of the British aerodromes by four machines, only two of which reached their objective, and no damage was done to them, although one of the British aeroplanes was shot down. On December 29, 1915, sixteen British aeroplanes attacked the Comines station with bombs, and hit the station railway and sheds in the vicinity. Ten of the British aeroplanes attacked the aerodromes and did considerable damage, in both cases all machines returning safely.

On this day, December 29, 1915, there were twelve encounters with hostile aeroplanes, and a British aeroplane engaged four belonging to the Germans, one of which was believed to have been brought down, while another was damaged, and all four were driven off. The British aeroplane fell as the result of a struggle with two machines. On January 5, 1916, a number of British aeroplanes made a bombing raid against enemy aeroplanes at Douai, while the Germans retaliated by an aeroplane raid over Boulogne, dropping a few bombs without damage. The next day the British made another raid with eleven machines on gun and supply stations at Lesars. On January 10, 1916, enemy aircraft dropped bombs near Starzelle, Hazebrouck and St. Omer, and one woman and one child were killed.

That the activities of the British were not always crowned with success is stated in the report for January 13, 1916, where record is made of the fact that four of the British aeroplanes sent out on the previous day had not returned. On January 17, 1916, sixteen British aeroplanes attacked the German supply depot at Lesars, northeast of Albert, and did considerable damage. On this day there were nineteen encounters in the air, and five of the German machines were driven down, and two British aeroplanes were lost.

The activity of the French did not diminish as the war progressed, and the the activity of the bomb-operating squadron continued. On December 20, 1915, four French aeroplanes designed for bomb-dropping, escorted by seven machines with rapid-fire guns dropped on the fort and station at Mülhausen six shells of 155-millimeter caliber, and twenty shells of ninety-six caliber. In the terse language of the official report, "they reached their objective." The damage must be imagined as it was not specified.

During December, 1915, and January, 1916, the French aviators were active with the eastern army, although many difficulties were encountered, especially the intense cold in the Balkan Mountains when reconnoitering around the Bulgarian lines and elsewhere. French aviators during December, 1915, shelled Uskub, Istip, Strumitza, and other encampments with great

effect, and they made a remarkable series of photographs and maps, in addition to reporting to headquarters by wireless. The aviation corps in this section of Europe furnished daily weather reports to the headquarters staff regarding the speed of the wind and the height of the clouds from 1,000 meters altitude, and this work shows the extent of the organization and plan of campaign. On December 29, 1915, the French aeroplanes bombarded parks and encampments of the Bulgarians at Petrik, east of Lake Doiran, and that the activity in this region was not all one-sided was evident by the fact that on January 27, 1916, hostile aeroplanes bombarded the cantonments of the Allies in the environs of Saloniki, doing little damage, but losing one of their aeroplanes, which was brought to earth by gunfire. On January 14, 1916, the Allies were again attacked, and bombs were dropped on Janes (Yanesh), northwest of Kukus (Kilkich), and on Doganizi.

In the operations around Constantinople both sides employed aeroplanes for various purposes. On the Gallipoli front on December 20, 1915, it was reported that the Allies had a seaplane shot down and its occupants made prisoners, while on December 23, 1915, an ally aeroplane was shot down at Birheba. On December 26, 1915, an ally aeroplane was brought to earth near Birelsabe, and the French pilot, Captain Baron de Ceron, and a British lieutenant were killed. On December 27, 1915, the Turkish forces sent out a seaplane, which made a reconnoitering flight over Tenedos, the island of Mavro, and the many positions near Sedd-ul-Bahr, striking a torpedo boat south of this point with a bomb. On December 28, 1915, three ally aeroplanes flew over Ari-Burnu, and one of these was hit by artillery fire and fell into the sea, while a British seaplane successfully dropped some bombs on a tent camp. On December 28, 1915, Turkish artillery brought down a biplane flying over Yent Shehr and Kum Kaleh, and on the previous day a reconnoitering and bombing expedition was undertaken by a Turkish seaplane, which dropped bombs on the harbor tool house at Mudros.

On January 1, 1916, a Turkish seaplane attacked and repulsed a hostile ally aeroplane while reconnoitering, and on the following day a Turkish seaplane dropped bombs on the enemy's camp

at Sedd-ul-Bahr. Lieutenant Ryck Boddike figured prominently in a number of successful flights, in one of which he attacked a French aeroplane on January 6, 1916, killing the aviator and bringing down the machine on the Anatolian coast, near Akbanca. On the following day he shot down, east of Yalova, a British Farman aeroplane. On January 7, 1916, also there was bomb dropping by the Turkish aviators over the enemy's positions at Sedd-ul-Bahr, and their aviation station on the island of Imbros. January 10, 1916, Lieutenant Ryck Boddike brought down his fourth enemy aeroplane, which fell into the open sea, and two days later he shot down his fifth, a British machine of the Farman type, killing one of the aviators and wounding the other. This aeroplane fell in such condition that it could be repaired by the Turks. On January 14, 1916, a Turkish aeroplane attacked a monitor which, with other vessels, opened fire in the direction of Kilid Bahr. The monitor was forced to withdraw in flames.

Late in the year 1915 the Germans, after a period of inactivity, made a raid in force on the French fortress at Belfort. At least three aeroplanes dropped bombs over the city, and were attacked in turn by the machine and antiaircraft guns of the garrison, and French aviators proceeded to the attack, beating off the Germans, who returned again later in the day discharging another shower of shells over the fortress.

On December 29, 1915, the Germans reported that they had shot down an English biplane in an aerial flight near Bruges, and the occupants of the machine were killed. The English machine had been flying over the district of Lichtervelde, south of Bruges, and had dropped several bombs, one of which had hit a munitions depot with disastrous effect. A German aeroplane intercepted the British machine on its return, and in the course of the battle both machines were disabled and crashed to earth. The same day the Germans reported the loss of two aeroplanes by the British, one of which was forced to descend at a point to the north of Lens, and the other, a large battle aeroplane, was shot down in a fight north of Han, on December 27, 1915, and three British aeroplanes were destroyed by fire west of Lille. The Berlin report on December 29, 1915, stated that on the whole

front artillery and aeroplanes were active. The enemy's aircraft attacked the towns and railroad stations of Wervick and Menin, Belgium, without, however, doing military damage. A British aeroplane was shot down in a fight northeast of Cambrai, and on January 6, 1916, the Allies made an aircraft attack upon Douai, which failed, and two British aeroplanes were shot down by German aviators. One of these was brought down by Lieutenant Boelke, and was the seventh aeroplane that he had disabled. January 10, 1916, a German air squadron attacked the warehouses of Furnes. On this same day an interesting air battle occurred, involving a series of fights, with casualties on both sides, between the French and German aeroplanes above the lines of the latter near Dixmude. Three French avions cannon (Voisin steel biplanes armed with 37-millimeter quick-firing guns at the bow) fought with German scouting aeroplanes of the Fokker type. The attack was brought on by the Fokker assailing a French machine which was forced to descend, but one of its companions straightway attacked the German and brought him down by machine gunfire at a distance of twenty-five meters. A third French machine was also successful in attacking another Fokker, which fell in the forest of Houthulst, southeast of Dixmude.

On January 11, 1916, a French battle aeroplane was attacked by German rifle fire and forced to land near Noumen, south of Dixmude in Belgium, and the aeroplane and its occupants, uninjured, became German prisoners. On this day a British biplane was shot down in an encounter near Tournai, Belgium. Lieutenant Boelke on January 13, 1916, shot down a British aeroplane, as did also Lieutenant Immelmann—one northeast of Tourcoing and the other near Bapaume. Both were decorated with the Order of Pour-le-Mérite by the emperor. A third British aeroplane was shot down in an aerial fight near Roubaix, and a fourth was brought down by German defense guns near Ligne, northwest of Lille. Of the eight British officers on these four aeroplanes six were killed and two wounded.

On January 15, 1916, Lieutenant Boelke again shot down an enemy aeroplane, which fell within the British lines and was set on fire by German artillery. On January 18, 1916, there were

aerial battles near Paschendaele and Dadezelle in Flanders, and three of the four occupants of one machine were killed. A French aeroplane was shot down by German airmen near Moyenvic, and the pilot and observer were captured.

In the course of the war the German aeroplane fleet developed at the close of the year 1915, and at the beginning of 1916, a renewed activity and initiative of attack. In the period from December 20, 1915, to January 19, 1916, an analysis of the official reports indicated that the British airmen had had seventy-five individual combats with the Germans, in the course of which nine British and eight German machines were lost. The Germans, on the other hand, reported in this time that they had destroyed fourteen British and three French aeroplanes, while the French claimed the destruction of three German machines, one of which was shot down in the Balkans; while the Turks, defending the Dardanelles, claimed to have shot down seven ally aeroplanes. Italian airmen overcame two Austrian machines, and Austria and Montenegro each overcame one enemy aeroplane. An analysis of these figures indicates that for this month the advantage was distinctly with the Germans, as they had destroyed twenty-five machines as against fourteen aeroplanes brought down by the enemy.

The statements concerning the losses of airships and aeroplanes published by the various armies and newspapers in most cases were disputed for their accuracy. The Paris "Temps" on February 5, 1916, criticising a German statement, stated as the correct figures for the aeroplane losses of the various combatants on the western front between October 1, 1915, and January 31, 1916, the following: "Thirteen English and seventeen French aeroplanes lost on the side of the Allies—eleven German aeroplanes destroyed on the English front and twenty on the French front. Of the French machines lost, four were overcome in aerial combats, one destroyed by artillery fire, three were forced to descend by motor troubles, and eight disappeared on land-scouting missions."

During the month of February, 1916, patrol service was actively maintained on both sides of the frontier; a large number

of attempts at bombing were made, and many individual combats took place, with the losses, so far as the French and Germans were concerned, about evenly divided, the French reporting the destruction of nine German aeroplanes, while the Germans claimed to have destroyed eight French and four British machines. For this period the official reports of the British claimed that four German machines were forced to the ground, but it was not apparent whether they had been actually destroyed or merely forced to retire. In the French reports, in addition to the nine German aeroplanes destroyed as noted, it was stated that two additional were "forced down."

The Austrians reported the destruction of three Russian aeroplanes during the month. The British, French, Italian, and Austrian reports each announced a loss of one aeroplane in their respective services.

The Germans claimed regarding their losses of aeroplanes during the month of February, 1916, that none were lost in aerial battle and none by being shot from the ground, but that six were missing. They claimed, on the other hand, that the French and British had lost thirteen in aerial battles, five by being shot from the earth, and three by forced landing within German lines, or a total of twenty-one. The French War Office disputed this claim, and stated that in February, 1916, the French brought down five German aeroplanes, which fell within the French lines, and five others, which fell within the German lines, and that during this month only one French aeroplane was brought down in aerial fighting.

In January and February, 1916, the German air service again began its activity against the British Isles, and not only Zeppelins but also seaplanes and aeroplanes crossed the Channel and dropped explosives and incendiary bombs on English towns and villages, mostly on the east coast. The Germans claimed that in one instance a Zeppelin had gone as far as Midlands in an attempt at some of the great manufacturing centers of England, and this seemed to indicate that the campaign would be carried on with greater relentlessness than ever and more attempt at material damage. More and more aeroplanes of the German

service were beginning to cooperate with the Zeppelins, and it was clear that future attacks would be in forces with aeroplanes to protect the Zeppelins from attack by quick-flying hostile aeroplanes. It was evident from the activity of the Germans that in all departments of its aerial services increases were being made, and increased activity was to be manifested. At the same time the Allies were showing corresponding activity in their attempts to destroy the air cruisers of the enemy.

The German military Zeppelin *L-Z-77* was brought down by a French incendiary shell from a 75-millimeter antiaircraft gun of the motor-gun section of Rénigny in the neighborhood of Brabant-le-roi, on February 21, 1916. This airship was hit by an explosive shell which ignited the gas bag and caused an explosion of the bombs, so that it was completely wrecked and fell in flames. The *L-19*, belonging to the German navy, previously had been destroyed by a storm in the North Sea on January 31, 1916.

One of the developments of the war in the German air service was the long-range aeroplane possessing a considerable cruising radius, and carrying about a dozen bombs of twenty pounds weight each. A number of these in February and March, 1916, were in flight over the western frontier, and appeared over Great Britain, but the actual number of bombs dropped was not large. On February 20, 1916, however, four large German aeroplanes in squadron formation visited the east and southeast coasts of England, and two of these machines dropped seventeen high-explosive bombs, which did "considerable damage" to buildings, according to official reports. The British now were looking for many attempted raids in force where the Zeppelins with heavy loads of explosive bombs would be accompanied by large aeroplanes.

PART VI—POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONS OF THE BELLIGERENT COUNTRIES

CHAPTER XXI

NEW ENVIRONMENTS—INTERNECINE WAR POLITICS—TWO PICTURES OF BELGIUM

THE second year of hostilities opened with the nations engaged settled down to a virtual recognition of war as a normal condition. They displayed such an implacable spirit that any lurking hopes of an early peace the onlooking world may have cherished could no longer be retained.

A new national environment and atmosphere had been created. The social, political, and industrial fabrics of the warring nations, after trembling under the blows aimed at their established order, were adjusted to the time of stress, in so far as such an overhauling could endure when not only national superstructures but the underpinning of their foundations were assaulted. Reliance was placed more on reserve forces to prop up their national existence rather than on their creative currents of productiveness, and wells of reserves, unless replenished, were prone to run dry when overdrawn upon. But the high command had spoken. There must be no cessation.

“God is with us!” declared the kaiser in a manifesto to his troops on August 1, 1915. “In heroic action we suffer and work without wavering until peace comes; peace which offers us the necessary military and political economics and guarantees for a future which fulfills the conditions for the unhindered develop-

ment of our producing energy at home and on the high seas. The communities of agriculture, industry, commerce, science, and technology have endeavored to soften the stress of war. Appreciating the necessity of measures for the free intercourse of goods, and wholly devoted to the care of their brethren in the field, the population at home has strained all its energies in parrying the common danger. Internal strength and a unanimous national will guarantee victory."

Hear the Czar of Russia in a message to his army and navy: "After the year's preparation for the invasion of our country the enemy has failed to crush our strength, and, trampling under foot all the accepted rules of war, is dashing to pieces his regiments on the granite rock of Russian soldiery. The Lord God, in his unfathomable wisdom, has been pleased oftentimes to send upon our land grave trials, and every time our country has come out of its strife with fresh strength and renewed might."

"Russia and her allies," said the czar's War Minister, M. Polivanoff, "must continue the war—should it last for several years—till the enemy is completely crushed."

Dispassionate and unbending, the British Prime Minister, Herbert H. Asquith, in a message to the United States, thus voiced the spirit of his countrymen: "Our duty, which we shall fulfill, is to continue to the end in the course which we have chosen."

Amid these and like pronouncements from spokesmen for France and other nations engaged in the war, ushering in its first anniversary, a voice was heard crying in the wilderness. It was that of Pope Benedict in a plea for peace: "Blessed be he who first extends the olive branch!"

Political truces and the closing of ranks on all domestic issues, which the war had thrown into the discard, had been faithfully observed. Nevertheless, there was a constant straining at the leashes imposed by the internal armistices. Sections of parties broke away from the consolidation of factions, and political antagonisms became as pronounced as in peace times, but with the important difference that the issues raised solely related to the war policies. The war, in effect, created its own politics in the countries engaged in it.

The British Coalition Cabinet gave a prolonged siege of uncompromising criticism of its conduct of the war, both in the press and its own parliamentary citadel, and there were symptoms of political cabals aiming at the ousting of Premier Asquith in favor of Lloyd-George, and of Lord Kitchener as secretary of war. But beyond slight changes in its personnel, such as the withdrawal of Winston Churchill, who filled a sinecure, and of Sir John Simon and Sir Edward Carson, the cabinet's solidarity was undisturbed.

In France the Viviani Ministry, largely of its own volition, yielded to the attacks of parties not represented in it, and gave place to the Briand Cabinet, which included all factions.

Austria-Hungary suffered cabinet changes which did not so much indicate political changes—though these no doubt existed—as the inability of the retiring members to provide the needful sinews of war.

In Russia there had been a change in the premiership and other cabinet offices, after the Government had borne with a discontented populace and an angry Duma, which tried to express its indignation over the Russian disasters in Poland and Galicia by trying to revive a number of old contentious domestic issues by way of stirring up strife with the Government.

Only in Germany and Italy did there seem to be sustained cohesion of government, unmarked by any political crisis, though in Germany's case the official restraints of the press barred the disclosure of any rifts in the lute had there been any. But Germany had her revolting Socialists who, led by Dr. Karl Liebknecht, relentlessly harried the Government from the Reichstag benches. Only through this isolated group of ultra-radicals, divorced from the main social democratic body by the war, and through their irreconcilable organ "Vorwärts," did the scattered and meager opponents of the war in Germany find their voice. Suspensions for demanding peace did not silence "Vorwärts," nor did banishment to the trenches nor party ostracism curb Liebknecht. The boldest attack on the Government came from "Vorwärts," in November, 1915, when it called upon the authorities to state definitely for what Germany was fighting.

"For twelve months we have been listening to what is not true," it declared. "Surely we cannot be taken amiss if we express a desire to hear once what is true and what the German Government really considers as its object in this war. The people, through all this complexity of the war, never get to know what is happening or of what we are striving to attain." Another suspension instantly followed this outburst.

Belgium remained the pivot for any peace proposals to which the allied powers would even consent to consider. All of them signatory to the independence and neutrality of that country decided, in February, 1916, to renew their agreement not to end hostilities until the political and economic independence of Belgium was reestablished and the nation indemnified for the damages suffered at the hands of Germany.

Conditions in Belgium exercised the pens of a host of chroniclers who appeared unable to write of things as they saw them without revealing bias either against the Germans or the Belgians, thereby coloring their narratives consciously or otherwise. No Belgian painted a picture of his country under German rule that was not black, while every pro-German account described conditions which led to the conclusion that the Belgians had little cause for grievances.

Summing up the impressions to be obtained of Belgium after eighteen months' subjugation, as seen through German eyes, the picture that shaped itself in its larger lines was as follows:

War's horrors had almost been obliterated. Any traveler on arriving in Belgium who expected to see a country devastated by war, would be agreeably surprised. German administration, he would find, had spared no effort to heal the wounds caused by the war, and had succeeded not only in reestablishing the course of normal life, but also in inspiring the admiration of the Belgians for its work. The task of the conquerors, he would be told, had been to set up a vast organization among an agitated and distrustful populace prejudiced against foreign rule, and this task had been brilliantly accomplished.

The German attitude to the Belgians, according to one German observer, was thus expressed by General von Bissing, the gov-

ernor general: "We do not expect the Belgians to love us. We simply want them to respect us. We wish and hope that the measures adopted this year, 1916, by the German administration will prove useful and profitable to both the people and the country. We do not know what is in store for us in future, but we firmly hope that many things will remain of all we have organized here during the war."

The same observer described General von Bissing's efforts to feed the Belgians in the autumn of 1915:

"The governor general felt it his duty to see that the new harvest should exclusively benefit the Belgian population. A thorough investigation was accordingly made in order to ascertain the amount of wheat produced in Belgium during 1915. The Belgian population accepted this measure with gratitude. Every farmer received the necessary amount for home consumption, together with that which he was entitled to sell. Prices were fixed by the governor. It is significant that despite the war the 1915 crop was better than usual. This is exclusively due to the German administration, since no efforts were spared to secure such a result. I had occasion personally to assure myself that the fields had been cultivated up to the lines of the first trenches."

Under such conditions this narrator said, the American Relief Committee, which imported from the United States wheat and flour subject to the governor general's undertaking not to transship any of either into Germany, only imported one-third of the wheat necessary for local consumption.

A similar attractive picture was presented by George B. McClellan, a former mayor of New York, and now a professor at Princeton University, New Jersey. After a tour through Belgium, aided by special facilities provided by the German authorities, Mr. McClellan concluded that the Germans were doing their utmost to conciliate the Belgians and to administer the country as efficiently as possible.

"Everywhere we went," he wrote in October, 1915, "the land was well cultivated, every inch of soil seemed to be employed, and there was certainly neither waste land nor were there crops rotting in the fields. There were more men of military age work-

ing on the farms than we had seen in Germany, Switzerland and France.

"Actually less than one per cent of Belgian factory property has been destroyed during the war. That work has not been resumed in the factories throughout the country, is, I am told, due to the unwillingness of the proprietors to go home and resume operations. There is demand in Germany for practically everything that Belgium can produce; in fact, were the Belgian factories to resume, there can be no question that they would soon be running at full time."

Incidentally this question of the revival of Belgian industries became a subject of acrimonious controversy between the German and British Governments. In correspondence with the Belgian Minister in London, Sir Edward Grey, the British Foreign Minister, charged that plans proposed for the rehabilitation of Belgium's industries had failed because Germany had disregarded Great Britain's request that she guarantee that raw materials and manufactured goods sent into Belgium should not be seized by the German authorities there. The German Government, through press channels, denied that this was the case, but rather had first to subject the British proposals to investigation before assenting to them. Great Britain, it said, made conditions which seemed harmless but were recognized as "having the character of duplicity." The plans apparently did not mature.

Mr. McClellan's panegyric of German rule in Belgium, intending to show that the country was rising phenixlike from her ashes, produced a flood of hostile comment, the most comprehensive of which were the criticisms of James G. Whiteley, Secretary General of the Central Committee of the Belgian Relief Fund.

"In denying the "beneficence" of German rule in Belgium, Mr. Whiteley said:

"Belgium is being used as a milch cow for Germany. Under such conditions business in Belgium is at a standstill. Merchants and manufacturers can do nothing for themselves, nor can they give employment to Belgian workmen. The Belgians under German rule are in even worse plight than they were a

year ago. Germany is running Belgium for military purposes and for revenue only. She stifled all Belgian trade and commerce. She is collecting from impoverished Belgians a war tax of 480,000,000 francs (about \$96,000,000) a year, besides occasional extras—and after that, she leaves the Belgians to starvation."

A similar picture of conditions in Belgium during the winter of 1915-16 was drawn by S. S. McClure, whose description was accepted with more credence from the fact that his views on the war leaned toward the German standpoint. Of the 1,500,000 industrial workers in Belgium he found that one-half were workless and wageless. Of Belgians engaged in agricultural labor a large percentage were idle because the export of bulbs and flowers had ceased. One-fifth of the population of Brussels were fed by the soup kitchens. The shopkeepers, who had been living on their capital through the sale of their stocks, faced empty shelves. The \$96,000,000 a year exacted by the Germans in war contributions, translated into commodities on which the money collected was spent, meant that much less for the Belgians. The people lived on what was supplied to them through the bounty of other nations—the United States, Spain, Argentina, Australia, and New Zealand. But much the larger proportion of the contributions came from Great Britain—a fact heretofore little mentioned. The British Government had been advancing £500,000 (\$2,500,000) a month to the exiled Belgian Government, and the money was spent on relief. To Great Britain, therefore, belonged the chief credit for rescuing the Belgians from actual starvation. Handsome though the beneficence of the United States had been, its gifts became negligible when contrasted with those made by Great Britain. A striking coincidence was that the tribute the Germans exacted from Belgium for the maintenance of the army of occupation about equaled the contributions made to succor the Belgian people. The impoverishment of the latter was such that Germany, her critics said, would be unable to exact from Belgium the \$96,000,000 in goods annually without the substantial help of the foreign supplies.

CHAPTER XXII

CARDINAL MERCIER'S INDICTMENTS AGAINST
GERMAN RULE IN BELGIUM—THE EXECUTION OF MISS CAVELL

THE internal administration of General von Bissing in Belgium found an unsparing and ceaseless adversary in Cardinal Mercier, Archbishop of Malines. This Catholic dignitary emerged out of the wreck of Belgium as a stormy petrel and was in constant epistolary conflict with the German Governor General, who met the same difficulty in restraining his utterances as Russia did in trying to suppress the pen of the late Count Tolstoy. The free and uncompromising attacks and accusations of Cardinal Mercier were borne with, and were only met by protests, to which the cardinal showed small respect.

In the period under review, the alleged violations of The Hague Convention by the German military and civil authorities in Belgium formed the subject of specified charges made by Cardinal Mercier and the bishops of the Roman Catholic dioceses of Belgium, who submitted them to the Catholic clergy of Germany and Austria-Hungary in support of a plea they made for the appointment of a joint commission to investigate all reports circulated in and out of Belgium regarding the methods of German rule. The charges covered the administrations of Generals von der Goltz and von Bissing from the invasion of Belgium in August, 1914, to the beginning of 1916. Substantiated by unquestionable records, as Cardinal Mercier termed the evidence he had accumulated, this ecclesiastical indictment of German rule embraced the cowing of Belgians to make war on their own country, infliction of collective punishment against communities for alleged offenses by individuals, levying of huge taxes, confiscation of Red Cross property, execution of priests and maltreatment of nuns by troops.

Most of these accusations related to the earlier period of German occupation and have already been made familiar by histori-

cal records. The more recent set forth the Belgians' aversion to the German enforcement of labor on military works, one of the sorest of the many humiliations the Belgians had to bear. Cardinal Mercier charged that the German ordinances requiring Belgians to work on military undertakings aimed against Belgium's allies contravened The Hague Convention, Article 52 of which relating to compulsory labor for the enemy, held that requisitions in kind and service could only be claimed from conquered communities if they did not oblige the population to "take part in the operations of war against the nation." The cardinal also quoted a final note to Article 23, proposed at the second Hague conference in 1907 by the German delegation, and reading: "A belligerent is forbidden to force the subjects of an enemy country to take part in operations against their country."

Among the various decrees cited in the Mercier document was a notice placarded in Menin in July-August, 1915: "From to-day the town will no longer afford aid of any description, including assistance to their families, wives and children, to any operatives except those *who work regularly at military work* and other tasks assigned to them. All other operatives and their families can henceforward be helped in no fashion whatever."

In the area of military operations contempt of The Hague Convention, the cardinal charged, had been pushed to the extreme. On October 12, 1915, the official bulletin of orders for the district under military operations published an order containing this passage:

"Whoever, without reason, refuses to undertake or to continue work suitable to his occupation, and in the execution of which the military administration is interested, such work being ordered by one or more of the military commanders, will be liable to imprisonment not exceeding one year. He may also be transported to Germany. *Invoking Belgian laws or even international conventions to the contrary can in no case justify the refusal to work. On the subject of the lawfulness of the work exacted the military commandant has the sole right of framing a decision.*"

Any person or association of persons who induced another to refuse to work were subject to heavy punishment, and even com-

munes, wherein military work was refused by individual men, were liable to a fine or other coercive police measures.

"The injustice and arbitrariness of this decree exceed all that could be imagined," commented the Mercier document, "forced labor, collective penalties, arbitrary punishment, all is there. It is slavery, neither more nor less."

An event which brought German rule in Belgium more than ever before the world's attention was the hasty execution of an English gentlewoman, Edith Cavell, on October 12, 1915, after a secret trial by a German court-martial on the charge of aiding English, French, and Belgian soldiers to escape from Belgium. Miss Cavell was the head of a nursing institution in Brussels, and when the war came to the Belgian capital, indiscriminately tended the wounds of all the combatants, Germans included. As a prominent ministrant of the sick and wounded she was brought in touch with fugitive English, French, and Belgian soldiers, who, after fighting round Namur and Mons, hid about the country and in Brussels, trying to avoid capture or a worse fate. A number besought Miss Cavell's aid to get out of the portion of Belgium occupied by the Germans in order to rejoin their regiments. She acknowledged having helped them to leave Belgium. The German authorities charged that she had assisted 130 soldiers to do so. Suspecting her, they set a watch upon her movements; a spy, it was said, had appealed to her as a fugitive, and then betrayed her. Her arrest followed on August 5, 1915, and she was placed in close, solitary confinement in the military prison of St. Gilles. Miss Cavell made no effort to conceal the fact that she had taken pity on some of the fugitives, and knew that in assisting them to escape she had committed a military offense; but she did not expect more than a term of solitary imprisonment.

Brand Whitlock, the American Minister in Brussels, who represented British interests there during the war, interposed on Miss Cavell's behalf with a view to insuring a fair trial for her. He wanted M. de Leval, counselor at the American Legation, to take charge of her defense, but the civil governor of Belgium, Baron von der Lancken, refused not only to permit M. de Leval

to defend her, but forbade him to see her. The German governor had selected counsel of his own choice to defend her. He told Mr. Whitlock that Miss Cavell had admitted concealing French and English soldiers in her house, as well as Belgians of military age, all desirous of proceeding to the front, that she had furnished these soldiers with money necessary for their journey to France and provided them with guides to facilitate their departure from Belgium, enabling them to cross the frontier secretly.

Miss Cavell was one of thirty-five prisoners, all similarly charged, who were brought to trial before a court-martial on October 7, 1915. After the evidence had been heard, the military public prosecutor asked the court to pass a death sentence on Miss Cavell and on eight of the other prisoners. The court did not seem to agree and judgment was postponed. The British placed a sinister construction on subsequent events. The trial ended the next day, Friday, October 8, 1915. On the following Monday the American legation, which had been ceaseless in its activities on Miss Cavell's behalf, was told that sentence was to be passed the next (Tuesday) morning. But the legation learned on Monday evening from another source that sentence of death had been pronounced at five o'clock that afternoon and that Miss Cavell would be shot at two o'clock the following morning.

By misleading the American legation an attempt was seen to thwart any outside attempt to interfere with the execution of the sentence for appeal to the kaiser, the final arbiter, who had no cognizance of the affair until after the execution. There was only six hours left in which to attempt to save the English nurse. Mr. Whitlock, who was ill, sent an entreating note to the civil governor asking him to save Miss Cavell's life, and the Spanish Minister, with Hugh Gibson, the first secretary of the American legation, appealed to him in person. Their pleas were of no avail. "Our failure has been felt by us as a very severe blow," Mr. Whitlock wrote later.

Little became known of the manner in which Miss Cavell was executed. It was reported that she fainted on the way to her

death, that she was fired on by a squad of twelve men, who aimed low, and that only one bullet struck her, without killing her. The officer of the firing party then shot her, it was said, through the head.

The British saw in the successful attempt to keep the conviction and execution secret a fear on the part of her accusers that a plea for mercy might prevail at the eleventh hour. The world's press generally, outside the countries affiliated with the Teutonic cause, condemned the execution as needless savagery. The German view was indicated in a feeling of surprise that the world should be interested in the case. "When thousands of innocent people have died in the war," remarked Baron von Bissing, "why should anyone become hysterical over the death of one guilty woman?"

The feeling aroused in England over a deed which was denounced as murder on a military technicality reflected itself in a quickening of recruiting, and, according to Frederick Palmer, became echoed in a new battle cry of the British troops in Flanders when cheering—"For Miss Cavell!" A memorial service was held for her in St. Paul's Cathedral in London. The susceptible French were no less deeply moved by her fate.

The Germans defended their action on the ground that it was necessary to awe the Belgians into subjection. "Punishment in a case of this nature," said Baron von Bissing to an American correspondent, "is meted out to deter others from committing the same offense. We have only recently uncovered a big spy system in Belgium. Important military matters have been communicated to the enemy for some time. This Cavell woman was aware of these activities—had guilty knowledge of much of their work. Her death was deplorable, but I do not see why it should occasion such hysteria in America."

The English press contrasted the case of Miss Cavell, who was not tried for espionage, but merely with assisting fugitive soldiers to escape—with the treatment accorded by the English courts to Mrs. Louise Herbert, a self-confessed German spy. Miss Cavell was put to death; Mrs. Herbert escaped with a prison term of six months. Miss Cavell defended the aid she ex-

tended to them as an act of mercy because she felt she was helping to save their lives.

In the official report of the American Minister, Brand Whitlock, to the State Department, emphasis was laid on the fact that she was not convicted as a spy.

"The fact that she had nursed numbers of German wounded soldiers," Mr. Whitlock commented, "might have been regarded as a complete reason in itself for treating her with leniency. The attitude of the German authorities is, if possible, rendered worse by the discreditable efforts successfully made by the German civil administration of Brussels to conceal the fact that sentence had been passed and would be carried out immediately. These efforts . . . show in the clearest manner that the German authorities were well aware that the carrying out of the sentence was not warranted by any consideration."

British comment on the affair might be summed up in a denunciation by the London "Chronicle" in reviewing Mr. Whitlock's report: "Only less amazing than the futile cruelty of the thing is the series of lies and subterfuges whereby it was sought to trick the American legation and to insure that Miss Cavell should be dead before they could finally protest. The sense of the whole civilized world can be left to judge between this helpless woman and her murderers."

Later it was reported that the kaiser had informed King Alfonso of Spain that other persons sentenced with Miss Cavell for the same offense had been pardoned. Among these were the Countess Jeanne de Belleville, for whom King Alfonso personally intervened, and Princess Marie de Croy, a member of one of the great mediatised families of Europe whose German relatives were able to exert considerable pressure from within the empire. These cases were carried to Berlin, while Miss Cavell's was passed on in Brussels. Her nationality appeared to have decided her fate.

CHAPTER XXIII

EVADING ARMY SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN—
WANING RESPONSE TO CALLS—CON-
SCRIPTION FOR SINGLE MEN

GREAT BRITAIN'S internal troubles became centered round the sore question of compulsory military service as the war's second year advanced. It caused a social and political cleavage and recurrent crisis, extending for several months, until the continued failure of young unmarried men to join the ranks of the army forced a change of policy. Thereupon, in conformity with the customary British way of facing an inevitable situation, there was an instant coalition of conflicting factions. The departure from tradition determined on in the passage of the Military Service Act practically enforced the enlistment of some 600,000 men, subject to certain exemptions. Their shirking of the call to succor their pressed compatriots on the various battle fronts had continued despite the persuasive pleas of elaborate advertising schemes, recruiting marches and meetings, military displays, public lectures, and private canvasses.

The success of this propaganda had earlier been great and seemingly overwhelming, but as the war developed the requirements became far greater than the response. A deep-rooted dislike to the adoption of conscription, or any resort to methods of compulsory enlistment that savored of a revival of the old device of the press gang, produced by the Napoleonic wars, had caused too great a reliance to be placed on Lord Derby's plan of voluntary enlistment. By far the greater response had come from young married men; but those the army really sought, able-bodied single men, failed to appear in anything like adequate numbers. The burden of military service was thus falling unfairly upon the young married men. While recognizing and relying on them as a reserve to be called upon when required, the Government decided that the single men must first be requisitioned, and if sufficient did not voluntarily present themselves to relieve the benedicts

from taking their place, they would be compelled to do so. Thence followed the most radical departure from fundamental English conceptions of individual liberty since the days of Oliver Cromwell.

The war was consuming men. By the autumn of 1915 the unfilled gaps in all ranks due to an insufficiency of recruits satisfied the authorities that the voluntary system was exhausting itself. There was a weekly wastage of at least 30,000 men. The Dardanelles by the autumn alone had exacted a total of 200,000 men, either killed, wounded, missing, or invalidated; while in Flanders, from one cause or another, infantry battalions were suffering a shrinkage of 15 per cent monthly.

In September, 1915, renewed efforts were made to induce further voluntary recruiting. The cooperation of the labor unions was invoked by Mr. Asquith and Lord Kitchener, the latter of whom told the labor leaders that if he could have seventy divisions, about 1,500,000 men, in the field between then and the spring of 1916, he would guarantee victory. The labor chiefs pledged their aid, and a new campaign was organized, embracing meetings of workers throughout the country; the circulation of additional recruiting literature, and deputations to trades councils and other influential labor organizations to explain the country's needs and enlist their cooperation in meeting them. A national recruiting rally in October, 1915, held throughout the country, with marching of troops and special meetings everywhere, formed one successful demonstration of these final efforts to save the voluntary system from being ousted for continental methods of drafting an army. But the indications were abundant that spasmodic efforts would not yield the influx of men required.

The Earl of Derby now came forward and shouldered the burden of directing the recruiting for the army at Lord Kitchener's request. "I feel somewhat in the position of a receiver who is put in to wind up a bankrupt concern," he told a meeting in Lancashire; "but I hope to be able to do it with such satisfaction as will enable the creditors to receive their twenty shillings in the pound." Lord Derby set about achieving this object by making radical changes in the recruiting organization. A wholesale

canvass of all enlisted men of military age, based upon the national register, which had been taken in August, 1915, was instituted.

Under the new system civilians who volunteered were classified in forty-six different groups—twenty-three for single men and twenty-three for married men—according to age. Single men would be called for service in the order of their groups, men in their twenties, before those in their thirties, and all single men before the married men. But either or both classes could enlist at once if they so desired. Having come forward and attested their availability as army recruits, the men so grouped returned to their occupations, holding themselves in readiness to join the colors when called upon. Among those sent back to their trades were many “starred” men, so designated because employed in munition plants, and others deemed to be indispensable in their particular employments elsewhere. Lord Derby, however, did not guarantee permanent exemption from field service even for the starred men. In indicating that the war’s exigencies might require their liberation from their employments, he appeared to have in mind a further extension of female labor in the munition plants; so that, as a last resort, the women remained as a reserve to produce munitions if the war’s developments emptied the factories of male labor.

The Derby canvass was inaugurated to last six weeks, from October 25 to December 4, 1915. Its slogan was “single men first.” As the canvass progressed the old doubt arose, not so much regarding the success of the scheme generally, but as to whether the slogan would yield sufficient response from the men it designated. In fact the canvass began to reveal again that the Barkis who was willing was the benedict, not the bachelor. Every available social and political machinery and influence was set in motion to induce the unwedded “slackers” to attest their availability for enlistment. The campaign was boomed by the press, and multitudes of canvassers of all grades and conditions worked together with a rare unanimity. Nevertheless, though all classes attested, and many business firms surrendered their staffs *en bloc*, the wave of enthusiasm that spread throughout

the country did not sweep every eligible man into the new volunteer corps.

The boom suddenly ended; the voluntary system of raising reinforcements was clearly *in extremis*. The country's finger of reproach was pointed at the shirking and elusive single men, and the Government's attitude to them became threatening. To give them a final chance the canvass was extended to December 13, 1915. A promise made to married men was renewed by Lord Derby in a letter to the prime minister, wherein the position was restated to dispose of uncertainty and brought a confirmation from Mr. Asquith of the Government's intentions. The understanding as set forth by Lord Derby was:

"Married men are not to be called up until young unmarried men have been. If these young men do not come forward voluntarily, you will either release the married men from their pledge or introduce a bill into Parliament to compel the young men to serve, which, if passed, would mean that the married men would be held to their enlistment. If, on the other hand, Parliament did not pass such a bill, the married men would be automatically released from their engagement to serve.

"By the expression 'young men coming forward to serve' I think it should be taken to mean that the vast majority of young men not engaged in munitions work or work necessary for the country should offer themselves for service, and men indispensable for civil employment and men who have personal reasons which are considered satisfactory to the local tribunals for relegation to a later class, can have their claims examined for such relegation.

"If, after all these claims have been investigated and all the exemptions made mentioned above, there remains a considerable number of young men not engaged in these pursuits who could perfectly be spared for military service, they should be compelled to serve. On the other hand, if the number should prove to be, as I hope it will, a really negligible minority, there would be no question of legislation."

Here the issue was drawn between the unenlisted single men and the Government. It was not theirs even to say that in their

employment they were indispensable to the industries of the country, and should therefore be exempt from army service. Lord Derby laid down the cardinal principle that it was the state's privilege, not the man's nor yet his employer's, to say whether he was indispensable or not in his particular work. The man's duty was first to attest, and then submit, his claim for exemption from military service to the local tribunals.

An eleventh-hour response came, unexpected in its volume and yet insufficient. In the final four days of the canvass the recruiting officers all over the country were suddenly swamped by thousands of men presenting themselves to attest. These four days—from December 10 to December 13, 1915—produced attestations from 1,070,487 men. The completed figures were not immediately revealed to the public; but there were speedy indications that the canvass had not realized the none too rosy hopes of the sticklers for the voluntary system. Symptoms arose of a struggle in the cabinet on the conscription issue. The patent fact that the question of compulsion had reached an acute stage in the cabinet's deliberations bore that significance to the country. The official figures duly showed that of 5,011,441 unvolunteered men remaining on the national register between the ages of eighteen and forty, only 2,829,263 had attested, of which 1,150,000 were single men. This number of 2,829,263 was subjected to considerable analysis and deductions for "starred" and unfit men, with the net result showing that the canvass had yielded only 831,062 men actually available, of whom 343,386 were single men and 487,676 were married. The net number of men unaccounted for numbered 1,338,424, of whom 657,160 were single and 681,264 were married. The Government abided by its pledge to the married men that they would not be held to their attestation unless and until the services of the unvolunteered single men had been obtained by "other means," the existing voluntary system having failed to bring them to the colors.

The Military Service Bill was presented to Parliament on January 4, 1916, by the premier, and signalized the defeat or surrender of those members of the cabinet who had fought tooth and nail against conscription. The bill excluded Ireland from its

provisions, and affected all English, Welsh, and Scotch single men, or widowers without children dependent on them, between the ages of eighteen and forty. On August 15, 1915, they were offered the choice of voluntarily joining the Derby groups within five weeks after the bill's passage, when, unless they had been exempted, they would be deemed to have enlisted for the duration of the war. Mr. Asquith explained that he was himself opposed to general compulsion, and did not think that any case had been made out for its adoption. The bill was not expressive of any new military policy adopted by the cabinet, but was confined to a specific object—the redemption of the Government's pledge to the married men, made at a time, November, 1915, when, the premier said, overwhelming evidence had been submitted to him that if the pledge was not given there was serious danger of the whole recruiting campaign breaking down. An unbending voluntarist, Sir John Simon, Home Secretary, had quitted the cabinet on the conscription issue, and as a private member denounced the measure in Parliament. But the country and Parliament had made up their mind, though very reluctantly. The opposition to the bill divided with successive divisions in the House of Commons, and on its third reading, January 24, 1916, had shrunk to thirty-six votes, the bill passing by a majority of 347.

The measure only aimed at the 657,160 single men who had failed to attest after patient inducements had been extended to them under the voluntary system. As a conscription measure it was therefore merely a whip for recalcitrants, and the fact that the overwhelming majority of men in the trenches, in training, or in the home guards had volunteered without being canvassed, or hectored, or shamed into joining the colors, proves that the voluntary system had only failed in reaching a minority, though the latter had been considerable enough to necessitate legislation. In fact, Lord Derby pointed out later that if not a single man to whom the conscription bill applied came forward until he was fetched, the British army would nevertheless consist of 93 per cent volunteers, and 7 per cent conscripts. Many of the laggards, however, did not continue to abstain from presenting themselves after the bill's passage. They came forward in such numbers

that before the bill became operative the proportion of the 657,160 single men who had failed to enlist was largely decreased. Hence, when all was said and done, the upholders of the voluntary system took comfort in the fact that it was not such a failure after all.

The army had been increased to 4,000,000 men, the largest ever raised by Great Britain. This number was necessary to meet the large reserve requirements under modern war conditions. At home a reserve of 1.8 men for every soldier in the field was needed, based on the monthly wastage of 15 per cent, experienced in the first year of the war.

Thus the 1,250,000 men who constituted the British forces abroad in December, 1915, required 2,250,000 reserves in training at home, so that a total of 3,500,000 men was necessary for the prosecution of the war on the present basis for one year.

CHAPTER XXIV

GREAT BRITAIN AN ARMS FACTORY—LABOR IMPEDIMENTS TO PRODUCTION— THRIVING WAGE EARNERS

THE working of the Munitions Act, under which the industrial resources of Great Britain were organized for the production of shot and shell, was now in full swing. As a country is typified by its leading industry, Great Britain may be said to have become an arms factory. Lloyd-George, in his successful rôle as Minister of Munitions, repeatedly told his countrymen that the war was a war of munitions, and British success hinged vitally upon all the national resources in men and machinery being employed in producing ammunition and equipment. The initial method adopted of working through armament firms as the principal founts of production had early become exhausted. The task of the munitions minister had been to establish in a few weeks an organization which in other circumstances would re-

quire years to develop. This meant to equal and surpass the enormous output of 250,000 shells a day, which it was believed the Teutonic Powers were producing. The problem was beset with difficulties at every turn. Local resources had to be mobilized, and all manner of factories, hitherto utilized for various industries, were appropriated and adapted for munition production. Difficulties were met in obtaining the right materials raw or semimanufactured, in getting inventories of the country's plants, and the extent to which they could be modified for shell production, and an insufficiency of skilled labor. Linked to the last obstacle were the hampering rules and regulations of the trades-unions, the "most devastating" of which, as Lloyd-George phrased it, were those unwritten, which curbed a man's industry and zeal for fear of incurring the disapproval of his union brethren. As a consequence, the Munitions Act considerably curtailed the freedom of labor enjoyed in peace times, to organize strikes and lockouts, and any such action due to a dispute which was directly or indirectly prejudicial to the manufacture, transport, or supply of munitions of war, became punishable offenses under the act unless the cause had been submitted to arbitration.

The act had only been a month in force with the second year of the war. In that time, sixteen national factories had been erected and equipped with men and machinery, in addition to an extension of existing factories for the manufacture of shells, and 40,000 further workers had been engaged in munitions. Trades-union restrictions still projected as the chief difficulty, despite the act's provisions, in operating the local arsenals which were fast dotting the country. Lloyd-George told the House of Commons that the output could be increased at least 25 per cent if the men, as they had agreed, abandoned the union rules and practices which throttled production. Under his persuasion the union executives concerned in munitions work later recognized the justice of the complaint and pledged themselves to effect a suspension of the obstructive practices.

The blunt tongue of Lloyd-George was never without effect in impressing upon the British workingman the imperative need of

setting aside union rules when necessary in order that munitions could be manufactured at a rate commensurate with the army's needs. Addressing several thousand trade-unionists in Glasgow in December, 1915, he set forth what he perceived to be the inevitable alternative. It was, he said, "to tell the kaiser frankly that we cannot go on," pay an indemnity, give up a British colony or two, surrender the command of the sea, and place Great Britain at the mercy of Prussian despotism.

"I have often feared that the British people think of this war as only a passing shower," he said. "I have wondered if they realize the tremendous issues involved. This is a cyclone, an earthquake. You cannot haggle with an earthquake. The skilled workmen as well as others must realize it is really opening before them the greatest opportunity ever presented to their class, and there will emerge after this war that future hope which the great leaders of democracy of all ages have pictured in their dreams."

From the employers' viewpoint the sins of British labor were manifold. "This is an engineers' war," said Lloyd-George, by which he meant that the indispensable handy man at home was the "machinist," to use the nearest American equivalent. The torrent of work, with overtime and night shifts everywhere, turned loose by the Government departments, created a situation of which the men considered they had the upper hand.

"For years," wrote one chronicler, "the men had been taught that the employer was their enemy, that he exploited labor for his own private benefit, that he regarded his men simply as a means to the end of his own aggrandizement. Now the employer was delivered into their hands. The necessity of the nation was imperative; no stoppage would be tolerated, and the country would look with impatience and disfavor on any dispute for wages at such a time. The temptation was too much for men, and from all over the country evidence began to accumulate that they had decided to get some of their own back. The Clyde strike was an extreme example of the spirit that began to prevail. A fortnight's work at a most critical time involving dislocation and delay on hundreds of the nation's contracts, was absolutely lost and irrecoverable. The spirit which has been displayed is almost

beyond belief, and has taken the form of a stubborn and active campaign against any methods of arrangements, which might secure the increased production of the works, and the imposition of restrictions and insistence on trades-union principles, continued unceasingly and in the most aggravated form.

"Shop managers were afraid to introduce inventions to secure greater efficiency in production in case of trouble, and any departure from ordinary peace-time conditions of working was the signal for threats of stoppage. Obsolete practices and claims which could not be enforced upon the employers in normal times were resuscitated and insisted upon. Concessions were made to endeavor to avoid difficulties, but every concession has been seized upon and utilized as a jumping-off place for something more. . . . The old fallacy that the longer a job can be made to last the better for the work retains its hoary supremacy, and is acted upon to its limit in the shops under the domination of the Amalgamated Society of Engineers. The Government misjudged, and has misjudged all along, the psychology of the workers, and to its errors of judgment is largely due the industrial chaos. Neither the workmen nor their leaders will accept strong measures voluntarily, or as the result of argument or discussion, but they look to the Government as having a single eye to the national good and a single purpose to achieve. And if strong measures were necessary to secure that purpose, they will accept them and feel the better for their acceptance, even though they may indulge in their necessary prerogative of a preliminary grumble."

This criticism of "the callous and irreconcilable selfishness of trades-union principles" charged that union machinists had sought, at a critical period of the war, to insist upon their own ideals at the expense of the country, and to coerce employers into an acceptance of conditions which the unions had been unable to enforce in peace time. One measure after another was tried by the Government to overcome it. Several firms obtained men from Canada, the United States, and elsewhere; and volunteer labor clerks, stockbrokers, teachers, and even clergymen offered their services. The unions declined to permit them to start. To

meet this condition Parliament passed a bill permitting the Government to reserve skilled union workers from the less difficult tasks in the manufacture of supplies essential to the conduct of the war, and replaced them by unskilled labor.

Labor difficulties were accompanied by a shortage of tools. The machinery census revealed the munitions needed. The Government thereupon decided to place the great machine tool-makers of the country under its direct control, in order that they could concentrate their attention on increasing the amount of machinery available for munition production.

As a result of all these measures the number of Government controlled establishments numbered 345 on August 6, 1915, expanded to 715 by the beginning of September, 1915, and in October, 1915, exceeded 1,000. By the latter period some million work-people were employed in munition production in these plants and in Government factories, spread over eighteen cooperative areas.

Nevertheless, labor sustained its stand, quiescently under an enforced truce, against the Government on various issues arising from what the unions considered to be violations of labor principles by the operation of the national-war policy. It demanded amendments to the munitions act to prevent the "pretext of the war being used for greater coercion and subjection of labor." The unions contended that the act should be so revised as to restore the individual right to contract and give labor a fuller share in the responsibility of managing and controlling munition establishments. They deemed that the conduct of the war policy was menacing the industrial and political liberties of working-men. Labor's protective laws, they complained, were tending to become nullified, and the introduction of military conscription brought in its wake the danger of industrial conscription. But in view of the unprecedented situation that existed, the unions appeared to be reconciled, for the time being, to shelve their grievances against the Government, and decided to avert a serious schism in the labor ranks, that the interests of the nation would be best served by their representatives remaining in the coalition cabinet. There had been a danger that the resignations of the three labor members of the Government would be forced.

Perhaps unexampled economic conditions influenced the unions to bear with restraints which they deemed inimical to the interests of the laboring classes. Official statistics at the opening of 1916, confirmed by personal observations, showed that there had never been a time of less unemployment. Lloyd-George announced in January, 1916, that in order to man further factories, approaching completion for the manufacture of munitions, he would require the services of 80,000 additional skilled workmen and over 200,000 unskilled. The enormous demand for labor naturally resulted in an increase in the rate of wages, stimulated by the trades-unions, which took care that the rise in commodities due to war conditions was accompanied by a corresponding rise in pay. As the result of overtime and "speeding up," there was also a substantial increase in the actual wages received. This war prosperity became chiefly visible among the toiling masses of the Midlands, the north of England, and the south of Scotland.

From the wage earners' point of view the economic situation was satisfactory; but the so-called upper and middle classes—the income receivers—confronted less palatable conditions. They suffered most from the war because depending upon a fixed income derived from investments. In many cases, not only had the capital value of their investments shrank, but the income declined, while prices rose all round. Rich men here and there became richer through the war; but the richer classes generally became appreciably poorer, whether their wealth was measured by capital value or by income-earning capacity. In fact it was they who bore the brunt of the burden of meeting the war's cost.

CHAPTER XXV

BRITISH TAXES SOAR—ENFORCED ECONOMICS—
MOBILIZING AMERICAN SECURITIES—THE
MOUNTING DEBT AND WAR COST

BY September, 1915, Great Britain had trebled her debt and doubled her taxation. New imports, levied to meet the rising cost of the war, broke the free-trade tradition. They were the most drastic and far-reaching in the history of the country, and in proposing them Reginald McKenna, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, a Radical and a free trader, was forced to assume the rôle of a protectionist. All automobiles, bicycles, moving-picture films, clocks, watches, musical instruments, plate glass, and hats imported were taxed 33 1-3 per cent ad valorem—a temporary war measure, Mr. McKenna told the House of Commons, the object being principally designed to discourage imports and remedy the foreign exchange situation.

The principal blow fell on incomes. The existing tax not only was expanded by 40 per cent, but its scope widened to include workingmen and others earning as little as \$13 weekly, the exemption limit of incomes being reduced from \$800 to \$650 a year. The richer classes were taxed more than ever by an increase in the supertax, which compelled them to pay the Government more than one-third of their income. Thus the possessor of an income of \$500,000 was mulcted in the sum of \$170,000. A special tax was also levied on profits from war munitions and equipment. All concerns dealing in such supplies were called upon to pay a tax at the rate of 50 per cent on their abnormal profits above \$500, other firms with normal profits paying the usual income tax. Sugar was further taxed a cent a pound, and there was an all-round increase of 50 per cent made on the duty on tea, coffee, chicory, tobacco, dried fruits, and other articles, and an increase of 100 per cent on the duty on patent medicines.

The new taxation was based on the principle that the minimum provision which sound war finance must make should be adequate

to meet the interest and sinking fund on the new war debt. The nation submitted to the added burden on its resources with resigned cheerfulness. In some respects, perhaps, the most important feature of the new taxes were their sociological incidence. They obliged the people to put into practice the principles of economy which had been preached from pulpit, platform, and the press for some months past. Frank critics of the British plutocracy welcomed the new taxes as enforcing a wholesale eviction of luxuries and as promising to give a less materialistic tinge to the lives of the "comfortable classes" by compelling them to descend with dignity to a lower scale of expenditure, which would in nowise diminish their happiness.

By way of a Christmas exhortation, a manifesto was issued to the people by a group of representative bankers, urging economies to enable the nation to meet the war's heavy liabilities. The task of finding the greater part of the immense sums of money needed by the Allies, the bankers said, was the special duty of the British people, for they in particular possessed the necessary financial resources:

"The income of the British people has been maintained at a high level. Exports, though not as great as before the war, are greater than in 1909. The income from capital invested abroad has been reduced but little; the earnings of shipping are greater than ever, and the factories are working full time. Moreover, the effect upon production of the great army's mobilization has been greatly neutralized by the more vigorous and effective work of the civilian population, particularly the women. The average individual income is much in excess of any total heretofore reached.

"In the current calendar year the British people will spend £1,300,000,000 (\$6,500,000,000) on war and government; next year £1,800,000,000 (\$9,000,000,000). To raise this sum is a stupendous task, which will try the mettle of the nation as it has not been tried in a hundred years. The task demands the strenuous cooperation of every man, woman, youth and maiden —that the nation's energies be concentrated on the production of really essential things, that the production of nonessentials be wholly stopped."

At the existing stage of the war the bankers saw only one thing needful to command victory, namely, to support the vast armies of new men and pay for the vast quantities of arms and munitions being manufactured. Only by all classes adding to and carefully husbanding their income, by selling foreign securities, and by creating foreign credits, would it be possible (so the bankers finally warned) to provide the vast sum needed by the nation and its allies.

Steps had already been taken to give British investors an opportunity of disposing of their holdings for the service of the nation in the manner here indicated. Among the unusual measures resorted to by Great Britain to safeguard her enlarged obligations abroad was what amounted to a financial conscription of American and Canadian securities held by Britons. War imports from the United States, and a diminution of her exports, had heavily swung the balance of trade against her, and this condition in turn had lowered the market value of the pound sterling on exchange. Measures were therefore taken in December, 1915, through a customary parliamentary bill, to mobilize American and Canadian securities, whereby the Government could buy or borrow them from their British owners, to be used primarily as collateral for loans, or, in case of necessity, to balance the current merchandise account with the United States. The chancellor of the exchequer told the House of Commons that the amounts paid in interest on foreign securities held in Great Britain, or earned by British shipping, were not sufficient to equalize the balance of trade with the United States in England's favor. Consequently, in order to meet the liabilities in the United States, the Government was obliged to go outside the ordinary courses of trade and buy or borrow securities. American and Canadian securities held in Great Britain were valued anywhere from \$1,500,000,000 to \$4,000,000,000, and these, it was hoped, would suffice to meet the American liabilities and to maintain the exchange for the remainder of the war. British holders were invited to exchange their American securities for five-year 5 per cent exchequer bonds, or, if they could not sell, deposit them with the Treasury for two years, receiving ac-

crued interest and half of one per cent. The plan met with general approval, both in British and American financial circles. For some time past New York bankers had been hoping that such a step would be taken to stabilize the exchange situation and had urged upon the Anglo-French Commission that the best kind of security for a credit in the United States would be stocks and bonds sold abroad by American corporations.

When Parliament reassembled on February 15, 1916, the chancellor of the exchequer informed it that the British national debt for the financial year, ending on March 31, 1916, would be £2,200,000,000 (\$11,000,000,000). As the debt stood on March 31, 1914, at \$3,256,350,000, the war period had increased it by \$7,743,650,000. Credits were passed to the amount of £420,000,000 (\$2,100,000,000) to cover the war's expenditures to the end of the following May, bringing the total value of credits sanctioned since the outbreak of the war to £2,082,000,000 (\$10,410,000,000). This huge sum was referred to by the premier as "not only beyond precedent but actually beyond the imagination of any financier of this or any other country." Large as it was, the sum was exclusive of loans Great Britain and the Bank of England made to her allies and her dominions, amounting to £591,000,000 (\$2,955,000,000), of which £168,000,000 was provided by the Government and £423,000,000 by the bank.

The daily cost of the war had mounted from \$14,000,000 between April 1 and July 17, 1915, to \$17,000,000 between July 18 and September 11, 1915, \$21,750,000 from September 12 to November 6, 1915, and between \$21,500,000 and \$22,000,000 from November 7, 1915, to February 16, 1916. Mr. Asquith said that by careful economy and safeguards the Government had succeeded in keeping down the expenditure to the last-named figures, and he thought it unlikely that the war's cost would exceed \$25,000,000 a day at any time.

The condition of British credit remained sound. After eighteen months of war Great Britain was described by Mr. McKenna as still almost the only open gold country in the world. British paper could still be exchanged for gold at the Bank of England. "It is an absolute marvel," he told the House of Com-

mons. "It would never have been believed two years ago that British credit could stand the extraordinary test to which it has been subjected."

The food situation was favorable despite war conditions, especially when contrasted with conditions prevailing in Germany and Austria-Hungary. In February, 1916, the average increase in the retail price of food since the beginning of the war was 47 per cent. According to the British Board of Trade this compared favorably with the general level of prices of certain important food articles in Berlin and Vienna, where the food advances were 83.4 and 112.9 per cent respectively above the prices prevailing in July, 1914. In January, 1916, retail prices in the United Kingdom had advanced about 1½ per cent. Flour and bread, taken separately, showed an increase of 6 per cent. The Government's continued monopoly of the export of all wheat from India was a considerable factor in keeping down the price of bread.

Trade policy to be pursued after the war drew together a notable gathering in London of representatives of the great commercial organizations constituting the British Association of Chambers of Commerce. They decided that the experience of the war had shown the strength and safety of the British nation in time of national peril to lie in its ability to produce its requirements from its own soil and its own factories rather than in the possession of values which might be exported and exchanged for products and manufactures of foreign countries. The traders were mainly interested in a proposed change in Great Britain's present tariff system, which allowed practically the free admission of foreign imports, owing to the prevailing belief that Great Britain's free markets had been one of the chief sources of the building up of German industry. With practical unanimity they favored preferential trading relations between all British countries, reciprocal trading relations between the British Empire and allied countries, favorable treatment of neutral countries, and restriction by tariffs and otherwise on all trade relations with enemy countries, so as to make impossible a return to pre-war conditions.

The blockade of Germany, and the policy and practice of the Government relating to the commerce passing into and from neutral countries, became such an extensive task that in February, 1916, it was departmentized. The war portfolio of Blockade Minister, with full-fledged cabinet rank, was created and bestowed on Lord Robert Cecil, who was thus charged with responsibility for the conduct of the blockade.

The war, despite the fact that it had closed political ranks in all belligerent countries, did not prevent France from having her accustomed periodic cabinet upheaval. At the close of October, 1915, the Viviani coalition ministry resigned after a life of fourteen months as a direct offspring of the declaration of war. Technically, there was no Cabinet crisis, the Government not having been defeated in the Chamber of Deputies, and no vote of lack of confidence was passed. But the fact that this war ministry collapsed showed that all had not been going well and that all elements of French opinion were not satisfied with the Government's policy. France, like Great Britain, was not averse to changing horses while crossing a stream; but her opponents vainly searched for evidence of internal weakness to explain her doing so. Premier Viviani would not disclose his letter of resignation to the Chamber; hence causes for the change had to be surmised. *Prima facie* grounds for the upheaval were seen in the failure of French diplomacy to avert the German coup in the Balkans, which was followed by the successful meeting of the Austro-German and Bulgarian forces in northeastern Serbia.

In this failure British diplomacy was involved; indeed, the Balkan policy, which was supposed to have wrecked the Viviani ministry, was believed by many observers to have had its inception in Downing Street. Sir Edward Grey, rather than M. Delcassé, was pointed to as the real culprit. Soon a change of cabinets was looked for in England too; but all that happened there, after recurrent rumors, based upon unsubstantial symptoms of a cabinet at cross purposes, had been the earlier withdrawal of Sir Edward Carson as Attorney General. This resignation was due to a conflict of opinion with his Cabinet

colleagues over the Balkan policy; but it stood alone, and caused only a passing flutter.

With Aristide Briand as the new Premier, with General Gallieni, the "savior of Paris," as War Minister, and with ex-Premier Viviani remaining in the Cabinet as Foreign Minister, France closed its administrative ranks again with greater cohesion. The new ministry comprised representatives of every party in France, whose inclusion was made with a view to securing the help of the ablest statesmen of all factions and capitalizing the greatest political reputations in the Republic. No French cabinet had ever before had such a mixed constitution. The formation of such a novel ministry was the culmination of deep popular sentiment demanding that, at the supreme crisis of the war, party division should give way to united action in support of the Government. Premier Briand's first public act was to declare to the allies of France, and to her enemies, that the change in the Ministry was in no way a change of policy. That policy, he said, was summed up in the word "Victory."

The new Ministry duly faced the problem of food supplies. Prices had been soaring to a degree that demanded controlling legislation. France in this respect was forced to follow the example of Germany's organization and method in dealing with the question. The country, having its over-sea channels open, was not on short commons, and hence, unlike Germany, did not have its rations portioned out by means of bread, meat, and milk tickets. But food capitalists had been reaping rich harvests by speculation, supply control, and immoderate profits. The consequence was that many a household's commissary had to be curtailed through exorbitant prices and there was thus a dearth of necessities by reason of their costliness. The legislation agreed on, which fixed the prices for necessities, was aimed at the capitalists who manipulated the markets. The debate on the bill in the Chamber revealed that the remedies proposed were viewed as revolutionary, but nevertheless necessary in the interest of the nation. The food speculators were denounced, and stringent measures were urged against them as well as against merchants illegally exporting indispensable commodities to neutral coun-

tries—a practice said to be in part responsible for the high prices.

Toward the close of 1915 the most outstanding event in France was the success of the "loan of victory." The Government sought further sinews of war and appealed to all classes in the country to supply them. Over 3,000,000 of the people subscribed to the loan, 2,000,000 from the provinces and the remainder in Paris, the sum raised amounting to 14,500,000,000 francs (\$2,900,000,000). Addressing the Senate on December 24, 1915, M. Ribot, the Finance Minister, said:

"The reserves of France are still considerable. We have negotiated a loan later than others, and at this time our resources are coming fresh and are well arranged, while our enemies' financial strength is already showing signs of lassitude. We will overcome whatever difficulties may arise, because we have courage and resolution and the confidence of the country. Is it necessary to establish new taxes? Great Britain has done so, but she is differently situated. In France a new heavy tax could not be collected easily, and it would be a heavy burden on the country. We would be living then on credit. We have at last negotiated a loan under difficult conditions. At a moment when we were suffering from lack of united action, the allied powers and the country largely responded to our appeal. There was an infinite number of small subscriptions by the humble people. In England 200,000 subscribers brought us 600,000,000 francs (\$120,000,000). Everywhere we have received effective aid, which was due to the universal feeling that a weight too heavy would bear on the world if we were not victors in the fight for civilization."

The coalition ministry successfully resisted an attempt of the Socialists to overthrow them in February, 1916, on the question of whether too much authority was not being delegated to the General Staff. The attack had been in preparation for over a month; but it was based more on political rivalries than on real differences over the conduct of the war. Premier Briand on February 15, 1916, resolutely declined to have the Socialists' interpellation even discussed in the Chamber of Deputies, and de-

manded a vote of confidence in the Government, whom the Chamber upheld by 394 to 169.

France's finances at this period, as revealed by M. Ribot, Finance Minister, covered appropriations of 44,415,000,000 francs (\$8,883,000,000) from August, 1914, up to June 30, 1916, of which sum 32,449,000,000 francs was for purely military purposes. The Minister required 7,817,000,000 francs for the second quarter of 1916, of which all but 657,000,000 francs was for military purposes. The amount was 330,000,000 francs more than was appropriated for the first quarter. Virtually the whole of this increase was for artillery and accessories, the estimates for which had expanded to 2,450,000,000 francs. The provision for artillery and munitions for the second quarter of 1916 was in reality 450,000,000 francs more than the appropriation for the first quarter, indicating an enormous development in this arm of the service.

The financial measure showed that France had advanced 600,000,000 francs to Belgium, 165,000,000 francs to Serbia, 5,000,000 francs to Greece and 400,000 francs to Montenegro. Of the \$500,000,000 Anglo-French loan arranged with American bankers, France had received in cash, up to December 31, 1915, \$77,240,000, of which sum there remained at that date in New York cash to the amount of \$33,628,000. To obtain further revenue for the war, the Chamber of Deputies passed a bill taxing war profits, to remain effective a year after the cessation of hostilities. It was a levy on all who profited by the war, the regular suppliers of war necessities not being exempted.

Political harmony was firmly balanced in Italy between a Parliament with a majority of the followers of ex-Premier Giolitti, whose pro-German sympathies, while in office, retarded Italy's entrance into the war, and the Government of Premier Salandra, which had the nation behind it. Public opinion so strongly supported the Salandra cabinet in its war policy that the Giolittian Parliament, at heart opposed to the Government, refrained from giving vent to its hostility. Salandra, with Sonnino, his Secretary for Foreign Affairs, conducted the war under a mandate of the people expressed outside Parliament. Popular criticism of

NEW ZEPPELINS
AND OTHER
AIR RAIDERS AND SCOUTS

ALSO

COLONIAL TROOPS IN GERMAN EAST AFRICA AND AN AVIATOR'S
VIEW OF TROOPS MASSED BEHIND CLOUDS OF GAS




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A Fokker aeroplane, beaten in an air duel, is falling to the earth in flames. The Fokkers are swift German monoplanes, built especially for fighting other aircraft



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The armored car of a new French dirigible, in which men and engines are to some extent protected from the enemy's fire. The airship is being prepared for a flight



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Russian soldiers taking a German "Albatross" aeroplane to the repair shop. A shot broke the propeller, and the aviators were forced to descend within the Russian lines



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British aviator in a 'parasol' aeroplane. The identification mark of the Allies is clearly displayed on the underside of the wing




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An observation balloon in service with the Belgian army. It is held to the ground by heavy weights until the observers are ready



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The famous French aviator, Vedorines, loading the machine gun of his monoplane. These small, speedy machines are of particular service, like the German Fokkers, in outmaneuvering and fighting other aeroplanes



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This unusual picture, taken from a Russian aeroplane, shows German soldiers in line behind clouds of poison gas intended to demoralize troops in the Russian trenches. The Germans charge when the gas clears away.



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Colonial troops from South Africa resting after a day of fighting in German East Africa. The conquest of German colonies in Africa is of far-reaching importance to the British Empire



Drawn by Georges Scott for *L'illustration*

A German Zeppelin shot down by gunners with a French 75 on an automobile. Only a huge, twisted mass of metal framework and charred bodies remained

their handling of the war, which inevitably was not without its errors and deficiencies, was withheld from a recognition that otherwise a hostile and unrepresentative Parliament might be encouraged to voice its antagonism to the Government. Implicit trust, therefore, was reposed in Salandra and Sonnino, on whose leadership the people felt the successful outcome of the war with Austria depended. The popular confidence reposed in Sonnino was symptomatic of the times and the voluntary repression of animosities and prejudices, in that he was, before the war, an unloved and unpopular minister because of his intellectual aloofness from the people. But the war's progress made him probably stronger politically than even his most genial superior in the Cabinet, Premier Salandra.

With the beginning of 1916, after seven months' military operations against Austria and along the Adriatic, a notable change was discernible in the Italian spirit toward the war. The people, as those of the other allied countries had done earlier, passed from the ebullience of national enthusiasm to a cold, undemonstrative attitude of national determination. Neither excitement nor depression marked the new classes called under arms, but rather a matter-of-fact acceptance of the burdens of war. This dispassionate view of the situation, shared alike by the proletariat and the intellectual classes, was strikingly similar to the change which the war had wrought in the French temperament.

A war loan floated in February, 1916, revealed another trait the Italians had in common with the French by the large response of small investors, who subscribed as much from a conviction of the soundness of the loan as from patriotic considerations. It was the third war loan, the contributions to which eclipsed all expectations, reaching 3,000,000,000 lire (\$600,000,000). Inclusive of previous loans, the sum raised for the war exceeded 5,000,000,000 lire (\$1,000,000,000). The loan's success was largely due to an educational campaign inaugurated by the Salandra Government, and the use of theatres, newspapers, posters, booklets, and lectures, and other advertising propaganda.

Two blows were aimed at Germany about this time. One was a royal decree, issued on February 11, 1916, prohibiting the importation into or transit through Italy of all German as well as Austrian merchandise, in addition to the exportation of all merchandise of German and Austrian origin through Italian ports. All trading with Austria-Hungary had already been prohibited with Italy's declaration of war in May, 1915. The decree, in coupling Germany with Austria, was the first formal act on Italy's part breaking off commercial relations with Germany. Following this action, the Cabinet decided, in order to thwart Austro-German efforts after the war to recover lost Italian import trade, to permit the free importation from allied and friendly countries, during the next five years, of machinery, raw materials, and manufactured articles destined for the development of existing industries or the creation of new ones.

The other blow directed at Germany was the requisitioning on February 29, 1916, of thirty-four German vessels interned in Italian ports. When Italy declared war on Austria those ports sheltered fifty-seven German and Austrian ships, but the Austrian vessels were immediately seized. The confiscated German craft provided a useful contribution to allied shipping of which there was a shortage, due to submarine warfare and the transfer of many liners for military service as transports.

CHAPTER XXVI

TURMOIL IN RUSSIA OVER DEFEATS—AN ANGRY DUMA—FOOD SHORTAGE THROUGH TRANS- PORT DEFICIENCIES

IN Russia the war has created wide internal interest, principally manifested through the attitude of the Duma towards the Government. The body, in a critical and defiant mood, re-assembled in August, 1915, bent upon pressing numerous reforms which occupied the attention of the new Liberal and Demo-

cratic majority. It passed a bill for the formation of a board of munitions, on which the Duma and the Council of the Empire were to have equal representation and demanded that legal proceedings be taken at once against all, irrespective of their position in the state, who were responsible for the shortage of guns and munitions which had brought about the disasters in Poland and Galicia. It spoke with conspicuous freedom of the shortcomings of the Government, but its voice was unanimous for prosecuting the war to a victorious conclusion.

The politicians harried the Government by stirring up old contentious issues, many of which they wanted settled before the war ended. The reforms they demanded included the autonomy of Poland, the three divisions to be united within ethnographical limits under one parliament, with common ministers for war, marine, and foreign affairs; full civil rights to Jews and the removal of their present disabilities in inhabiting Russia proper; amnesty for all political prisoners; removal of disabilities of workingmen and recognition of the right of organization in trades unions, etc., a liberal and tolerant policy in respect to Finland; and complete economy and emancipation of commerce, especially from German restrictions. Another reform called for, which subsequent events nullified for the time being, was an alteration in the export arrangements of wheat in South Russia and generally in rates of exchange after the ultimate opening of the Dardanelles and the then probable possession of Constantinople.

As though this was not extensive enough a program for the Government to carry out, the Duma parties urged further reforms, to be granted after the war, or as soon as practicable. These embraced the appointment of a new legislative body elected by universal male suffrage; autonomy of Lithuania, Siberia, and the Caucasus; autonomy of the universities and the establishment of secular elementary schools; reforms in the Church, with restriction of the powers of the Synod and the retribution of the Patriarch; reform of municipal administration, the control of which was largely exercised by the great landowners; restriction of privileges enjoyed by local governors, and exercised in defi-

ance of the Minister of the Interior; restriction of the powers of the Upper House—the Council of the Empire; the liberty of the press, of speech, and of assembly; agrarian reforms; the greatest possible encouragement of industries; and the conclusion of a new commercial treaty with Germany, with terms designed to protect Russian industry, or the declaration of a tariff war as an alternative.

The Government considered the presentation of such a broad scheme of reforms as untimely. The czar exhorted the Duma to lay aside every preoccupation which diverted its concentrated attention from the war, and adjourned the session on September 16, 1915. The Duma did not meet again until February 22, 1916.

This abrupt disposal of the Duma only aggravated the discontent of the people with the Government, according to discerning observers, who foresaw Russia in revolution after the war ended, if not before. The empire was described as seething with conflicting emotions. The liberal leaders, whose program had been thrust aside as unpropitious by the Government, thus summed up conditions as they saw them: "The Russian people have two wars on their hands—an outside war and an inside war. We must vanquish the external enemy before we turn on the foe within. Otherwise we will lose both fights. Beat Germany first."

The causes of the popular dissatisfaction with the Government were deep-seated and manifold, but their immediate discontent was due to the conduct of the war. The Government was charged with inefficiency and corruption and was held responsible for the inadequate equipping of the army, especially the shortage in guns and ammunition, which had caused Russia's heaviest defeats. Ammunition gave out, it was alleged, because the officials charged with ordering it abroad withheld the orders while they haggled with the manufacturers for their personal commissions. The people also resented the removal of the Grand Duke Nicholas from his office as commander in chief of the Russian forces, and attributed it to jealousy, treachery, and other sinister influences at court. They were particularly in-

dignant in being denied their right to a share in the conduct of a war which concerned their most vital interests. The czar's peremptory adjournment of the Duma, and his failure to reconvene it, as promised, in December, 1915, fanned the popular dissatisfaction.

A shortage in sugar, flour and coal did not improve matters. The shortage was due to inadequate transportation, which prevented the flow of these commodities from certain provinces where there were ample supplies to the big cities. The purchase of these necessities by householders was restricted, and "bread and sugar lines" were the result. "A bread or sugar line is a splendid place to talk politics," wrote Gregory Mason, after a visit to Russia, "and a fertile field for the efforts of agitators. The million war refugees in Petrograd, the million in Moscow, and the hundreds of thousands in other cities and towns, like the discontented householders, also feel bitterly toward the Government which deliberately wiped out their homes as the army fell back, refusing to let the people remain and live behind the advancing German lines. Evidences of popular unrest are everywhere. Everywhere the engrossing subject is politics, whenever people come together for any purpose whatsoever, the conversation inevitably comes round to the internal situation. Every meeting for war relief, for the organization of national resources, for the discussion of art, agriculture, poetry, and what not, becomes a political meeting. In the restaurants, on the street cars, in their homes, the people talk politics, and in the hospitals similar discussions are kept up from cot to cot by wounded soldiers."

The position of the Government did not lend itself to ready analysis. Apparently it was not a unit, its agents being divided in their attitude toward the war and toward the important internal questions; but the Government's actions at least showed that its policy was to grant as little to the people as it could safely do, relying on the knowledge that the bulk of the populace were bent on keeping a united front against Germany, and would not disturb law and order, until Germany had been disposed of, unless inflamed beyond endurance.

As viewed by members of the Octobrist and Progressive parties, who were freely quoted in the news dispatches from Petrograd, the prorogation of the Duma was one of the severest tests which representative government in Russia had met since it came into being. Only the unwavering patriotism of the Duma leaders, they said, prevented the prorogation from becoming a disaster of the most far-reaching import. At one stage it threatened to precipitate a general strike in all the factories supplying the army, a consummation that would have left the army practically helpless.

The discontent appeared to have abated, as far as surface indications were a criterion, by the time the Duma reassembled on February 22, 1916. The czar tendered an olive branch by informally appearing in person at the proceedings, a visit that had no precedent in the history of the Duma on such an occasion. The incident had a favorable effect upon popular opinion, especially as the czar appeared without any of the formal ceremony customary in countries where the sovereign opens Parliament in state. He was heartily cheered by the deputies when the Duma's president received him at the portico, and later addressed the session. The president responded with a patriotic speech.

An event, not without its bearing on the internal situation in Russia, was the resignation of the Premier, J. L. Goremeykin, a short time before the Duma met. He was classed as having reactionary tendencies, and his appointment in 1914 was hailed as a triumph for the reactionary group. Ill health was the stated reason for his retirement. His successor was B. V. Struemer, a member of the Council of the Empire.

Russia had incurred a war debt of \$2,620,500,000 by the autumn of 1915. This comprised three internal loans, two of \$257,500,000 each and the third of \$575,000,000; an exterior issue of bonds of \$309,000,000; treasury bills of \$779,500,000; joint English and French advances amounting to \$277,000,000; and New York bank credit of \$25,000,000. In February, 1916, a further war loan of 2,000,000,000 rubles (\$1,000,000,000) was approved. Some time previously an imperial ukase was issued authorizing the Finance Minister to transact in foreign markets

credit operations amounting to 5,500,000,000 rubles (\$2,-750,000,000) and to issue abroad the necessary treasury notes in pounds, francs, and dollars. Steps had then been taken to reform the whole financial system of Russia, on the basis of the income tax, which had been approved by the Duma and was under the consideration of the Council of the Empire. All textiles were to be taxed, which would bring into the treasury \$75,000,000 annually. Schemes for creating tea, coffee, and match monopolies were also being planned. As to loans, the Russian market, according to the Finance Minister, was rich in resources. In the autumn of 1915 current deposits in private banks had reached a total of \$2,000,000,000, showing an increase for the year ended in September, 1915, of \$500,000,000, while the savings banks' monthly deposit increase was \$25,000,000.

Before the reopening of the Duma, the Minister of the Interior, M. Khvostoff, made an extended tour of the provinces to ascertain conditions prevailing, traveling unescorted and visiting districts unannounced to reduce to a minimum the possibility of deriving false impressions. He found general prosperity and an abundance of money in the rural sections, and an extraordinary confidence in the ultimate victory of Russian arms over the Teutonic forces. This sentiment, "coupled with the excellent relations prevailing in all ranks of society," he further reported, offered a striking contrast to the conditions during the Russo-Japanese War, and also to the present pessimism and class divisions observable in Petrograd and other centers.

The question of supplies became pressing, due to the diminution of the area of cultivable land under crops in consequence of the war. Agriculture supplied two-thirds of the total annual output of Russia. The war had withdrawn large numbers of rural workers to the army, and the area under crops had been reduced by ten per cent. This drawback had been counterbalanced by the stoppage of export, so that Russia had at her disposal corn enough for a year to come. Apart from corn, however, the question of supplies projected as of paramount importance for the successful prosecution of the war. The growing strain, the difficulties of transport (earlier referred to), the ap-

parent lack of any clear plan on the part of the Government, discussions between Government departments and conflicts between the police and local authorities on the supply question, aroused considerable anxiety. To maintain the area under crops, in addition to employing 380,000 war prisoners, the Ministry contemplated the employment of women and schoolboys, and perhaps of Chinese and Koreans in agricultural work, and also arranged to have soldiers sent home for seed time and harvest.

The lack of adequate transport for supplies seriously curtailed their distribution. In one district of Siberia were immense stocks of wheat, sufficient to supply European Russia for two years; but they could find no sale, owing to the absence of transport facilities. The question of meat supply was even more serious. The total number of horned cattle in the empire was 52,000,000 head. The annual increase was 9,000,000, which was also the amount of the annual consumption. The needs of the army raised the consumption to 14,000,000 annually, so that measures were needed to reduce the consumption of meat.

Political conditions in Germany as indicated by the outset of this review, remained static to the view of the outside world, beyond the skirmishes of a handful of irreconcilable Socialists who baited the Government without apparently disturbing it. Financial and industrial conditions were much more instructive regarding the actual situation in the empire than the externally unruffled working of its Government; but both were viewed from two aspects—one as seen through the rose-tinted glasses of official spokesmen and the other through the cold vision of press chroniclers.

The Government reports on the state of the nation were couched in the most optimistic view, depicting a satisfactory situation, though fraught with difficulties. But placed in conjunction with reports from other German sources, these official assurances that all was well became subject to considerable discount especially as to food supplies.

Germany's financial needs as the war progressed indicated that she must have approximately \$2,500,000,000 every six months. Between September, 1914, and August, 1915, she had raised or

sought about \$6,000,000,000 in three loans. This single year's obligations had more than doubled the entire outstanding debts of the empire and the individual German States combined. She had swelled her national debt by an amount equal to 10 per cent of the entire wealth of the country, or, in other words, had placed a 10 per cent blanket mortgage on the whole of Germany.

Notwithstanding this dead weight of new obligations, in August, 1915, Dr. Karl Helfferich, Secretary to the Imperial Treasury, sustained the customary official attitude of only seeing the bright side of German conditions. The British starvation war, he said, had failed:

"Our domestic production of foodstuffs, bread card system, and maximum prices assure even to the poorest the necessary supply of food and at prices lower than prevailing in Great Britain. Nor can we be starved out in raw materials. The difficulties cast in the way of their importation are unpleasant, but not fatal. We have an ample supply in our own country of the most important raw materials—coal and iron—and others manufactured and unmanufactured—great supplies which, with the economical employment thereof, insured by our methods of organization, are virtually inexhaustible.

"The specter of unemployment has been banished. There is more work than workers. The war has proved itself to be a greater employer of labor than our export trade was. We produce in our own country practically everything needed for war. Thus expenditures for war purposes resolve themselves into savings. These, again, are at the empire's disposition, as payments on the war loans and deposits are flowing into the banks and savings institutions more plentifully than in times of peace. The total deposits to-day, August 1, 1915, after over \$3,000,000,000 has been paid on war loans, is higher than at the outbreak of the war. The gold reserve of the Reichsbank has almost doubled since the war began. Notes and deposits in the Reichsbank covered by gold are 33½ per cent, as compared with 26.7 per cent in the Bank of France and 21.7 in the Bank of England."

Financial recovery in Germany, as the result of "rigid organization and discipline," was also reported in September, 1915, to the United States Government by the American Association of Trade and Commerce in Berlin.

"The change of the entire economic activity from its peace conformation to one of war," the association found, "has, with the aid of the Reichsbank, taken place rapidly and thoroughly. The establishment of the official loan banks and credit institutions has provided credit accommodation in abundant measure. It is significant that in the past year, when Germany was not only in a military, but also in an economic, sense, confronted with superiority of hostile forces, the issue of industrial securities did not come to a full stop. Besides the official new corporations organized as purely war measures, quite a number of new corporations having no war connection have been established. Many existing concerns have increased their capital stock. From the outbreak of the war up to August 1, 1915, altogether \$125,000,000 has been invested in new and existing industrial undertakings, as against new issues of \$250,000,000 in 1913."

The original war loan obtained by Germany from her own people amounted to \$1,115,000,000, the second \$2,265,000,000 and the third \$2,270,750,000, subscriptions for which began to flow in during the autumn of 1915. By the close of February, 1916, it was foreseen that in the financial year beginning the following April, 3,000,000,000 marks (\$750,000,000) would be needed for current expenses apart from the war on account of the great reductions in customs and current revenues, and that the budget would call for 5,500,000,000 marks (\$1,375,000,000), which would include 2,000,000,000 marks (\$500,000,000) interest on war loans. A fourth war loan was under way at this time for \$2,650,000,000, counting marks at their face value.

The German Government took pride in the popular response to the third war loan, which was for an indefinite amount bearing interest at 5.90 per cent. The two previous flotations had been made at 5 per cent. In December, 1915, Germany announced that the subscriptions paid "in cash" to the third loan were 10,452,000,000 marks or 86 per cent, while the amounts ad-

vanced by the loaning institutions were 630,700,000 marks. The percentage in cash and the number of subscriptions were larger for each loan, and afforded sufficient evidence of the universality of German sentiment in support of the German cause. The separate subscriptions for the third loan were 3,557,746, for the second 2,691,000, and for the first 1,177,235 marks. The number of small subscriptions also constantly increased. Thus applications for 2,000 marks (\$500) or less for the third loan were 2,983,799, for the second 2,113,220 and for the first 926,059 marks.

Thus Germans rallied to the support of the Fatherland in a manner rivaled only by the French. The popular subscriptions of both countries to war loans were in pointed contrast to the indifference of the British working classes to their Government's calls for money. Prosperous workmen in Great Britain neither put their funds in savings banks nor in war loans, according to accounts, but spent them in jewelry and automobiles and in unaccustomed luxuries and pleasures. On the other hand, the wealthy British poured their substance into the treasury, the British subscription war loans having been conspicuous for their size and the fewness as the German were for their comparative smallness and number.

German finances, and the Government's method of replenishing the war chest were examined externally from various angles both by hostile and neutral critics, and they were good or bad according to the viewpoint. What was abundantly plain was that Germany was meeting the emergency in her own way, with her people acquiescent and generous, and if her adversaries saw in the Government's methods a spurious solvency and future disaster, Germany herself did not.

British critics view the German war loans as a "towering pyramid of paper" and ironically complimented the German Government for having, in its wisdom, decided to substitute a paper currency for gold, and carrying out this policy with more than German thoroughness. They charged that assertion and appearances as to Germany's financial position were deceptive, and that it was needless to accuse the Reichsbank of "cooking" its figures

or of "lying" as to the amount of gold in its cellars, as, without any such allegations, the position of Germany was sufficiently serious. Great Britain, they pointed out, despite the heavy strain that had been put upon her, remained a free market for gold, while Germany, by contrast, immediately on the outbreak of the war, found it necessary to resort to an inconvertible paper currency. As a consequence the value of the German note abroad fell rapidly. One British observer, the "neutral correspondent" of the London "Times," thus summed up his views of the financial situation in Germany in January, 1916, after a tour through the central empires:

"A German war finance cannot be discussed upon a scientific basis. It is an economic outlaw. No serious expert would attempt to fix the intrinsic value of the mark. It may be worth fourteen or eighteen pfennig, as German bankers assert, or nothing, as some critics insist, upon the ground that the value of the mark can only be fixed at the end of the war when the exact amount of paper money will be known and a comparison is possible with the then existing stock in gold.

"Competent German financiers already have grave apprehensions with regard to the real amount of gold in stock. They think it quite possible that the figures published contain, for example, such foreign bills as have been received from the allied countries against advances in specie. [This is a presumable reference to German loans made to Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria.]

"The present state of things gives the people a feeling of uncertainty. They see the mark declining and wonder if it is not better to lose 40 or 45 per cent on their money now than perhaps much more later. Consequently the neutral countries have been lately flooded with German money and as a result the exchange has been still further lowered.

"There is some apprehension with regard to the ability to recognize foreign loans after the war. The possibility of national bankruptcy is openly discussed and the idea of a huge contribution to be levied from Germany's enemies is no longer held as a serious opinion. The people even speculate whether the

state is simply to reduce the war loan paper to a minimum percentage of face value or confiscate the capital."

The autumn of 1915 found Germany seriously alarmed regarding the food problem. There was much more tangible ground for contesting the official assurances of well-being in this direction than for questioning Germany's methods in the puzzling field of high finance. Leading German scientists, according to accounts from German sources, agreed that signs were not wanting that the limitation of food supply—brought about by the war—had already imposed an expected effect on the health and strength of the German people. The Government had initiated the measures of economy mentioned by Dr. Helfferich; but the savants, writing in German periodicals, urged that serious steps be taken at once to conserve the food supplies of the country.

Economic difficulties, in fact, due mainly to the increase in the retail price of most commodities, multiplied as the summer waned. Lard, butter, fat, meat, sausages, cheese, cereals, cocoa, coffee, sugar, salt, and all other food necessities were sold at an increase ranging from one and a half times to twice and even three times their former prices. Lentils and rice had long since been out of stock in the majority of stores. As all these articles formed an essential part of the daily fare of the working classes (from the tables of the wealthy their absence could hardly be noticed), the fears of the German people, as voiced by their press, became only too well founded. The Government's efforts to check the greed of the food capitalists apparently had been ineffective. Price inflation, traceable to this artificial cause, inspired the "*Neueste Nachrichten*" to utter this indignant protest:

"The poison fungus of the war usury, which not only exists but is spreading even wider, notwithstanding all the Draconic government regulations, must be uprooted and crushed. The name of everyone, no matter how highly placed, who engages in usury with the people's food must be published far and wide throughout the empire as that of an unscrupulous traitor, so that the example may strike terror into the hearts of others like

him, and so that at length there will be pure air to breathe in Germany."

Dear food and short supplies caused no little uneasiness and discontent, especially among the poorer classes, and journals of every political complexion urged the Government to relieve the strain. To the poor it was an almost unsupportable burden. An official statement made in August, 1915, that 60,000 tons of grain available would suffice till the new crop was marketed at the end of October, 1915, was flatly disputed by the Berlin "Vorwärts," the leading Social-Democratic organ in Prussia, as "nonsensical," because it worked out at only two ounces of breadstuff per head per day. "Even if the authorities contrive," said this organ, "on the basis of their new regulations, to supply the population with bread at prices within their reach, only the simpler portion of the Government's duty will have been fulfilled. The people cannot live on bread rations alone. Other necessities of life must also be placed under control, notably milk and meat."

On October 23, 1915, the Federal Government decided to assume control of the price and supply of victuals throughout Germany. The state provincial authorities had hitherto been deemed competent to control the food situation; but the German Government now considered it necessary to equalize and place under different conditions the distribution and price of victuals in the various sections of the Empire.

In explanation of this step the most sanguine of statements came from the Government by way of denying assertions made abroad that such a course proved the Allies' food blockade of German ports to be succeeding and that Germany was being slowly but surely starved out.

Acknowledging that Germany's whole economic life had been changed by the British embargo on all importations, the Government held that the old law of supply now no longer held good, as in times of peace. Hence Government regulations must supplant the law at many points—in order to spare the poorer population from excessively high prices.

"As a matter of fact," the statement continued, "we have carried over from last year's harvest into the new harvest so much

grain that we are compelled to let 3,000,000 tons of it be fed to the cattle. We can do this because we know the quality and quantity of our new grain crop. We have also this year such a record potato crop as Germany has never known before. We had figured on having a good crop of 45,000,000 tons of potatoes, but we have actually 60,000,000 tons. To this amount must be added a surplus of potatoes from the enemy's territory which is occupied by us. In this connection we are not even dependent on Germany for feeding our armies. The raising of hogs has in the last nine months had an undreamed-of impetus, which will be further increased by the mammoth potato crop."

CHAPTER XXVII

FOOD RIOTS AND PRIVATIONS IN GERMANY— SUPPRESSION OF COMPLAINTS OF CONDITIONS IN AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

SIMULTANEOUSLY came reports of housewives' food riots in Berlin, during which the women in their struggle to obtain butter and other commodities broke store windows and doors. Following these disturbances the authorities placarded the east side of Berlin, the poorer section of the city, with posters pointing out to the denizens the penalties for the violation of imperial statutes regarding mobs and rioting and the regulations of martial law under which Berlin was still governed. Nevertheless, reports persisted that riots owing to the scarcity of food were of almost daily occurrence.


The Berlin press did not disguise that the pinch of hunger was being felt, and that many in Berlin were suffering from lack of food. Toward noon, day after day, a motley crowd assembled at the doors of the military depots and barracks. It was composed, said the "Tägliche Rundschau," of shamefaced men and women, ancient wrinkled, shriveled little grandmothers, old men, young men, and children. They waited patiently for an hour and a

half, sometimes in a pelting rain, until a kitchen servitor appeared carrying a huge saucepan containing the leavings of the soldiers' dinner, pieces of fat meat and bone, bread, potatoes, and table scraps of all kinds. The old people hobbled forward to present their pots and pannikins; but the younger and more robust elbowed them aside, with the result that their elders departed with their hands as empty as their stomachs. They reappeared each day till they collapsed.

Before the municipal shops for the sale of meat and fat thousands assembled in all weathers and fought to obtain a scrap of meat. Masses of people crushed together in their eagerness long before the shops opened, and then nearly tore the clothes from one another's backs in order to get the coveted treasure.

Side by side with dearer and less food came an accession of means to purchase it, as far as the artisan classes were concerned. The huge orders and losses of the war had had the paradoxical effect of placing the German workingman in a position of prosperity—unexampled in his history—of raising his wages to a point never before attained, and of almost completely solving his nonemployment problem. Dr. Helfferich's roseate picture of labor conditions at least found confirmation from unofficial sources which, in view of the restraints and noncommittal tone imposed upon governmental utterances by the exigencies of war, began to be viewed as more trustworthy. The faster the men at the front fell and the gaps in the ranks were filled the better became the prosperity of the workers at home, and the higher mounted the saving-bank deposits of the few doing the work of the former many.

As in Great Britain, the flourishing condition of labor generally was due to the impetus of war industries which displaced other fields of work wherein the men found their subsistence in peace times. War trades had ousted peace trades, and among the latter severely hit was the textile industry. Raw materials—cotton and most of the other elements of manufacture—were no longer obtainable in quantities sufficiently large to supply the innumerable factories. The diminution of imports, followed by their almost complete stoppage, only aggravated the situation in



this field. An official sequestration of stocks throughout Germany, and their redistribution, which was viewed as judicious and equitable, proved to be only palliative measures. Hundreds of thousands of workmen were affected by the depression, and to relieve it the labor unions invoked the aid of the state and municipalities.

The official optimism regarding Germany's economic condition was not modified, though a statement made by the President of the Reichstag, Dr. Kaempf, when that body met on November 30, 1915, was qualified by the admission of a food shortage—an acknowledgment not previously made through Government channels. The official spokesmen's pronouncements regarding the country's food supplies had, in fact, been unconsciously paradoxical in that, while impetuously defending submarine warfare as a retaliation for Great Britain's "policy of starvation," they declared that Germany could not run short of anything, and hence could not be starved. Dr. Kaempf's observations at least were more definite.

"All our enemies have recognized that we are invincible on the battle field; so the more eagerly do they cling to the hope to destroy us economically, to conquer us by hunger. As they allow themselves to be deceived regarding our financial strength, which has been proved by the astonishing success of our war loans, so they have also been deceived in their estimate of our economic strength. We have grain for bread; potatoes, the most important food of the people, are abundant. If in other things there may be scarcity, as cannot be disputed, yet the hardships thus caused to a majority of our population will be surmounted by the organization of the provision market. We therefore, financially and economically, have every reason to contemplate the future with firm determination and unshaken confidence."

Concurrently with the delivery of this speech the German Government was reported to be taking energetic action to stop reports of starvation. The Agricultural Union, as a mouthpiece of the Government, issued a proclamation urging the German population to abstain from complaints. "Complaining," it warned, "is useless, and its only result is to rekindle the enemy's

hopes of a final victory." The suspension of a dozen newspapers was announced for printing articles relating to the food question. Maximilian Harden, who could not be effectually silenced, wrote in "Die Zukunft": "We must confess that the German people for the moment are suffering great want." The Social-Democratic organ, "Vorwärts," whose suspensions did not succeed in bridling its utterances, commented: "The upshot of the matter is that there must be no more complaints in the press about the dearth of foodstuffs. The Government should set an example by ameliorating the situation in such a way that the people will no longer have cause for complaint."

These were the conditions in the latter part of 1915. By the new year of 1916 the Government apparently had not succeeded in muzzling the press, which denied official assertions made in the Reichstag that the German food supply was ample and starvation impossible in consequence of the British blockade, and gave further indications of the increasing pinch of hunger. The "Berliner Zeitung" thus described the situation:

"It is difficult to imagine that things could grow worse just now without some crowning disaster. The masses of the people are hungry all day long, many articles of food having reached a price wholly beyond the reach of the families of the working class. Hunger renders the people sullen and deprives them of all joy in victories, though all the bells are ringing and flags wave. The children are underfed, pale and wan, looking like fading flowers. In the meantime we are informed that the military authorities have forbidden meetings convened to discuss the high cost of living."

Germany searched for food and raw materials outside her frontiers through a noteworthy institution called into existence by the war, known as the Zentral Einkaufs-Gesellschaft (Central Purchasing Company), which had the strong backing of the Government, and whose tentacles were described as penetrating everywhere. Its aim was to buy foodstuffs and raw materials in every market in the world to which it could gain access directly or indirectly, and sell them in Germany at the lowest possible price, with little if any profit. A Hungarian chronicler of its

operations recounted that Turkey, Rumania, Bulgaria, Scandinavia, and even Hungary were ransacked from end to end for every ounce of foodstuffs and raw materials with which their merchants could be induced to part.

"In Turkey and Bulgaria," he said, "Germany contrived to obtain a monopoly of supplies, shutting out even her allies, Austria and Hungary, from any direct purchasing. Only the Z. E. G. (as the German's purchasing company was called) has the right to buy goods in Turkey and Bulgaria. Then the company distributes the goods purchased among the three allies, Germany, Austria, and Hungary, in certain proportions. Of cereals Germany gets 50 per cent, Austria 30 per cent, and Hungary 20 per cent. At least that is the division in theory. Actually Germany gets two-thirds of the whole, and Austria and Hungary only one-third between them. Then of raw materials so purchased Germany gets 60 per cent, Austria 36 per cent, and Hungary only 4 per cent. But here again reality differs from the theory, for in practice Hungary got nothing.

"The activity of the Z. E. G. explains a fact that has caused much mystification, the fact, namely, that Germany is much better provided with foodstuffs than is Austria-Hungary, although the latter is largely agricultural. For example, no sooner were communications opened with Bulgaria than the Z. E. G. hastened to Sofia and bought up all that was to be obtained, while the Austrians were debating the question of making more purchases from Bulgaria. By the time the Austrians had made up their minds to buy, the Germans were actually carrying off the goods. Precisely the same thing happened in Turkey. The work of the Z. E. G. also throws considerable light on the question of economic exhaustion and explains why that exhaustion has not been so rapid as many expected. Its work has been most thorough. Hungary had formed a War Products Company, and the Austrians a War Cereals Company with similar aims; but the Z. E. G. obtained control of both these companies, and so acquired a practical monopoly."

The conclusion reached from these successful commercial activities of Germany was that she not only dominated the armies

in the field but the Governments of her allies, and that this economic control was tolerated without being pleasing to Austria and Hungary. The situation created doubts whether the projected customs union between Germany and Austria-Hungary—Germany's stepping to economic domination—was really practicable and likely to work without friction, and whether the economic situation was such that the Teutonic Powers could face with equanimity a long continuance of the war.

The conditions in Austria-Hungary present themselves for a brief glance. Several members of the Austrian Cabinet resigned in November, 1915, revealing a rupture which was interpreted as showing, not a cleavage over Germany's war policy, but rather the inability of responsible ministers to carry it out. The outgoing ministers were Dr. Karl Heinold von Udynski, Dr. Rudolf Schuster von Bonnott, and Baron Engel von Mainfelden, who held the portfolios of the Interior, Commerce, and Finance respectively.

While their resignations apparently had no direct bearing upon the international status of the Dual Monarchy, or upon the sentiment of the Reichsrath, whose majority they represented, they had a considerable relation to the economic and financial situation in Austria.

The resignations meant, according to accredited chroniclers, that the departing ministers had no program to offer to show how Austria was to raise her quota for the continuance of the war, and that they had exhausted all means of raising money from internal taxation, commerce, and duties on imports. They were known to be Pan-Germanic in sentiment, affiliations and politics. Succeeding them were financial experts—the President of the Supreme Court of Accounts, the Director of the Kredit-Anstalt, and the Governor of the Postal Savings Bank—who were not politicians, and whose services, it was reported, could hardly have been demanded unless the economic condition of the country was realized to be desperate.

These cabinet changes in Austria timed with a visit the German Emperor paid to Vienna, and political seers saw in this conjunction of events a divergence of views between Germany and

Austria regarding the war, and an attempt by the kaiser to reconcile them. From Rome it was said that the object of the kaiser's visit was to put a stop to efforts Austria was believed to be making, by means of negotiations through Madrid with the Vatican, to obtain a separate peace with the Quadruple Entente. If there was any rift within the lute in Austro-German relations regarding the war, events did not reveal it. Hence the explanation of the ministerial resignations could not be sought in any declared opposition by Austria to continuing the war according to the Hohenzollern program, but lay in the confessed inability of the ministers to provide adequate funds to sustain that program.

Germany, as the dominating partner of the Dual Alliance, had accommodated Austria with \$136,000,000, \$76,000,000 of which was loaned by German banks, the remainder, \$60,000,000 being a credit in Germany for the purposes of the war. At home Austria had raised \$433,000,000, a Hungarian loan of \$237,000,000, and a second war loan in the autumn of 1915 of \$900,000,000. At that date, therefore, Austria's war loan had reached the sum of \$1,706,000,000.

Austria-Hungary, like Germany, had her tribulations through a shortage of necessities. Riots and widespread distress were reported from Hungary. In Vienna, during the autumn of 1915, food prices advanced by leaps and bounds. Coal became dearer as winter aproached, and clothing doubled in price. The immediate outlook for the great mass of the population was the reverse of propitious. The transportation of food had become demoralized owing to nine-tenths of the able-bodied men in Vienna having been taken by the army, depleting the carriers of necessary labor to transport the supplies. The city council at length had to utilize the municipal street cars to carry great quantities of flour, provisions, and coal, which cluttered the railway warehouses, to the storekeepers. Food speculators created an artificial famine by hiding enormous stores of provisions. The police, suspecting that huge stocks of necessities were kept concealed in the city until famine prices soared, raided storage warehouses, discovering hundreds of tons of rice, flour, sugar,

cheese, canned goods, chocolate, currants, tea, coffee, and condensed milk.

The retail bakeries lacked sufficient flour. In the poorer suburbs the inhabitants gathered around the stores as early as three in the morning, and by six o'clock the crowds numbered between 500 and 1,000, mostly women and children. The bakeries opened at seven, and before an hour had elapsed they were sold out. Late comers got nothing. Vienna conditions were said to be representative of those prevalent in other cities.

The same story of privation was heard from Hungary. In October, 1915, the country was reported to be practically in a state of famine, especially in Budapest, where the population was described as being on the brink of starvation. Prices were rising by leaps and bounds, showing increases of 40 to 70 per cent, and even at that cost certain necessities were not to be obtained. The press, even the subsidized organs, accused the Government of gross neglect in despairing articles. Two meatless days a week became seven meatless days, and only the wealthy could afford to have meat five times a week. Butter cost \$1.50 to \$1.75 per kilogram, and chickens \$1.25 each. Bread was three times as dear as in Germany, where Hungarian flour, it was complained, was used in making it.

Food remained dear and scarce in Austria-Hungary throughout the winter. By February, 1916, the people were tired of the war and longed for peace. Destitution and unemployment were widespread in Vienna, where crippled officers and soldiers crowded the streets. The shops were empty and many factories closed.

Few men were seen who were not wearing uniforms, including youths and graybeards. Women had taken the place of men everywhere, especially as drivers and lamplighters, while they performed every kind of manual labor. They drove the street cars and collected the fares. The people were sad and depressed and insufficiently fed.

A manifest dearth of men for war service in Austria was evident by her calling out old men to the colors in her Landsturm classes of 1865, 1866, 1867, 1868, 1869, 1870, 1871, and 1872.

Men of the class of 1865 would be 69 years old, while those of the class of 1872 would be 62. Presumably they would be detailed to clerical positions or to act as guards on home service, thus releasing younger men for field warfare.

CHAPTER XXVIII

TURKEY'S LOAD OF DEBT—EXTERMINATION OF ARMENIANS—CHARGED WITH AIDING RUSSIA

A GLANCE at conditions in Turkey appeared to reveal an insolvent nation linked as a heavy drag to the already overburdened Teutonic powers. Her entrance into the war increased her debt incubus by joining in the war by \$108,000,000 loaned to her by Germany. In February, 1916, a further German loan of \$106,000,000 was in contemplation. Her national indebtedness—funded, floating, and unprovided—approached \$1,000,000,000 at the time of her taking up arms with the Teutonic Powers. The mere annual charge on the portion of that debt covered by loans amounted to about a third of her actual revenue, which was not one-seventh of her liabilities.

Turkey's war with the Balkan States added above a year's revenue to her debt and more than that to her liabilities, robbed her of one-tenth of that revenue and an eighth of her population by the loss of Macedonia and the isles. After that war, fast bound as she was already in international shackles, she riveted yet others on herself by perpetuating foreign monopolies, and mortgaging what was left of her economic liberty to Paris bankers and the French Government.

France, in fact, held nearly 60 per cent of the Ottoman debt before the Balkan wars, and found \$150,000,000 more for her afterward. Germany stood second with over 20 per cent, and Great Britain came third with the remainder. At an increasing rate during recent years her great creditors exacted

from Turkey, in return for loans, not merely security for high interest and repayment of capital, but also exclusive concessions in which their nationals invested. The French loan of \$150,000,000 imposed extraordinary conditions in the shape of concessions to French capitalists to construct railroads, highways, harbor works, etc., almost all over the Ottoman Empire. Turkey's participation in the war as a Teuton ally canceled these concessions.

The desperate condition of Turkey's finances had hitherto been a protection to her. The certain loss involved in foreclosure, added to the opposition which any one creditor who proposed such a course expected to meet from the rest, not only deterred all, but left them no choice but to agree to bolster her up. Her temerity in joining in the present war made it less certain that the international props which sustained her in the past would remain standing. If she went into bankruptcy by repudiating her international debt, as it was reported she threatened to do, she would lose all protection from her financial position. The actual international situation also created the contingency that two of her creditors, holding together nearly 80 per cent of her debt, might agree to foreclose jointly, irrespective of the others. By the cancellation of her concessions by the war, France stood to lose heavily, even though the interest and capital of her actual loans still proved to be secure.

The situation existed in which one, at least, of the belligerents might find that its prospective national loss outweighed any gain to be expected from the continued solvency of Turkey. Hence should she decide not to seek dissolution but bankruptcy, the outlook was that she would find the protection which her financial position used to afford her dangerously diminished or even destroyed. The course of the war has not improved the prospects of her financial *status quo*, remaining as it was before she entered the war. France's ally, Russia, has overrun Armenia, and her possession of that territory constitutes an asset for the French loans which will figure as one of the determining elements in the peace settlement as it will relate to the disposition of the Ottoman Empire.

Turkey at war did not predicate any change bringing devastating conditions within her borders. Economically, she was buttressed by her Teutonic allies. Meager reports indicated that her populace was feeling the pinch and that the voices of malcontents had been raised against the Germanic overlordship. But war conditions were not unusual. After Turkey's conflict with Greece, there followed the Balkan wars, and then the European upheaval. A long peace in Belgium, Germany, and Austria-Hungary made war conditions and deprivations stand out in sharp contrast to the placid movement of their national life before the guns boomed. A long peace was not Turkey's lot. Hence war conditions were not far removed from normal conditions.

Armenia suffered most. Wholesale massacres were reported from that Turkish province in the summer of 1915, through Tiflis, a Russian city. Toward the end of October, 1915, the estimate was made that of the 1,200,000 Armenian inhabitants in Turkey before the war there remained not more than 200,000. The figures were based on a statement of the Armenian Patriarch at Constantinople that 800,000 had been killed or enslaved by the Turks and 200,000 had fled, supposedly by way of Russia and Persia. Tiflis was the chief center of news regarding the massacres, and because that city was in Russian territory the gruesome stories circulated from it lent themselves to the charge of exaggeration. The only doubtful question was the extent of the massacres. That they had taken place, the Turks admitted, and defended their course as a military measure enforced on them by a disloyal race.

According to Lord Bryce, the horrors of the massacres exceeded anything in the history of persecutions. Women and children had been driven across the Arabian desert with whips. At Trebizond the Turks carried their victims out to sea in boats and drowned them.

The process of extermination was not confined to Armenia, but was organized throughout the whole Ottoman Empire. Seven of the most prominent Armenians in Constantinople were hanged in the streets. American missionaries in Asia Minor reported that they were unable to afford more than temporary pro-

tection to their Armenian pupils, as Turkish soldiers entered the missions and slaughtered the Armenians before their eyes.

A French eyewitness said the extermination was carried out by three means—massacre, deportation and forced conversion to Islam, the Armenians being Christians. The Government had released from prisons criminals whom it organized and enrolled. These criminals were in charge of the Armenian convoys, and, the narrator stated, there was no brutality that they did not commit.

There were massacres in Constantinople. In the provinces the violence of events was described as surpassing all that could be imagined. Whole towns were sacked and the inhabitants sent to the interior. At Marsivan the men were told they need not take provisions with them; they would be fed on the way. Before their eyes their town was then burned, and they were taken to a series of graves already prepared and killed.

The Italian consul at Trebizond recounted that the Armenians there were interned, and were then sent under escort to distant regions, but the fate of at least four-fifths of them was death. The local authorities tried to resist, and to decrease the number of victims by hiding them, but in vain. The orders from Constantinople were categorical, and all had to obey. The scenes that ensued were of "desolation, tears, curses, suicides to save honor, sudden insanity, fires, shooting in the streets and in the houses," and continued daily for a month.

Endeavors made by the American Committee on Armenian Atrocities to furnish food to the victims ordered deported to distant parts of the Ottoman Empire were frustrated by the Turkish authorities, who declared that "they wished nothing to be done that would prolong their lives."

There were rumors, which the British Government hesitated to accept, that German consular representatives in Asia had encouraged the massacres. The Marquis of Crewe told the House of Lords that this charge had been made by an American observer, but he was bound to say that, "knowing what had happened elsewhere, there could not be said to be antecedent improbabilities that such were the case."

Lord Bryce's view was that the only means of saving the remnants of the Armenians from Turkey's policy of extermination lay in the weight of the world's opinion, especially of neutral countries, which might prevail upon Germany to interpose and induce her ally to stop further massacres. The Germans, however, had excused the Turks on the ground that the Armenians had rebelled—a charge Lord Bryce denounced as untrue. The Armenians, he said, were quiet and inoffensive while forced to defend themselves.

The United States was approached to protest to Turkey against the adoption of such barbarous methods against her own people. But the State Department would do no more than make informal representations to the Ottoman Government through Ambassador Morgenthau pointing out the bad effect such treatment of the Armenians threatened to have upon public opinion in the United States. The Turkish legation filed a series of countercharges with the State Department accusing Armenians and Greeks, aided by Russian troops, of wronging the Turks by committing barbarous acts upon Moslems in the Caucasian frontier. Later, the Ottoman Government issued its official defense of the massacres, in reply to the American protest, laying the blame for the bloodshed on revolutionary uprisings among the Armenians incited by the British, French, and Russian Governments.

On behalf of Turkey it was submitted that the Armenians had seized upon her entrance into the war as an opportunity to revolt and aid the Russian campaign in the Caucasus. In substantiation of this defense, one Turkish sympathizer quoted an American missionary as an eyewitness of a battle to which he thus referred: "For twenty-seven days 1,500 determined Armenians held Van against 5,000 Turks and Kurds." It was in Van and its vicinity, where the internal revolt of the Armenians was said to have spread, that the Russians succeeded in invading Turkish territory. The Armenians were driven en masse from this territory. The Turks justified this expulsion as a penalty imposed on the Armenians for aiding the Russians. So, from the Turkish viewpoint, the Armenians had only themselves to blame for what

befell them. The Turks reasoned that a legally constituted government, having been deceived by the treason of a certain element of the population, took necessarily severe measures to prevent the repetition of a similar treason, and the consequences it would have on any other part of the country, by concentrating, in a place easy to control, all and every member of such a turbulent element.

PART VII—THE UNITED STATES AND THE BELLIGERENTS

CHAPTER XXIX

SINKING OF THE ARABIC—ANOTHER CRISIS— GERMANY'S DEFENSE AND CONCESSIONS

THE *Lusitania* issue, after the dispatch to Germany of the third American note of July 21, 1915, was withdrawn from the publicity in which the exchange of diplomatic communications had been made. Note writing having fulfilled its mission in stating the case, an interlude followed devoted to private conversations between the American Ambassador at Berlin and the German Foreign Office and between the German Ambassador at Washington and the State Department. Apparently a way out of the *impasse* was seen in conferences in the privacy of the chancelleries rather than by negotiations conducted in the light of day on the theory that absorbed public observation and criticism of every stage in the exchanges was not helpful to a settlement. But time did not show that this resort to secrecy smoothed the path of Germany meeting the American demands.

In fact, the ruthless course of the submarine warfare, which the sinking of the *Lusitania* only momentarily checked, relegated that specific issue to the background, or at least made it only one of a series of indictments by the United States of the entire submarine policy pursued by the Teutonic Powers.

Thirty days after the American Government had warned Germany that any further contravention of American neutral rights at sea would be regarded as an act "deliberately unfriendly," the

White Star Atlantic liner, the *Arabic*, with twenty-nine Americans among her company, was sunk without warning off the south of Ireland by a German submarine. Germany had not responded to the reiterated demands made in the third American note on the *Lusitania* and the question was impetuously asked in the press: Was the sinking of the *Arabic* Germany's answer? This view of Germany's second blow at transatlantic liners, made at a time when the *Lusitania* crisis had only seemingly abated because withdrawn from the public gaze, found its best expression from a pro-German quarter. The "New Yorker Staats-Zeitung" deplored the absence of a reply from the German Government to the third *Lusitania* note as "most unfortunate," because the subsequent destruction of the *Arabic* could therefore be held to be a "direct challenge," particularly as reports showed that the liner had been torpedoed without warning and the rescuing of the passengers had been left to "blind chance."

The *Arabic* was bound from Liverpool to New York, so that the motive for sinking her could not be that advanced by Germany for destroying the *Lusitania*—that the vessel was carrying war munitions to her enemies. The fact that she was headed for the United States inspired some incensed commentators to make the direct charge that the German submarine commander deliberately aimed at the lives of Americans on board. As elsewhere described, the *Arabic* was sunk on August 19, 1915, without being first warned by the attacking submarine. Abundant testimony from survivors satisfied the Administration as to this circumstance, in addition to disproving the belief originating from German sources that the liner was being convoyed by a warship, whose presence would deprive her of any right to protection from attack. The Administration was also assured that the liner, contrary to Germany's allegation, did not attempt to ram the submarine or escape from it. Two Americans were among the passengers lost; but this was not the sole issue.

The days immediately following were charged with dangerous undercurrents. The President was silent. Had he not said all there was to be said in the *Lusitania* notes? But there was no doubt that the press correctly divined what was passing through

his mind, and the press said that, short of a satisfactory explanation from Germany, made in a proper spirit, accompanied by a disavowal of the deed, a break in diplomatic relations was inevitable. But the onus was on Germany to speak before the Administration took action, which could not take the form of another protest. The situation had grown beyond the stage of protests. They had already been made. If Germany could not show extenuating circumstances that palliated the sinking of the *Arabic*, the President must act on his *Lusitania* warning, or remain silent—must go forward or recede.

This ominous condition of American sentiment was not lost on Germany. It was true the Berlin press affected an apathetic tone in referring to the *Arabic*, saw nothing calling for perturbation, and, in casting doubt on the accounts of the liner's destruction, hinted that a mine was responsible. But the German Government, wisely informed by Count von Bernstorff on the state of American feeling, knew better than to belittle the situation. Pending the receipt of any report from the submarine commander who sank the *Arabic*, it charged Ambassador von Bernstorff to ask the American Government to defer judgment.

"The German Government," Count von Bernstorff pleaded, "trusts that the American Government will not take a definite stand after hearing the reports of only one side, which in the opinion of the Imperial Government cannot correspond with the facts, but that a chance be given Germany to be heard equally. Although the Imperial Government does not doubt the good faith of the witnesses whose statements are reported by the newspapers in Europe, it should be borne in mind that these statements are naturally made under excitement, which might easily produce wrong impressions. If Americans should actually have lost their lives, this would naturally be contrary to our intentions. The German Government would deeply regret the fact and beg to tender sincerest sympathies to the American Government."

This statement, made five days after the *Arabic*'s destruction, was viewed as the first ray of hope in the crisis. A disavowal of unfriendly intent was seen in the regrets expressed for the loss

of American lives. There was a disposition to credit Germany with cherishing a desire to avert a rupture with the United States and to go to considerable lengths in that endeavor. This impression eased the Washington atmosphere, which had been weighed by the President's determination not to depart from the stand he took in the third *Lusitania* note, and also by Germany's apparent indifference to its warning, as shown by her pursuit of submarine warfare seemingly regardless of consequences.

What the "facts" were in the sinking of the *Arabic* to which, according to the German statement, the reports to hand could not correspond, exercised official Washington. As the German Government had not so far heard from the submarine commander of its own acknowledgment, it could not itself be aware of this version of how the *Arabic* sank. Why Germany was so confident that the reports the Administration accepted were inaccurate was explained on the surmise that she had revised her orders to submarine commanders governing the conduct of their operations. For some time before the sinking of the *Arabic* the German submarine commanders had been conforming closely to the rules of search and seizure demanded by the United States. The sudden divergence from this procedure in the sinking of the *Arabic*, according to the accepted reports, implied that the submarine commander had contravened instructions, or could plead justification. Germany was indisposed to believe that the submarine commander had disobeyed orders. But if he had done so, the German Government would give "full satisfaction" to the United States. This assurance came from the Imperial German Chancellor, Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg, the day after Ambassador von Bernstorff had revealed Germany's conciliatory spirit.

The United States consented to withhold judgment until Germany had presented her side of the case. Meantime Count von Bernstorff urged upon his Government the imperative necessity of making more substantial concessions to the United States on the submarine issue. Another catastrophe such as the sinking of the *Lusitania* or *Arabic*, he warned Berlin, would aggravate the situation beyond his control. That Germany recognized the danger was shown by a further declaration from her Imperial

Chancellor on August 26, 1915, wherein he endeavored to placate American feeling by declaring that the sinking of the *Arabic*, if caused by a German submarine, was not a "deliberately unfriendly act," but, if the accepted version of the disaster proved to be true, was "the arbitrary deed of the submarine commander, not only not sanctioned but decidedly condemned by the German Government," and that the latter, being "most anxious to maintain amicable relations with the United States, would express its deep regret and make full reparation." This conditional promise was made in the continued absence of any report from the implicated submarine commander, whose silence became mysterious. The British added to the perplexity by making the unqualified statement that the submarine which sank the *Arabic* had herself been sunk by a British patrol boat.

While the United States waited significantly for Germany to make the *amende honorable*, an internal conflict was proceeding in Berlin over the submarine policy. The *Arabic* crisis had been transferred to Germany by the stand the Chancellor, Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg, and the Foreign Minister, Herr von Jagow, made for modifying the ruthless conditions under which the German admiralty had pursued the submarine warfare. Grand Admiral von Tirpitz and the extremists opposed any relaxation permitting passenger ships to be warned before being torpedoed or safeguarding the lives of passengers. The chancellor desired to place Germany on record as an observer of international law, and the kaiser faced the task of determining which side should prevail.

Admiral von Tirpitz was generally regarded as the originator of the policy of sinking merchant shipping without heeding the recognized laws of visit and search. "What would America say if Germany declares war on all enemy merchant ships?" he had asked before Germany initiated the submarine methods which caused the destruction of the *Lusitania* and the *Arabic* and numerous other craft. His view of the *Lusitania* issue, as freely expressed in an interview, was that the maintenance of friendly relations with the United States was of far less importance than the continuance of the submarine blockade of British ports, and

that the entrance of the United States into the war among Germany's enemies was preferable to acceding to the American demands.

Since the *Lusitania* disaster the imperial chancellor had been the target of sustained attacks from the Von Tirpitz group, who charged that he was not radical enough and inclined to abandon the extreme aims of German policy. The agitation attained such serious proportions that the National Liberal party issued a statement denying knowledge of any lack of confidence in the Government. Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg's difficult position in trying to save Germany from international outlawry, however, was not sensibly weakened. Events temporarily showed that the kaiser concurred more in his view than that of the hotspurs. There was a momentary cessation of submarine activity. The chancellor's policy, the keynote of which was: "Keep at peace with the United States," gained the upper hand, and Admiral von Tirpitz grudgingly bowed to the chancellor's contentions, on the condition that his acquiescence must be deemed unofficial; but he held out against any formal disavowal by Germany of the sinking of the *Arabic*. This attitude was comprehensible, for a disavowal meant a repudiation of his submarine policy. Thus the surrender of the extremists did not go very far; it merely helped to relax the friction between the kaiser's councilors.

The outcome of this agreement was a note (September 1, 1915) from Count von Bernstorff to Secretary Lansing announcing that his instructions concerning Germany's answer to the last American note on the *Lusitania* contained this passage:

"Liners will not be sunk by our submarines without warning and without safety of the lives of noncombatants, provided the liners do not try to escape or offer resistance."

The German Ambassador added that this policy had been decided on before the *Arabic* was sunk. Secretary Lansing, commenting upon this abatement of Germany's sea war methods, said: "It appears to be a recognition of the fundamental principles for which we have contended." A settlement of the *Lusitania* case, however, was deferred until that of the *Arabic* had been satisfactorily disposed of.

The atmosphere was clearer. But Germany was still silent regarding the report of the submarine commander, on whose version of the *Arabic*'s destruction hinged the question whether Germany would disavow his act. The report that the submarine had been sunk revived in London, but the British admiralty maintained an impenetrable silence regarding its truth or falsehood. The circumstantial story was that the submarine later sighted a cattle boat, and was engaged in shelling it when a British patrol boat appeared and, opening fire, sank the submarine with its crew except two or three survivors. Hence London concluded that in the disappearance of the submarine lay Germany's reason for her readiness to climb down to the United States on the *Arabic* controversy.

On September 7, 1915, nineteen days after the *Arabic* was sunk, Germany appeared to disprove this story of furnishing a report to the American Government giving the submarine commander's account of the sinking. This delay was in contrast to the promptitude with which the German Government had officially announced the sinking of the *Lusitania*. The British openly charged that Germany could not have heard from the submarine commander, for the sufficient reason, they iterated, that he was drowned with his craft, and that the German Government, waiting in vain for him to report, had resorted to "manufacturing" a report to conform with its preconceived theories of the *Arabic*'s destruction. This, however, remained an unsolved press controversy in face of the British admiralty's silence. The American Government gave no indication that it took cognizance of the charge, or that the British admiralty had privately enlightened it as to whether it had any real basis. Hence Germany's report officially stood unquestioned.

The defense of Germany was that before sighting the *Arabic* the submarine commander had stopped the British steamer *Dunsley* and was about to sink her by gunfire, after the crew had left the vessel, when the *Arabic* appeared, headed directly toward the submarine. From the *Arabic*'s movements the commander became convinced that the liner intended to attack and ram his submarine; whereupon, to forestall such an attack, he

ordered the submarine to dive, and fired a torpedo at the *Arabic*. After doing so he had convinced himself that the people on board were being rescued in fifteen boats.

"According to his instructions," the German report continued, "the commander was not allowed to attack the *Arabic* without warning and without saving the passengers' lives unless the ship attempted to escape or offered resistance. He was forced, however, to conclude from the attendant circumstances that the *Arabic* planned a violent attack on the submarine.

"The German Government most deeply regrets that lives were lost through the action of the commander. It particularly expresses this regret to the Government of the United States on account of the death of American citizens.

"The German Government is unable, however, to acknowledge any obligation to grant indemnity in the matter, even if the commander should have been mistaken as to the aggressive intentions of the *Arabic*.

"If it should prove to be the case that it is impossible for the German and American Governments to reach a harmonious opinion on this point, the German Government would be prepared to submit the difference of opinion, as being a question of international law, to The Hague Tribunal for arbitration, pursuant to Article 38 of The Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes.

"In so doing it assumes that, as a matter of course, the arbitral decision shall not be admitted to have the importance of a general decision on the permissibility or the converse under international law of German submarine warfare."

Here Germany affirmed that submarine commanders were forbidden to attack liners without warning and safeguarding passengers' lives, but that commanders could justifiably disregard this precaution if they deemed that a vessel's movements, designedly or otherwise, jeopardized the safety of the attacking submarine. On this reasoning a submarine commander could excuse a wanton act on the plea of self-defense, which Germany appeared eager to accept, whether the need of self-defense was actual or fancied.

The Washington Government declined to consent to clothing a submarine commander with the discretionary power of determining whether a vessel should be sunk on sight because of movements he considered suspicious. The German Government would absolve him from blame and repudiate any obligation to grant indemnity, even if the commander was mistaken in attributing aggressive intentions in a vessel's movements. Germany's precept, as laid down by Count von Bernstorff in his note of September 1, 1915, and Germany's practice, as illustrated by the foregoing defense for the sinking of the *Arabic*, were thus widely divergent.

The situation receded to the *Lusitania* stage. Ambassador von Bernstorff's assurances as to warning and safety to passengers were negatived by the new condition that submarine commanders could disregard instructions, whether right or wrong, in doing so. The Administration accepted as convincing the abundant evidence before it that the *Arabic* made no attempt to ram the submarine. According to this testimony, no one on board the *Arabic* even saw the submarine; only the torpedo was seen coming from the direction of the sinking *Dunsley*, behind which, it was supposed, the submarine had been screened when the *Arabic* came in view, whereupon it submerged. Moreover, the *Arabic* was struck astern from a direction which showed that the submarine was at right angles to her. If the *Arabic* had been heading toward the submarine with the intention of ramming it, the torpedo should have struck her at the bow. But the *Arabic* testimony was that the submarine was invisible.

Germany's explanation was so unsatisfactory, so discredited by the overwhelming evidence of the *Arabic* survivors, as well as being qualified by an indirect recognition of the possibility that the submarine commander might have erred, that the question of severing diplomatic relations again became imminent. A resort to arbitration, as proposed by Germany, with the nullifying condition that any decision of a Hague tribunal was not to affect Germany's conduct of submarine warfare, was not deemed worthy of serious consideration. The question now was whether, after the pledge given by Count von Bernstorff, the Ger-

man Government intended to allow submarine commanders a broad discretion in deciding the circumstances under which passenger ships may be torpedoed. The ambassador was informed of the Administration's conviction that the torpedoing of the *Arabic* could not have been a mistake, justified or unjustified. Germany's unreadiness to disavow responsibility for the act of the submarine commander as "arbitrary" and "unsanctioned," to quote the German Chancellor, showed that she accepted her submarine commander's purported report, not the *Arabic* testimony. In this impasse the Administration was credited with being almost ready to break off relations with Germany, but deferred doing so until the German Government had studied the evidence on which the American Government had decided that the submarine commander was solely to blame.

In the negotiations which followed, the *Arabic* issue went the way of the unsettled *Lusitania* case by its withdrawal from being threshed out in public. The exchange of notes was abandoned for pourparlers, which were resorted to as seeming to afford a more supple means of arriving at a settlement. Germany was afforded an opportunity of privately establishing her good faith—which was in serious question—by reconciling her acts on the seas with her pledge not to attack passenger vessels without warning. No official disclosure was made to enlighten a forgetful public as to the extent to which she had done so in the negotiations which occupied the American and German Governments throughout September, 1915. But a communication from Count von Bernstorff to Secretary Lansing, which passed October 2, 1915, was permitted to be revealed acknowledging that the submarine commander was mistaken in believing that the *Arabic* intended to ram his vessel, and disavowing the act. The Von Bernstorff note contained this passage: "The order issued by His Majesty the Emperor to the commanders of the German submarines, of which I notified you on a similar occasion, has been so stringent that the recurrence of incidents similar to the *Arabic* case is considered out of the question."

The United States had thus brought Germany to an admission that the sinking of the liner was unjustified. This important

point gained, the issue was removed from the acute stage at which it had dangerously lingered, and only left undetermined the question of indemnity to be paid by Germany to the *Arabic* victims.

It cleared the diplomatic decks sufficiently to enable the deferred negotiations on the *Lusitania* dispute to be resumed; but these had made little headway when both the *Lusitania* and *Arabic* issues were overshadowed by the sinking of the *Ancona*.

CHAPTER XXX

ISSUE WITH AUSTRIA-HUNGARY OVER THE ANCONA—SURRENDER TO AMERICAN DEMANDS

THE attention of the United States was abruptly diverted from Germany to Austria-Hungary. The *Ancona*, an Italian liner en route for New York, was steaming westward in the Mediterranean, between the coasts of Sicily and Tunis, on November 9, 1915, when a submarine flying the Austro-Hungarian flag fired a shot at the steamship. As described by the American protest sent to Austria-Hungary on December 6, 1915, based upon the testimony of American and other survivors, the *Ancona* thereupon "attempted to escape, but being overhauled by the submarine she stopped; that after a brief period, and before the crew and passengers were all able to take to the boats, the submarine fired a number of shells at the vessel and finally torpedoed and sank her while there were yet many persons on board, and that by gunfire and floundering of the vessel a large number of persons lost their lives or were seriously injured, among whom were citizens of the United States."

A heated protest from the Italian Ambassador to the State Department thus depicted the same scene: "Without any warning whatever, without even a blank shot, without observing any of the formalities accompanying the right of search, the sub-

marine encountered by the *Ancona* opened fire upon the unarmed passenger liner, relentlessly shelling not only the wireless apparatus, side, and decks of the ship while she was at a stop, but even the lifeboats in which the terrified passengers were seeking refuge. Many of the passengers were killed outright or wounded. Some who approached the submarine in the hope of rescue were driven off with jeers. As a result of this inhumane procedure more than two hundred men, women and children lost their lives."

An impenitent explanation came from the Austro-Hungarian admiralty, who in upholding the submarine commander, saw "no reason to find fault with his course of action," and while recognizing that a commander in the heat of battle could act contrary to instructions, "nothing of the kind has occurred in this case."

"It appears from his report," said the admiralty defense, "that his ship was in danger; indeed, in double danger; first, that an enemy boat was approaching on a line that threatened to cut off his retreat, and the enemy ship and the *Ancona* could have established his radius of action and could have set a torpedo boat flotilla on him; and second, there was danger of the *Ancona* escaping, which, according to his instructions, was to be prevented in all circumstances. Hence the conduct of the commander, much as the loss of innocent lives must be regretted and deplored, cannot be disapproved. On the contrary, if he had departed without destroying the *Ancona*, it would have been failure to do his duty since the *Ancona* could have notified other ships of his whereabouts. The loss of American lives is regrettable, as well as that Americans used a vessel belonging to a nation at war with Austria-Hungary."

This statement amplified a previous defense by the Austrian admiralty, in which the latter admitted that the *Ancona* was torpedoed after her engines had been stopped and when passengers were still on board. The American protest cited the admiralty's admission as substantially confirming the principal testimony of the survivors. It, moreover, alluded to the correspondence which had passed between Germany and the United States on the use and misuse of submarines in attacking vessels

of commerce, and to Germany's acquiescence in the American stand thereon. Yet despite the "full knowledge" possessed by the Austro-Hungarian Government of the views of the United States, "as expressed in no uncertain terms to the ally of Austria-Hungary," the commander of the submarine which attacked the *Ancona*, the United States protested, failed to put in a place of safety the crew and passengers before destroying the vessel.

The United States accused the submarine commander of violating the principles of international law and humanity, and characterized his conduct as "wanton slaughter of defenseless non-combatants," as the vessel was not resisting or attempting to escape, and no other reason was sufficient to excuse such an attack, not even the possibility of rescue.

A tone of severity and bluntness, not hitherto used in American communications with the belligerents, marked this note of protest to Austria-Hungary. Demands were made for a denunciation of the submarine commander's act as "illegal and indefensible," for his punishment, and for reparation by the payment of indemnity for the loss of American lives. The United States left an avenue open through which Austria-Hungary could find an acceptable excuse. It preferred to believe that the submarine commander acted contrary to instructions rather than accept the alternative assumption that the Austro-Hungarian Government "failed to issue instructions to the commanders of the submarines in accordance with the laws of nations and the principles of humanity."

The answer of Austria-Hungary (December 13, 1915) was deftly befogging by clouding in diplomatic rhodomontade the familiar issues raised by the United States. Its deliberate evasiveness was so direct as to be almost an affront. Stripped of its confusing terminology, the Austrian note declared that the United States had not adequately stated its cause of complaint, and had wrongly assumed that the Austrian Government was fully acquainted with all communications passed between the German and American Governments on the submarine issue. This plea of ignorance was made in face of the precautionary transmission by the State Department to the Austrian embassy of

copies of all the American notes sent to Germany. The Austrian note also questioned whether the testimony made by the *Ancona* survivors, whom the American protest had not specifically named, was to be deemed more trustworthy than the report of the submarine commander. As to Austria-Hungary's knowledge of the American issues with Germany, that Government was not of the opinion that "this knowledge could be sufficient for the present case, which, according to its own information, is materially different from the case or cause to which the American Government apparently is referring." The note thus proceeded:

"Therefore, the Austro-Hungarian Government must leave it to the Washington Cabinet to draw up the individual legal maxims which the commander of the submarine is alleged to have violated when sinking the *Ancona*.

"The American Government also thought it advisable to point out the attitude which the Berlin Cabinet in the before-mentioned exchange of correspondence had taken. In the highly esteemed note the Austro-Hungarian Government finds no support for this course. If the American Government should have intended thereby to express an opinion as if a precedent exists for the present case, the Austro-Hungarian Government, in order to prevent misunderstandings, must declare that it, of course, must preserve full liberty to urge its own legal interpretations during the discussion of the *Ancona* case."

This was a virtual refusal by Austria-Hungary to be bound by or concerned with the submarine agreement between her ally and the United States. As viewed through German-American eyes (the "New Yorker Herold"), the Austrian answer represented "a very sharp censure of a dilettante diplomacy which desires to negotiate and expects plain replies before the most essential preliminaries are given. The tenor of the Vienna note is in substance this: 'We are willing to negotiate, but first you must furnish us with the necessary material—undebatable material at that.' It is quite comprehensible that Washington is peeved at this censure."

Austria's demand for a "bill of particulars" was aptly expressed in this hostile view of the American note. The United

States declined to accede to the request, which was viewed as a resort to the evasive methods practiced by Germany, but rested its case on the Austrian admiralty's self-condemning admission that the *Ancona* was sunk while people were still on board her. Nor would the American Government assent to the Austrian proposal that the two governments "exchange views" as to the legality of the act as described by the Austrian admiralty. President Wilson and his advisers saw no loophole for argument as to the justification or otherwise of a submarine sinking an unarmed merchantman with passengers on board her when the vessel was at a standstill.

Hence the second American note sent on December 19, 1915, was confined to a simple issue. The Government brushed aside the questions Austria raised as immaterial to the main fact based on the incriminating report of her own admiralty. The Austrian Government was informed that the admission that the *Ancona* was torpedoed after her engines had been stopped and while passengers remained on her was alone sufficient to fix the blame on the submarine commander. His culpability was established.

"The rules of international law," the American note continued, "and the principles of humanity which were thus willfully violated by the commander of the submarine have been so long and so universally recognized and are so manifest from the standpoint of right and justice that the Government of the United States does not feel called upon to debate them and does not understand that the Imperial and Royal Government questions or disputes them."

"The Government of the United States therefore finds no other course open to it but to hold the Imperial and Royal Government responsible for the act of its naval commander and to renew the definite but respectful demands made in its communication of the 6th of December, 1915."

Austria yielded. A lengthy response from Vienna, disclosed on December 31, 1915, was couched in a spirit which removed all danger of a cleavage of relations between the two countries on the *Ancona* issue. The United States drew from the Dual

Monarchy an affirmation that "the sacred commandments of humanity" must be observed in war, and a concurrence in the principle that "private ships, in so far as they do not flee or offer resistance, may not be destroyed without the persons aboard being brought into safety." Austria-Hungary was thus ranged in line with Germany in the recognition of, and pledging compliance with, principles for which the United States stood.

The Vienna Government, however, adhered to its own version of the sinking of the *Ancona*, and from it sought to show that the statements made in the first American note were based on incorrect premises, i. e.:

"Information reaching the United States Government that solid shot was immediately fired toward the steamer is incorrect; it is incorrect that the submarine overhauled the steamer during the chase; it is incorrect that only a brief period was given for getting the people into the boats. On the contrary an unusually long period was granted to the *Ancona* for getting passengers in the boats. Finally it is incorrect that a number of shells were still fired at the steamer after it had stopped.

"The facts of the case demonstrate further that the commander of the submarine granted the steamer a full forty-five minutes' time—that is more than an adequate period to give the persons aboard an opportunity to take to the boats. Then, since the people were not all saved, he carried out the torpedoing in such a manner that the ship would remain above water the longest possible time, doing this with the purpose of making possible the abandonment of the vessel on boats still in hand.

"Since the ship remained a further forty-five minutes above water he would have accomplished his purpose if the crew of the *Ancona* had not abandoned the passengers in a manner contrary to duty.

"With full consideration, however, of this conduct of the commander, aimed at accomplishing the rescue of the crew and passengers, the Imperial and Royal Marine authorities reached the conclusion that he had omitted to take adequately into consideration the panic that had broken out among the passengers, which rendered difficult the taking to the boats, and the spirit of the

regulation that Imperial and Royal Marine officers shall not fail in giving help to anybody in need, not even to an enemy.

"Therefore the officer was punished, in accordance with the existing rules, for exceeding his instructions."

On the question of reparation by indemnity for the loss of American lives, Austria-Hungary would not admit liability for damages resulting from the "undoubtedly justified bombarding of the fleeing ship," but was willing to come to an agreement on the subject.

It will be seen that the note did not denounce the attack on the *Ancona* as "illegal and indefensible"; but Austria's acquiescence in the American demand for the punishment of the submarine commander was viewed as a virtual admission of the illegality and indefensibility of the method of attack. Coupled with her expressed disposition to pay damages and her acceptance of the humane principle of warning and safety to passengers, Austria regarded her concessions as closing the *Ancona* issue, in so far as it affected the friendly relations between the two Governments. As the complaint of the American Government had been principally against the method of attack, and had been met by Austria, the crisis passed.

CHAPTER XXXI

THE LUSITANIA DEADLOCK—AGREEMENT BLOCKED BY ARMED MERCHANTMEN ISSUE—CRISIS IN CONGRESS

THE *Lusitania* negotiations were resumed, only to encounter a deadlock. The issue had been eased in one important particular—Germany's undertaking, drawn from her in the *Arabic* crisis, not to sink unarmed merchant vessels without warning and regard for the safety of passengers and crews. But there remained the no less vital questions of indemnity to relatives of the Americans who lost their lives when the *Lusitania* sank and a disavowal by Germany of the submarine commander's act.

Here was ground well traversed by the State Department in its communications with Austria over the *Ancona*; but Germany was much less pliant. The United States insisted that not only must full indemnity be paid for the American lives lost, but that the agreement for such payment must be accompanied by a declaration of disavowal acknowledging that the submarine commander committed an illegal act in sinking the *Lusitania*.

The stumblingblock lay in Germany's objection to subscribing to such a principle as was here implicated—that her war-zone decree against Great Britain, carried out by submarine attacks on merchant vessels, was illegal. She held that her submarine policy was a just reprisal for Great Britain's "starvation" blockade of Germany. The United States held that reprisals in the form of sinking helpless ships without warning were illegal. Germany would not admit that her submarine policy as practiced when the *Lusitania* went down was illegal. To do so would be an admission that her entire submarine campaign against Great Britain violated international law, and that Americans surrendered none of their rights as neutral citizens in traveling through a war zone on merchant ships of a belligerent power. But Germany was willing to pay an indemnity for the loss of American lives, not as an admission of wrongdoing, but as an act of grace.

Despite this deadlock the private conversations between Secretary Lansing and Count von Bernstorff continued. Germany submitted proposals in various forms aiming at making concessions to meet the American demand for disavowal of an illegal act; but in each case Secretary Lansing discerned an effort to evade acknowledging wrongdoing.

Matters remained at this stage toward the close of January, 1916, after negotiations extending over several weeks, apparently fruitless in opening any acceptable channel toward a settlement. That the status of the *Lusitania* case was unsatisfactory was vaguely hinted, and the alternative to Germany's meeting the American demands—a severance of diplomatic relations—which remained the menace it was from the outset, loomed up again. A speech by President Wilson before the Railway Business Asso-

ciation in New York City on January 27, 1915, ostensibly on preparedness for war, was interpreted as having a bearing on the deadlock in the *Lusitania* negotiations. At least it was significantly coincidental both in time and subject, and did not pass without comment in Europe, especially this passage:

“I cannot tell you what the international relations of this country will be to-morrow. I would not dare keep silent and let the country suppose that to-morrow was certain to be as bright as to-day. There is something the American people love better than peace. They love the principles upon which their political life is founded. They are ready at any time to fight for the vindication of their character and honor. I would rather surrender territory than ideals.”

Whether this utterance was a warning to Germany or not, the *Lusitania* negotiations afterward became more promising. Throughout them Germany balked at making an outright disavowal; she indicated a willingness to go part of the way to meet the United States, but always conditional to an expression being inserted in her apologia that the attack on the *Lusitania* was a justifiable reprisal against Great Britain. A proposal by Germany to submit the question of disavowal to arbitration was rejected, for the second time, on the ground that the “vital interests and national honor” of the United States were involved and were therefore not arbitrable. The right of Americans to be on board the *Lusitania*, under the protection of international law accorded to neutrals on the high seas in war time, was too firmly established to admit of debate. A renewed reminder to Germany that the private conversations threatened to end in failure, which meant further consideration of the alternative of a cleavage of relations between the two countries, brought from Germany a reply on February 4, 1916, which was described as “one word short” of a satisfactory surrender. The word needed was a synonym for “disavowal” which did not convey that Germany had committed an illegal act. So the proposal again fell short of the demand; it did not contain the exact form of disavowal insisted upon by the United States. But it came nearer to meeting the American demands than any of the varied proposals Germany had previously

submitted. The dispute turned on terminology that did not affront Germany's sensibilities. The aim sought was the avoidance of the words "illegal" and "disavowal" or whether to "assume" liability, which seemed to imply a voluntary act of grace, or "admit" liability, which implied an acknowledgment of an illegal act, or "recognize" liability, which was President Wilson's solution. On February 8, 1916, the outcome of these efforts in search of the acceptable word or words was a reported agreement on a memorandum which contained "language sufficiently broad to cover substantially the demands of the United States."

This bright prospect of a speedy settlement was suddenly dimmed by a communication received from Germany and Austria-Hungary two days later notifying that, beginning March 1, 1916, their submarines would sink all armed merchantmen without warning. Germany's revised draft apparently deciding the *Lusitania* issue came to hand on February 15, 1916. The following day the Administration intimated that the submarine controversy over the *Lusitania* could not be closed until the United States had fully considered the possible effect of the new policy of the Teutonic Powers.

Germany later informed the United States that her assurances regarding the future conduct of submarine warfare, given in the *Lusitania* and *Arabic* cases, were still binding, but that they applied only to merchantmen of a peaceful character; that the new orders issued to the submarine commanders, which directed them to sink without warning all belligerent merchantmen carrying arms, either for defense or offense, were not in conflict with these assurances; and that Germany and Austria-Hungary had entered into an agreement regarding the new submarine orders, which would go into effect by midnight, February 29, 1916.

Germany charged that Great Britain had instructed all her merchantmen to arm for offensive purposes against submarine attacks, and cited instances in which submarines were attacked by vessels seemingly of a peaceful character. This accusation was denied by Lord Robert Cecil, Great Britain's Minister for War Trade, who told the House of Commons:

"The British view has always been that defensively armed merchantmen must not fire on submarines or on any other warships, except in self-defense. The Germans have twisted a passage in a document taken from a transport which they sank into meaning that merchant vessels have instructions to take the offensive. This is not so."

The question of armed merchantmen had been simmering during the course of the *Lusitania* negotiations. It arose over the unexplained sinking in the Mediterranean of a Peninsular and Oriental liner, the *Persia*, on December 29, 1915. The American Consul to Aden, Robert N. McNeely, was among the passengers who lost their lives. The *Persia* carried a 4.7 gun. The Administration was believed to be exercised—though erroneously—over the question whether an armed liner was entitled to be regarded as any other than an auxiliary cruiser, and hence liable to be sunk without warning. No new issue, however, was raised by the United States with the Teutonic Powers, because both Germany and Austria-Hungary—Turkey also—categorically denied that the liner had been sunk by any of their submarines. The loss of the *Persia* thus remained a mystery, though there were not wanting suspicions in the American press that the Teutonic Powers, in disclaiming that they had any hand in the vessel's destruction, might have hit upon a new device to evade further controversies with the United States.

The *Persia*'s gun, added to the frequent reports rife of other merchantmen being similarly armed, injected a new element in the submarine controversy, which could not be wholly removed from the pending *Lusitania* negotiations. Germany had excused the sinking of vessels without warning on the plea that her submarine commanders, if they appeared on the surface to warn them to haul to for visit and search, or for those on board to take to the boats, could never be assured that they would not be fired upon and sunk. Hence she regarded armed merchantmen as being more than a match for submarines and not entitled to any consideration. Had evidence been forthcoming that the *Persia* was sunk by a German submarine, the presence of a gun on board her would, in Germany's view, have justified the vessel's

destruction without warning, and the uncertain attitude of the American Government, at this stage, appeared to lean toward the acceptance of such a defense. It was even hinted that the Administration was considering whether the situation did not call for a proclamation warning all Americans off armed merchantmen. Sweden had done so in the case of her nationals.

The Administration soon dissipated the impression current that it contemplated a change of policy in the submarine issue. But, while the uncertainty lasted, it appeared to have a credible basis in a proposal Secretary Lansing had made to the Entente Powers, as a *modus vivendi* of the submarine controversy, for the disarmament of merchant vessels, to assure the safety of their passengers and crews if attacked. The success of this course depended wholly upon Germany living up to her guarantees. The proposal was not well received by the Entente Powers, who doubted the good faith of Germany's pledges, and only saw in the Lansing suggestion an assurance of safety to her submarines in their raids on allied shipping.

The American attitude to the new Teutonic policy of sinking all armed merchantmen on sight remained to be declared. The Administration had upheld the right of Americans to travel on the high seas in merchantmen, and saw a surrender of national principle and an abridgment of personal liberty if the United States yielded to the terrorism caused by submarine warfare and warned Americans to stay at home. The United States also recognized the right of belligerent merchantmen to arm, but for defensive purposes only. At the beginning of the war it so notified Germany in a memorandum naming the following American regulations, among others, governing such vessels:

"A merchant vessel of belligerent nationality may carry an armament and ammunition for the sole purpose of defense without acquiring the character of a ship of war.

"The presence of an armament and ammunition on board a merchant ship creates a presumption that the armament is for offensive purposes, but the owners or agents may overcome this presumption by showing that the vessel carries armament solely for defense."

The memorandum was sent to Germany as an answer to Germany's protest against the refusal of the United States to intern as ships of war British liners leaving or entering New York with guns mounted. Germany dissented from the view that any belligerent merchant ship could carry guns. The United States declined to modify its rulings, but informed Germany that, recognizing the "desirability of avoiding a ground of complaint," it had disapproved of British vessels using American ports if armed, and had made such representations to Great Britain that no armed merchant vessel, since September, 1914, with the exception of two, had entered an American port.

The situation disturbed Congress. A resolution came before the Senate on February 18, 1916, opposing acquiescence by the United States in the notifications of the Central Powers of the right of their submarines to sink armed merchantmen. The foreign policy of the Administration was bitterly assailed by Senators Lodge and Sterling, especially for its attitude in relation to the pending negotiations over the new submarine order. For the Administration, Senator Stone, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, said the question of armed merchantmen was at least debatable. The position at this stage was that the Administration was taking cognizance of Germany's charge that British merchantmen were armed for offensive purposes, had been instructed to attack submarines, and that rewards had been offered for their success in so doing. Germany offered to furnish proofs to show that the American rules recognizing merchantmen armed for defensive purposes as peaceful ships could not now apply.

There was a division of sentiment in the Senate as to the stand the United States should take, and a wider one in the House of Representatives, where a panic-stricken feeling arose that the country was slowly but surely heading toward war with Germany. A vociferous demand was made by a minority of congressmen for strong action warning Americans off armed merchantmen of belligerents to prevent the United States raising further critical issues with Germany. The House leaders informed the President that they could not control their following,

and that on a vote the House would be two to one in favor of such legislation. They even were tempted to force the passage of such a resolution on the patriotic ground that in doing so they would merely be seeking to prevent American citizens from jeopardizing the peace of the nation. The President suspected that pro-German propaganda was behind the hysteria in Congress, and objected to any legislative interference in his handling of the submarine controversy. A resolution was actually pending in the House forbidding Americans to travel on armed merchantmen. The President finally stated his position in a forceful letter to Senator Stone on February 24, 1916, refusing to assent to any such abridgment of the rights of American citizens. This letter followed an emphatic rejection by him of a proposal made by the Democratic leaders in Congress that that body should relieve him of all responsibility of forcing an issue with Germany.

"The course which the Central European Powers have announced their intention of following in the near future with regard to undersea warfare," the President wrote, "seems for the moment to threaten insuperable obstacles, but its apparent meaning is so manifestly inconsistent with explicit assurances recently given us by those powers with regard to their treatment of merchant vessels on the high seas that I must believe that explanations will presently ensue which will put a different aspect upon it. . . . But in any event our duty is plain. No nation, no group of nations, has the right, while war is in progress, to alter or disregard the principles which all nations have agreed upon in mitigation of the horrors or sufferings of war, and if the clear rights of American citizens should ever unhappily be abridged or denied by any such action, we should, it seems to me, have in honor no choice as to what our own course should be.

"For my own part I cannot consent to any abridgment of the rights of American citizens in any respect. The honor and self-respect of the nation is involved. We covet peace, and shall preserve it at any cost but the loss of honor. To forbid our people to exercise their rights for fear we might be called upon to vindicate them would be a deep humiliation indeed. It would be an implicit, all but an explicit, acquiescence in the violation of

the rights of mankind everywhere and of whatever nation or allegiance. It would be a deliberate abdication of our hitherto proud position as spokesmen even amid the turmoil of war for the law and the right. It would make everything this Government has attempted, and everything it has achieved during this terrible struggle of nations, meaningless and futile.

"It is important to reflect that if in this instance we allowed expediency to take the place of principle the door would inevitably be opened to still further concessions. Once accept a single abatement of right and many other humiliations would certainly follow, and the whole fine fabric of international law might crumble under our hands piece by piece. What we are contending for in this matter is of the very essence of the things that have made America a sovereign nation. She cannot yield them without conceding her own impotency as a nation and making virtual surrender of her independent position among the nations of the world."

The leaders in Congress were so impressed by this uncompromising declaration of the President that they set about allaying the revolt against the Administration's policy, which, it was feared, was drawing the United States into war. Efforts were made to smother in committee the resolutions pending in both the House and Senate forbidding Americans to travel on armed merchant ships. But the President later saw that much harm had already been done. An impression became current abroad that Congress and the President were at cross purposes regarding the attitude the United States should take toward the new submarine policy of the Teutonic Powers. In the belief that the country was with him in his stand, the President decided that such an impression ought not to be permitted to prevail, and that the question should be determined as to whether Congress upheld him also. In almost irreconcilable contrast to his previous opposition to Congress voting on the resolutions forbidding Americans to travel on armed merchantmen, the President suddenly executed an audacious *volte face* on February 29, 1916, by demanding a test vote upon them. The congressional leaders were confounded by the request, coming as it did after they had done

their utmost to suppress the resolutions in deference to the President. But the latter made his reasons for changing his attitude cogent enough in a letter he addressed to Representative Pou of the House Rules Committee.

"The report," he wrote, "that there are divided counsels in Congress in regard to the foreign policy of the Government is being made industrious use of in foreign capitals. I believe that report to be false, but so long as it is anywhere credited it cannot fail to do the greatest harm and expose the country to the most serious risks.

"I therefore feel justified in asking that your committee will permit me to urge an early vote upon the resolutions with regard to travel on armed merchantmen, which have recently been so much talked about, in order that there may be afforded an opportunity for full public discussion and action upon them, and that all doubts and conjectures may be swept away and our foreign relations once more cleared of damaging misunderstandings."

The House resolution, which was proposed by Representative McLemore of Texas, was thereupon revived for immediate consideration. The President's demand for a vote upon it came on the eve of the date set by the Teutonic Powers for inaugurating their submarine war on armed merchantmen, March 1, 1916. The ensuing events belong to the next volume of this history.

CHAPTER XXXII

DEVELOPMENTS OF PRO-GERMAN PROPAGANDA—MUNITIONS CRUSADE DEFENDED —NEW ASPECTS OF AMERICAN POLICY

PRO-GERMAN propaganda soon developed far beyond its original aim. Registering protests against the Administration preserving a neutrality according to its own interpretation of American laws proved ineffective. Balked in this, the crusade took a form which was plainly an outgrowth of a country-

wide circulation of literature emanating from German publicity organizations devoted to presenting the Teutonic cause in the most favorable light to the American people. Opinions being free, epistolary zeal of this kind violated no laws, and words broke no bones. In the fact that the crusade failed perceptibly to swing national sentiment regarding the European war to a recognition of the German view of American neutrality obviously lay a stimulus and incitement for resorting to sterner measures, since mild measures were vain. Events already narrated show the extent to which German zealots pursued a defiant criminal course in making their "protests," but there was no certainty—though suspicions and allegations were not wanting—that their activities had official German inspiration and sanction. But as the summer of 1915 wore on, the Administration became satisfied—through an accumulation of evidence—that this was the case. For reasons of state, in view of the delicate stages of the *Lusitania* and *Arabic* issues with Germany, the Government forbore to take cognizance of the undoubted participation of German diplomats and secret-service agents in plots hatched and pursued on American soil against the country's neutrality, and provoking unrest and disorder. The Government's tolerance of such a situation did not long endure.

The first revelation that these activities were organized on an extended scale came through the columns of the New York "World" in August, 1915. The country was not unprepared for the disclosure. They had had forerunners in repeated rumors and accusations that German Embassy officials were involved in the passport frauds and were using American territory as a base for an espionage system, whose coils were wound about this country and Canada, as well as in the charge that German money had been freely spent in a way inconsistent with international friendship. The newspaper named unreservedly charged that "The German propaganda in the United States has became a political conspiracy against the Government and people of the United States." To substantiate that sweeping indictment the "World" reproduced the text of a series of letters it had obtained, addressed to Dr. Heinrich F. Albert, a German Privy Councilor,

who acted as the fiscal agent of the Kaiser's Government in the United States.

The correspondence, as printed, linked Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg, the German Imperial Chancellor, and Count von Bernstorff, the German Ambassador, with a vast project for spreading German propaganda. The disclosures of the correspondence, the authenticity of which was not contested, were described as showing that the German propaganda had for its purpose "the involving of the United States in the complications of the European war," and that the plans "designed to accomplish this result were carefully and deliberately projected, efficiently organized, superbly executed, and adequately financed." These plans embraced an elaborate scheme to control and influence the press of the United States to establish newspapers and news services, finance professional lecturers and moving-picture entertainments and publish books "for the sole purpose of fomenting internal discord among the American people to the advantage of the German Empire."

Teutonic agents, the letters published indicated, were involved in fomenting strikes in various munition factories throughout the country and were the prime movers of a project to cripple all the shipping along the Atlantic seaboard by effecting a general strike of longshoremen and other workers. Samuel Gompers, President of the American Federation of Labor, in part confirmed this charge. Other activities of German agents were concentrated on securing all the chlorine gas in the country, to prevent shipments to the allied powers; the control of the Wright patents for the manufacture of aeroplanes, and a continued agitation to stir public opinion to demand the passage of an embargo measure by Congress forbidding the export of war munitions, particularly centered in the South, which was urged to insist upon such a prohibition unless Great Britain permitted the shipment of cotton to Germany.

Concurrent with this movement, German agents were active in a contrary direction by buying up the output of several munition plants. The German Government was accused of actually being engaged in building and extending a large American plant,

which it secretly controlled, for the manufacture of casings for shrapnel and of that and other explosives. The correspondence also showed that the German-owned company operating this plant had a contract for the entire output of an explosive company, and that it spent hundreds of thousands of marks in developing the plant for producing projectiles for Germany, the transportation of which, while not revealed, was to be effected with the aid of a neutral country in close proximity to Germany. Finally, this German company pretended to negotiate with the British and Russian Governments for the sale of its products, but without any "liability for failure to deliver clause" in the contracts, or "any real purpose to deliver the product." Here was partial confirmation of the circumstantial story previously recorded of an extensive scheme promoted by German interests for the acquisition of all the munition plants in the country.

Dr. Albert, Germany's secret fiscal agent, in charging that the letters published were contained in a portfolio which had been stolen from him, defended the munitions campaign as legal. Not unsuccessfully he strove to show that there was nothing inconsistent or irregular in what the New York "Sun" described as "the double-faced treachery of the crusade engineered by German agents (hiding behind American dupes), for the excitement of public opinion, in demanding an embargo against England and France, while Germany herself was planning enormous exports of war material through secret agencies."

"I am unable to understand," Dr. Albert said in a public explanation, "on what theory our action in that direction should be the subject of criticism. If we had the means and the opportunity we would buy every munition factory in the United States if in that way we would keep munitions from the enemy."

Light was shed from this unrealized scheme by Dr. Albert's quotation from a memorandum Count von Bernstorff sent to the State Department about the time the project was bared. This document revealed that the German plans were communicated to the Government, so that the scheme was no secret to the American authorities. The German Ambassador sought to reconcile the double-edged policy of the German Government in seeking to

acquire munition factories to control their products while at the same time spreading a wide propaganda for the prohibition of the exports of arms and ammunition. Far from these pursuits being illogical and evidence of German *mala fides*, Count von Bernstorff maintained that, though seemingly contradictory, they were consistent:

"We regarded it as our right and duty, so long as Great Britain continued her piracy on the high seas, to protect ourselves against this international system of robbery by placing difficulties as far as possible in the way of the export of war materials for the Allies, either by the purchase of factories or war material, in spite of the fact that for the present we are not in a position to make use of these goods for our own protection. If we possessed the means and opportunities, we would buy up every munition factory in the United States of America if in this way we could deprive the enemy of munitions, and our proceeding would certainly not involve a lack of logic or *mala fides*."

A previous document handed to the State Department by the German Embassy submitted "that not only were we far from attempting to carry out our proposed purchases of war materials in secret, but that we explained our intentions fully to the State Department and even offered to sell them any or all the materials."

The ambassador contended that such purchases, though they would involve sacrifice of large sums of money, would alone be justified by curtailing the facilities of the Allies to slay or wound German soldiers:

"If the German Government during the war should consider it advisable to purchase arms, ammunition, and other war material in the United States, it could do so for no other purpose than to prevent them falling into the hands of the Allies, her enemy. The right of Germany to effect such purchases could not be questioned.

"Such purchases could not form a danger to the United States, but to some extent would serve in the limitation of the casualties of the war, thus serving humanity. Such purchases, furthermore, would serve the particular interests of the United States,

for you must remember, that if the German Government should ever consider it advisable to purchase war materials in the United States, it would do so knowing that delivery to Germany could not be secured and that no use of the purchased material could be hoped for during the war. It will readily be understood, therefore, that the German Government would at any time be willing and indeed glad to sell or transfer to the United States Government any or all of the material it had purchased. Instead of depriving this country of any part of her resources, the purchases by Germany would insure the retention within this country of any material it might purchase."

Dr. Albert denied that the German Government or its representatives in the United States were concerned in fomenting strikes in munition factories. As for the letters published, he described them as from "irresponsible persons" who made suggestions which were never acted upon. As for the publicity campaign, he failed "to see anything reprehensible in the desire of Germany to get its case before the people whose friendship it has had in the past and whose good opinion it is anxious to retain."

The letters published were among others received, which, according to Dr. Albert, "contained offers and proposals upon every conceivable subject by people unknown to us, whom we never took the trouble to answer or investigate, and to whose proposals we paid not the slightest attention." One letter, stamped as received at the German embassy, referred to an "opportunity" favoring the calling of a strike in the munition factories of Detroit, Cleveland, and Cincinnati "in so far as the necessary financial means can be secured. According to our estimates it could be done for about \$50,000." This letter inclosed another from Detroit, in which the writer spoke of a "plan for precipitating a general strike of all the automobile workers, including the allied industries," and had "reason to know that workers are very much dissatisfied with the part they are playing in the European war, and that with proper handling they would present a mighty protest against the responsible persons."

German reports on the various phases of the movement to prevent the shipment of munitions to the allied powers appear to

have been regularly transmitted to Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg in Berlin and Ambassador von Bernstorff in Washington. One such report from Chicago, addressed to Dr. Albert, referred to the leaders of the movement as being "firmly resolved to work toward the end that the German community, which, of course, will be with us without further urging, shall above all things remain in the background, and that the movement to all outward appearances shall have a purely American character."

As the Administration made no sign that it regarded these activities as implicating German officials in this country, it was supposed that it upheld the view of Dr. Albert that there was nothing reprehensible in the various German crusades. But the whole propaganda was undoubtedly embarrassing and exasperating after the Administration had definitely and finally explained to the German embassy that its attitude to the munitions question was solely dictated by a proper observance of the neutrality laws, any amendment of which, during a war, would be an unneutral act.

The American view was stated in even more uncompromising terms by Secretary Lansing in replying to Austria-Hungary's protest against the traffic in munitions. Austria raised the following questions, each of which was contested:

"(1) That the exportation of arms and ammunition from the United States to belligerents contravenes the preamble of The Hague Convention, number 13, of 1907;

"(2) That it is inconsistent with the refusal of the American Government to allow delivery of supplies to vessels of war on the high seas;

"(3) That 'according to all authorities on international law who concern themselves more properly with the question, "exportation should be prevented" when this traffic assumes such a form or such dimensions that the neutrality of a nation become involved thereby.'

The American note went far beyond the merely legal aspects of the question, which were easily met in view of the usages of nations. A new factor—influencing the United States in upholding its policy—became disclosed for the first time. One ground

stated for refusing to consider the Austrian request, was the practical effect such a prohibition, if generally adopted, would have on the power of the United States to meet a foe in the event of war. Austria was told that the American policy since the founding of the Republic had never been to maintain in time of peace a large military establishment or stores of arms and ammunition; that the United States had, in fact, always depended for such supplies upon the acknowledged right and power to purchase arms and ammunition from neutral nations in case of foreign attack. The citation of this domestic policy against militarism was thus frankly expressed in the American note:

"In consequence of this standing policy the United States would in the event of attack by a foreign power be, at the outset of the war seriously, if not fatally, embarrassed by the lack of arms and ammunition and by the means to produce them in sufficient quantities to supply the requirements of national defense."

Hence this disadvantage would be increased tenfold if it became a custom of neutral nations, able to supply munitions, to place an embargo on their exportation. The point made was that an embargo would not only be a repudiation of the policy by which the American Government had always abided, but would compel every nation, including the United States, to hold in readiness at all times a sufficient supply of war munitions to enable it to cope with a more aggressive and better equipped enemy. In short, an acquiescence in the Teutonic contention would turn the world more and more into an armed camp and retard the movement for universal peace.

Secretary Lansing also pointed out that Austria-Hungary and Germany, especially the latter, during the years preceding the present war, had produced a great surplus of war munitions, which they sold throughout the world, particularly to belligerents:

"During the Boer War between Great Britain and the South African republics the patrol of the coasts of neighboring neutral colonies by British naval vessels prevented arms and ammunition reaching the Transvaal or the Orange Free State. The

allied republics were in a situation almost identical in that respect with that in which Austria-Hungary and Germany find themselves at the present time. Yet, in spite of the commercial isolation of one belligerent, Germany sold to Great Britain, the other belligerent, hundreds of thousands of kilos of explosives, gunpowder, cartridges, shot, and weapons, and it is known that Austria-Hungary also sold similar munitions to the same purchaser, though in smaller quantities.

"If at that time Austria-Hungary and her present ally had refused to sell arms and ammunition to Great Britain on the ground that to do so would violate the spirit of strict neutrality, the Imperial and Royal Government might with greater consistency and greater force urge its present contention."

The note was sufficiently final in tone to end further diplomatic exchanges on the subject and to operate as an effective check on further sentiment developing—especially in the South—in favor of an arms embargo.

CHAPTER XXXIII

AUSTRIAN AMBASSADOR IMPLICATED IN STRIKE PLOTS—HIS RECALL—RAMIFICATIONS OF GERMAN CONSPIRACIES

PUBLIC absorption in German propaganda was abating when attention became directed to it again from another quarter. An American war correspondent, James F. J. Archibald, a passenger on the liner *Rotterdam* from New York, who was suspected by the British authorities of being a bearer of dispatches from the German and Austrian Ambassadors at Washington, to their respective Governments, was detained and searched on the steamer's arrival at Falmouth on August 30, 1915. A number of confidential documents found among his belongings were seized and confiscated, the British officials justifying their action as coming within their rights under English municipal law. The

character of the papers confirmed the British suspicions that Archibald was misusing his American passport by acting as a secret courier for countries at war with which the United States was at peace.

The seized papers were later presented to the British Parliament and published. In a bulky dossier, comprising thirty-four documents found in Archibald's possession, was a letter from the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Washington, Dr. Dumba, to Baron Burian, the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister. In this letter Dr. Dumba took "this rare and safe opportunity" of "warmly recommending" to the Austrian Foreign Office certain proposals made by the editor of a Hungarian-American organ, the "Szabadsag," for effecting strikes in plants of the Bethlehem Steel Company and others in the Middle West engaged in making munitions for the Allies. The letter contained this compromising passage:

"It is my impression that we can disorganize and hold up for months, if not entirely prevent, the manufacture of munitions in Bethlehem and the Middle West, which, in the opinion of the German military attaché is of great importance and amply outweighs the comparatively small expenditure of money involved."

The proposals named were made by the editor of the Hungarian-American newspaper to Dr. von Nuber, the Austro-Hungarian Consul General at New York City. They related the need of promoting a vigorous press agitation through which Austro-Hungarian workmen employed at munition plants could be reached. This enterprise involved the free subsidizing of poorly equipped papers printed in the languages of the nationalities of the Austro-Hungarian immigrants, and a preliminary sum of between \$15,000 and \$20,000 was named as necessary. The immediate need was money. As to the methods to be employed:

"Bethlehem must be sent as many reliable Hungarian and German workmen as we can lay our hands on who will join the factories and begin their work in secret among their fellow workmen. For this purpose I have my men, turners and steel workers. We must send an organizer who in the interests of the union will begin the business in his own way. We must also

PHASES OF THE WAR
FROM
BAGDAD TO THE NORTH SEA

TROOPS IN BAGDAD, THE BALKANS, RUSSIA, AND FRANCE
UNDERMINING · SHELL FIRE · DESTROYERS · TORPEDO



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Sappers who undermine the enemy have one of the most dangerous tasks of the war, since they may be countermined and blown up or imprisoned in their own tunnel



A long column of Austro-Hungarian soldiers marching over the almost impassable mountain roads of Dalmatia, whose Adriatic coast they must defend against Italian attack

Copyright, Press Illustrating Co.



Copyright, Press Illustrating Co

Turkish troops drilling in Bagdad, the famous city on the Tigris, once the capital of Harun-al-Raschid.
The garrison is preparing to resist British attack



Copyright, Press Illustrating Co.

The work of one shell from the great siege guns that brought
about the surrender of Belgrade, Serbia



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German infantry storming a hill in the Argonne. The men bend low for safety, though pressing eagerly forward toward the enemy's lines



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Russian troops mobilizing near the mouth of the Danube, where they would be available for transportation to Bulgaria, or for action should Rumania join the war

send so-called 'soap-box' orators who will know how to start a useful agitation. We shall want money for popular meetings, possibly for organizing picnics. In general the same applies to the Middle West."

Another letter from Dr. Dumba to Baron Burian contained a criticism of Secretary Lansing's recent answer, previously recorded, to the Austrian protest against munition shipments. The legal arguments of Secretary Lansing were termed "very weak," "not to the point," and "misleading." Nevertheless, because of the opinion held in this country, that the United States would have to depend on neutrals in time of war for all war material, and "having regard for the somewhat self-willed temperament of the President," he told Baron Burian that contending further with the United States on the question would be useless and perhaps harmful. "At no price, and in no case," wrote Dr. Dumba, "will President Wilson allow this source [output of munition plants] to dry up."

The United States Government took a serious view of the letter recommending the plan for instigating strikes in American factories. Dr. Dumba, thrown on his defense, explained to the State Department that the incriminating proposals recommended in the document did not originate from him personally, but were the fruit of orders received from Vienna. This explanation was not easily acceptable. The phraseology of Dr. Dumba far from conveyed the impression that he was submitting a report on an irregular proposal inspired by instructions of the Austrian Government. Such a defense, however, if accepted, only made the matter more serious. Instead of the American Government having to take cognizance of an offensive act by an ambassador, the Government which employed him would rather have to be called to account. Another explanation by Dr. Dumba justified his letter to Vienna on the ground that the strike proposal urged merely represented a plan for warning all Austrians and Hungarians, employed in the munition factories, of the penalties they would have to pay if they ever returned to their home country, after aiding in producing weapons and missiles of destruction to be used against the Teutonic forces. This defense

also lacked convincing force, as the letter indicated that the aim was so to cripple the munition factories that their output would be curtailed or stopped altogether—an object that could only be achieved by a general strike of all workers.

Dr. Dumba's offense was viewed as the more flagrant in that his letter followed the dispatch and publication of the American Government's note to Vienna answering the Austrian Government's protest against the continued supply by private American firms of arms and ammunition to the allied powers. The Washington authorities held that the Dumba letter proposed nothing short of a plan to circumvent the imprimatur of the United States, as expressed in the note of Vienna, upholding the right of Americans to supply munitions of war to the belligerent countries. Any project to interfere arbitrarily with or arrest the movement of such legitimate commerce must consequently be judged as an attempt to override the contention of the United States that the traffic in munitions was legal. That the Austro-Hungarian Government and its ambassador should thus have countenanced an enterprise whose object ran counter to the expressed policy of the United States, to say nothing of an infraction of criminal law, constituted an affront to the Administration. Bared of all theoretical extenuation, Dr. Dumba's defense represented an admission that he and his Government were parties to an attempt to disrupt American industries.

The Administration did not take long to make up its mind that the time for disciplining foreign diplomats who exceeded the duties of their office had come. On September 8, 1915, Austria-Hungary was notified that Dr. Konstantin Theodor Dumba was no longer acceptable as that country's envoy in Washington. The American note dispatched to Ambassador Penfield at Vienna for transmission to the Austrian Foreign Minister was blunt and direct. After informing Baron Burian that Dr. Dumba had admitted improper conduct in proposing to his Government plans to instigate strikes in American manufacturing plants, the United States thus demanded his recall:

"By reason of the admitted purpose and intent of Dr. Dumba to conspire to cripple legitimate industries of the people of the

United States and to interrupt their legitimate trade, and by reason of the flagrant violation of diplomatic propriety in employing an American citizen, protected by an American passport, as a secret bearer of official dispatches through the lines of the enemy of Austria-Hungary, the President directs us to inform your excellency that Dr. Dumba is no longer acceptable to the Government of the United States as the Ambassador of His Imperial Majesty at Washington."

Dr. Dumba was not recalled by his Government until September 22, 1915, fourteen days after the American demand. Meanwhile Dr. Dumba had cabled to Vienna, requesting that he be ordered to return on leave of absence "to report." His recall was ostensibly in response to his personal request, but the Administration objected to this resort to a device intended to cloak the fact that he was now *persona non grata* whose return was really involuntary, and would not recognize a recall "on leave of absence." His Government had no choice but to recall him officially in view of the imminent contingency that otherwise he would be ousted, and in that case would be denied safe conduct from capture by an allied cruiser in his passage across the ocean. His request for passports and safe conduct was, in fact, disregarded by the Administration, which informed him that the matter was one to be dealt directly with his Government, pending whose official intimation of recall nothing to facilitate his departure could be done. On the Austrian Government being notified that Dr. Dumba's departure "on leave of absence" would not be satisfactory, he was formally recalled on September 28, 1915. The British and French Governments acceded to the request of the United States for a safe conduct as an act of grace, and the Dumba incident ended by the ex-envoy's departure on October 1, 1915.

The seized Archibald dossier included a letter from the German military attaché, Captain Franz von Papen, to his wife, containing reference to Dr. Albert's correspondence, already quoted, which left no doubt that the letters were genuine:

"Unfortunately, they stole a fat portfolio from our good Albert in the elevated (a New York street railroad). The English secret service of course. Unfortunately, there were some very

important things from my report among them such as buying up liquid chlorine and about the Bridgeport Projectile Company, as well as documents regarding the buying up of phenol and the acquisition of Wright's aeroplane patent. But things like that must occur. I send you Albert's reply for you to see how we protect ourselves. We composed the document to-day."

The "document" evidently was Dr. Albert's explanation discounting the significance and importance of the letters. This explanation was published on August 20, 1915.

The foregoing disclosures of documents covered a wide range of organized German plans for embarrassing the Allies' dealings with American interests; but they related rather more to accomplished operations and such activities as were revealed to be under way—e. g., the acquisition of munitions combined with propaganda for an embargo—were not deemed to be violative of American law. But this stage of intent to clog the Allies' facilities for obtaining sinews of war, in the face of law, speedily grew to one of achievement more or less effective according to the success with which the law interposed to spoil the plans.

The autumn and winter of 1915 were marked by the exposure of a number of German plots which revealed that groups of conspirators were in league in various parts of the country, bent on wrecking munition plants, sinking ships loaded with Allies' supplies, and fomenting strikes. Isolated successes had attended their efforts, but collectively their depredations presented a serious situation. The exposed plots produced clues to secret German sources from which a number of mysterious explosions at munition plants and on ships had apparently been directed. Projected labor disturbances at munition plants were traced to a similar origin. The result was that the docket of the Federal Department of Justice became laden with a motley collection of indictments which implicated fifty or more individuals concerned in some dozen conspiracies, in which four corporations were also involved.

These cases only represented a portion of the criminal infractions of neutrality laws, which had arisen since the outbreak of the war. In January, 1916, an inquiry in Congress directed the

Attorney General to name all persons "arrested in connection with criminal plots affecting the neutrality of our Government." Attorney General Gregory furnished a list of seventy-one indicted persons, and the four corporations mentioned. A list of merely arrested persons would not have been informative, as it would have conveyed an incomplete and misleading impression. Such a list, Mr. Gregory told Congress, would not include persons indicted but never arrested, having become fugitives from justice; nor persons indicted but never arrested, having surrendered; but would include persons arrested and not proceeded against. Thus there were many who had eluded the net of justice by flight and some through insufficient evidence. The seventy-one persons were concerned in violations of American neutrality in connection with the European war.

The list covered several cases already recorded in this history, namely:

A group of Englishmen, and another of Montenegrins, involved in so-called enlistment "plots" for obtaining recruits on American soil for the armies of their respective countries.

The case of Werner Horn, indicted for attempting to destroy by an explosive the St. Croix railroad bridge between Maine and New Brunswick.

A group of nine men, mainly Germans, concerned in procuring bogus passports to enable them to take passage to Europe to act as spies. Eight were convicted, the ninth man, named Von Wedell, a fugitive passport offender, was supposed to have been caught in England and shot.

The Hamburg-American case, in which Dr. Karl Buenz, former German Consul General in New York, and other officials or employees of that steamship company, were convicted (subject to an appeal) of defrauding the Government in submitting false clearance papers as to the destinations of ships sent from New York to furnish supplies to German war vessels in the Atlantic.

A group of four men, a woman, and a rubber agency, indicted on a similar charge, their operations being on the Pacific coast, where they facilitated the delivery of supplies to German cruisers when in the Pacific in the early stages of the war.

There remain the cases which, in the concatenation of events, might logically go on record as direct sequels to the public divulging of the Albert and Archibald secret papers. These included:

A conspiracy to destroy munition-carrying ships at sea and to murder the passengers and crews. Indictments in these terms were brought against a group of six men—Robert Fay, Dr. Herbert O. Kienzie, Walter L. Scholz, Paul Daeche, Max Breitung, and Engelbert Bronkhorst.

A conspiracy to destroy the Welland Canal and to use American soil as a base for unlawful operations against Canada. Three men, Paul Koenig, a Hamburg-American line official, R. E. Leyendecker, and E. J. Justice, were involved in this case.

A conspiracy to destroy shipping on the Pacific Coast. A German baron, Von Brincken, said to be one of the kaiser's army officers; an employee of the German consulate at San Francisco, C. C. Crowley; and a woman, Mrs. Margaret W. Cornell, were the offenders.

A conspiracy to prevent the manufacture and shipment of munitions to the allied powers. A German organization, the National Labor Peace Council, was indicted on this charge, as well as a wealthy German, Franz von Rintelen, described as an intimate friend of the German Crown Prince, and several Americans known in public life.

In most of these cases the name of Captain Karl Boy-Ed, the German naval attaché, or Captain Franz von Papen, the German military attaché, figured persistently. The testimony of informers confirmed the suspicion that a wide web of secret intrigue radiated from sources related to the German embassy and enfolded all the conspiracies, showing that few, if any, of the plots, contemplated or accomplished, were due solely to the individual zeal of German sympathizers.

CHAPTER XXXIV

THE PLOT TO DESTROY SHIPS—PACIFIC COAST
CONSPIRACIES—HAMBURG-AMERICAN
CASE—SCOPE OF NEW YORK
INVESTIGATIONS

THE plot of Fay and his confederates to place bombs on ships carrying war supplies to Europe was discovered when a couple of New York detectives caught Fay and an accomplice, Scholz, experimenting with explosives in a wood near Weehawken, N. J., on October 24, 1915. Their arrests were the outcome of a police search for two Germans who secretly sought to purchase picric acid, a component of high explosives which had become scarce since the war began. Certain purchases made were traced to Fay. On the surface Fay's offense seemed merely one of harboring and using explosives without a license; but police investigations of ship explosions had proceeded on the theory that the purchases of picric acid were associated with them.

Fay confirmed this surmise. He described himself as a lieutenant in the German army, who, with the sanction of the German secret information service, had come to the United States after sharing in the Battle of the Marne, to perfect certain mine devices for attachment to munition ships in order to cripple them. In a Hoboken storage warehouse was found a quantity of picric acid he had deposited there, with a number of steel mine tanks, each fitted with an attachment for hooking to the rudder of a vessel, and clockwork and wire to fire the explosive in the tanks. In rooms occupied by Fay and Scholz were dynamite and trinitrotoluol (known as T-N-T), many caps of fulminate of mercury, and Government survey maps of the eastern coast line and New York Harbor. The conspirators' equipment included a fast motor boat that could dart up and down the rivers and along the water front where ships were moored, a high-powered automobile, and four suit cases containing a number of disguises. The purpose of

the enterprise was to stop shipments of arms and ammunitions to the Allies. The disabling of ships, said Fay, was the sole aim, without destruction of life. To this end he had been experimenting for several months on a waterproof mine and a detonating device that would operate by the swinging of a rudder, to which the mine would be attached, controlled by a clock timed to cause the explosion on the high seas. The German secret service, both Fay and Scholz said, had provided them with funds to pursue their object. Fay's admission to the police contained these statements:

"I saw Captain Boy-Ed and Captain von Papen on my arrival in this country. Captain Boy-Ed told me that I was doing a dangerous thing. He said that political complications would result and he most assuredly could not approve of my plans. When I came to this country, however, I had letters of introduction to both those gentlemen. Both men warned me not to do anything of the kind I had in mind. Captain von Papen strictly forbade me to attach any of the mines to any of the ships leaving the harbors of the United States. But anyone who wishes to, can read between the lines.

"The plan on which I worked was to place a mine on the rudder post so that when it exploded it would destroy the rudder and leave the ship helpless. There was no danger of any person being killed. But by this explosion I would render the ship useless and make the shipment of munitions so difficult that the owners of ships would be intimidated and cause insurance rates to go so high that the shipment of ammunition would be seriously affected, if not stopped."

The Federal officials questioned the statement that Fay's design was merely to cripple munition ships. Captain Harold C. Woodward of the Corps of Engineers, a Government specialist on explosives, held that if the amount of explosive, either trinitrotoluol, or an explosive made from chlorate of potash and benzol, required by the mine caskets found in Fay's possession, was fired against a ship's rudder, it would tear open the stern and destroy the entire ship, if not its passengers and crew, so devastating would be the explosive force. A mine of the size Fay used, three

feet long and ten inches by ten inches, he said, would contain over two cubic feet:

"If the mine was filled with trinitrotoluol the weight of the high explosive would be about 180 pounds. If it was filled with a mixture of chlorate of potash and benzol the weight would be probably 110 pounds. Either charge if exploded on the rudder post would blow a hole in the ship.

"The amount of high explosive put into a torpedo or a submarine mine is only about 200 pounds. It must not be forgotten that water is practically noncompressible, and that even if the explosion did not take place against the ship the effect would be practically the same. Oftentimes a ship is sunk by the explosion of a torpedo or a mine several feet from the hull.

"Furthermore, if the ship loaded with dynamite or high explosive, and the detonating wave of the first explosion reaches that cargo, the cargo also would explode. In high explosives the detonating wave in the percussion cap explodes the charge in much the same manner in which a chord struck on a piano will make a picture wire on the wall vibrate if both the wire and the piano string are tuned alike.

"Accordingly, if a ship carrying tons of high explosive is attacked from the outside by a mine containing 100 pounds of similar explosive, the whole cargo would go up and nothing would remain of either ship or cargo."

Therefore the charge made against Fay and Scholz, and four other men later arrested, Daeche, Kienzie, Bronkhorst, and Breitung, namely, conspiracy to "destroy a ship," meant that and all the consequences to the lives of those on board. Breitung was a nephew of Edward N. Breitung, the purchaser of the ship *Dacia* from German ownership, which was seized by the French on the suspicion that its transfer to American registry was not bona fide.

The plot was viewed as the most serious yet bared. Fay and his confederates were credited with having spent some \$30,000 on their experiments and preparations, and rumor credited them with having larger sums of money at their command.

The press generally doubted if they could have conducted their operations without such financial support being extended them in

the United States. A design therefore was seen in Fay's statement that he was financed from Germany to screen the source of this aid by transferring the higher responsibility *in toto* to official persons in Germany who were beyond the reach of American justice. These and other insinuations directed at the German Embassy produced a statement from that quarter repudiating all knowledge of the Fay conspiracy, and explaining that its attachés were frequently approached by "fanatics" who wanted to sink ships or destroy buildings in which munitions were made.

A similar conspiracy, but embracing the destruction of railroad bridges as well as munition ships and factories, was later revealed on the Pacific Coast. Evidence on which indictments were made against the men Crowley, Von Brincken, and a woman confederate aforementioned, named Captain von Papen, the German military attaché, as the director of the plot. The accused were also said to have had the cooperation of the German Consul General at San Francisco. The indictments charged them, *inter alia*, with using the mails to incite arson, murder, and assassination. Among the evidence the Government unearthed was a letter referring to "P," which, the Federal officials said, meant Captain von Papen. The letter, which related to a price to be paid for the destruction of a powder plant at Pinole, Cal., explained how the price named had been referred to others "higher up." It read:

"Dear Sir: Your last letter with clipping to-day, and note what you have to say. I have taken it up with them and 'B' [which the Federal officials said stood for Franz Bopp, German Consul at San Francisco] is awaiting decision of 'P' [said to stand for Captain von Papen in New York], so cannot advise you yet, and will do so as soon as I get word from you. You might size up the situation in the meantime."

The indictments charged that the defendants planned to destroy munition plants at Aetna and Gary, Ind., at Ishpeming, Mich., and at other places. The Government's chief witness, named Van Koolbergen, told of being employed by Baron von Brincken, of the German Consulate at San Francisco, to make and use clockwork bombs to destroy the commerce of neutral

nations. For each bomb he received \$100 and a bonus for each ship damaged or destroyed. For destroying a railway trestle in Canada over which supply trains for the Allies passed, he said he received first \$250, and \$300 further from a representative of the German Government, the second payment being made upon his producing newspaper clippings recording the bridge's destruction. It appeared that Van Koolbergen divulged the plot to the Canadian Government.

The three defendants and Van Koolbergen were later named in another indictment found by a San Francisco Federal Grand Jury, involving in all sixty persons, including the German Consul General in that city, Franz Bopp, the Vice Consul, Baron Eckhardt, H. von Schack, Maurice Hall, Consul for Turkey, and a number of men identified with shipping and commercial interests.

The case was the first in which the United States Government had asked for indictments against the official representatives of any of the belligerents. The warrants charged a conspiracy to violate the Sherman Anti-Trust Law by attempting to damage plants manufacturing munitions for the Allies, thus interfering with legitimate commerce, and with setting on foot military expeditions against a friendly nation in connection with plans to destroy Canadian railway tunnels.

The vice consul, Von Schack, was also indicted with twenty-six of the defendants on charges of conspiring to defraud the United States by sending supplies to German warships in the earlier stages of the war, the supplies having been sent from New York to the German Consulate in San Francisco. The charges related to the outfitting of five vessels. One of the latter, the *Sacramento*, now interned in a Chilean port, cleared from San Francisco, and when out to sea, the Government ascertained, was taken in command by the wireless operator, who was really a German naval reserve officer. Off the western coast of South America the *Sacramento* was supposed to have got into wireless communication with German cruisers then operating in the Pacific. There she joined the squadron under a show of compulsion, as though held up and captured. In this guise the war

vessels seemingly convoyed the *Sacramento* to an island in the Pacific, where her cargo of food, coal, and munitions were transferred to her supposed captors. The *Sacramento* then proceeded to a Chilean port where her commanding officer reported that he had been captured by German warships and deprived of his cargo. The Chilean authorities doubted the story and ordered the vessel to be interned.

Far more extensive were unlawful operations in this direction conducted by officials of the Hamburg-American line, as revealed at their trial in New York City in November, 1915. The indictments charged fraud against the United States by false clearances and manifests for vessels chartered to provision, from American ports, German cruisers engaged in commerce destroying. The prosecution proceeded on the belief that the Hamburg-American activities were merely part of a general plan devised by German and Austrian diplomatic and consular officers to use American ports, directly and indirectly, as war bases for supplies. The testimony in the case involved Captain Boy-Ed, the German naval attaché, who was named as having directed the distribution of a fund of at least \$750,000 for purposes described as "riding roughshod over the laws of the United States." The defense freely admitted chartering ships to supply German cruisers at sea, and in fact named a list of twelve vessels, so outfitted, showing the amount spent for coal, provisions, and charter expenses to have been over \$1,400,000; but of this outlay only \$20,000 worth of supplies reached the German vessels. The connection of Captain Boy-Ed with the case suggested the defense that the implicated officials consulted with him as the only representative in the United States of the German navy, and were really acting on direct orders from the German Government, and not under the direction of the naval attaché. Military necessity was also a feasible ground for pleading justification in concealing the fact that the ships cleared to deliver their cargoes to German war vessels instead of to the ports named in their papers. These ports were professed to be their ultimate destinations if the vessels failed to meet the German cruisers. Had any other course been pursued, the primary destinations

would have become publicly known and British and other hostile warships patrolling the seas would have been on their guard. The defendants were convicted, but the case remained open on appeal.

About the same time the criminal features of the Teutonic propaganda engaged the lengthy attention of a Federal Grand Jury sitting in New York City. A mass of evidence had been accumulated by Government agents in New York, Washington, and other cities. Part of this testimony related to the Dumba and Von Papen letters found in the Archibald dossier. Another part concerned certain revelations a former Austrian consul at San Francisco, Dr. Joseph Goricar, made to the Department of Justice. This informant charged that the German and Austrian Governments had spent between \$30,000,000 and \$40,000,000 in developing an elaborate spy system in the United States with the aim of destroying munition plants, obtaining plans of American fortifications, Government secrets, and passports for Germans desiring to return to Germany. These operations, he said, were conducted with the knowledge of Count von Bernstorff, the German Ambassador. Captains Boy-Ed and Von Papen were also named as actively associated with the conspiracy, as well as Dr. von Nuber, the Austrian Consul General in New York, who, he said, directed the espionage system and kept card indices of spies in his office.

The investigation involved, therefore, diplomatic agents, who were exempt from prosecution; a number of consuls and other men in the employ of the Teutonic governments while presumably connected with trustworthy firms; and notable German-Americans, some holding public office.

Contributions to the fund for furthering the conspiracy, in addition to the substantial sums believed to be supplied by the German and Austrian Governments, were said to have come freely from many Germans, citizens and otherwise, resident in the United States. The project, put succinctly, was "to buy up or blow up the munition plants." The buying up, as previously shown, having proved to be impracticable, an alternative plan presented itself to "tie up" the factories by strikes. This was

Dr. Dumba's miscarried scheme, which aimed at bribing labor leaders to induce workmen, in return for substantial strike pay, to quit work in the factories. Allied to this design was the movement to forbid citizens of Germany and Austria-Hungary from working in plants supplying munitions to their enemies. Such employment, they were told, was treasonable. The men were offered high wages at other occupations if they would abandon their munition work. Teutonic charity bazaars held throughout the country and agencies formed to help Teutons out of employment were regarded merely as means to influence men to leave the munition plants and thus hamper the export of war supplies. Funds were traced to show how money traveled through various channels from the fountainhead to men working on behalf of the Teutonic cause. Various firms received sums of money, to be paid to men ostensibly in the employ of the concerns, but who in reality were German agents working under cover.

Evidence collected revealed these various facts of the Teutonic conspiracy. But the unfolding of such details before the Grand Jury was incidental to the search for the men who originated the scheme, acted as almoners or treasurers, or supervised, as executives, the horde of German and Austrian agents intriguing on the lower slopes under their instructions.

CHAPTER XXXV

VON RINTELEN'S ACTIVITIES—CONGRESSMAN
INVOLVED—GERMANY'S REPUDIATIONS—
DISMISSAL OF CAPTAINS BOY-ED
AND VON PAPEN

IN this quest the mysterious movements and connections of one German agent broadly streaked the entire investigation. This person was Von Rintelen, supposed to be Dr. Dumba's closest lieutenant ere that envoy's presence on American soil was dispensed with by President Wilson. Von Rintelen's activities

belonged to the earlier period of the war, before the extensive ramifications of the criminal phases of the German propaganda were known. At present he was an enforced absentee from the scenes of his exploits, being either immured by the British in the Tower of London, or in a German concentration camp as a spy. This inglorious interruption to the rôle he appeared to play while in the United States as a peripatetic Midas, setting plots in train by means of an overflowing purse, was due to an attempt to return to Germany on the liner *Noordam* in July, 1915. The British intercepted him at Falmouth, and promptly made him a prisoner of war after examining his papers.

Whatever was Von Rintelen's real mission in the United States in the winter of 1914-15, he was credited with being a personal emissary and friend of the kaiser, bearing letters of credit estimated to vary between \$50,000,000 and \$100,000,000. The figure probably was exaggerated in view of the acknowledged inability of the German interests in the United States to command anything like the lesser sum named to acquire all they wanted—control of the munition plants. His initial efforts appeared to have been directed to a wide advertising campaign to sway American sentiment against the export of arms shipments. His energies, like those of others, having been fruitless in this field, he was said to have directed his attention to placing large orders under cover for munitions with the object of depleting the source of such supplies for the Allies, and aimed to control some of the plants by purchasing their stocks. The investigation in these channels thus contributed to confirm the New York "World's" charges against German officialdom, based on its exposé of the Albert documents. Mexican troubles, according to persistent rumor, inspired Von Rintelen to use his ample funds to draw the United States into conflict with its southern neighbor as a means of diverting munition supplies from the Allies for American use. He and other German agents were suspected of being in league with General Huerta with a view to promoting a new revolution in Mexico.

The New York Grand Jury's investigations of Von Rintelen's activities became directed to his endeavors to "buy strikes." The

outcome was the indictment of officials of a German organization known under the misleading name of the National Labor Peace Council. The persons accused were Von Rintelen himself, though a prisoner in England; Frank Buchanan, a member of Congress; H. Robert Fowler, a former representative; Jacob C. Taylor, president of the organization; David Lamar, who previously had gained notoriety for impersonating a congressman in order to obtain money and known as the "Wolf of Wall Street," and two others, named Martin and Schulties, active in the Labor Peace Council and connected with a body called the Antitrust League. They were charged with having, in an attempt to effect an embargo (which would be in the interest of Germany) on the shipment of war supplies, conspired to restrain foreign trade by instigating strikes, intimidating employees, bribing and distributing money among officers of labor organizations. Von Rintelen was said to have supplied funds to Lamar wherewith the Labor Peace Council was enabled to pursue these objects. One sum named was \$300,000, received by Lamar from Von Rintelen for the organization of this body; of that sum Lamar was said to have paid \$170,000 to men connected with the council.

The Labor Peace Council was organized in the summer of 1915, and met first in Washington, when resolutions were passed embracing proposals for international peace, but were viewed as really disguising a propaganda on behalf of German interests. The Government sought to show that the organization was financed by German agents and that its crusade was part and parcel of pro-German movements whose ramifications throughout the country had caused national concern.

Von Rintelen's manifold activities as chronicled acquired a tinge of romance and not a little of fiction, but the revelations concerning him were deemed sufficiently serious by Germany to produce a repudiation of him by the German embassy on direct instructions from Berlin, i. e.:

"The German Government entirely disavows Franz Rintelen, and especially wished to say that it issued no instructions of any kind which could have led him to violate American laws."

It is essential to the record to chronicle that American sentiment did not accept German official disclaimers very seriously. They were too prolific, and were viewed as apologetic expedients to keep the relations between the two governments as smooth as possible in the face of conditions which were daily imperiling those relations. Germany appeared in the position of a Frankenstein who had created a hydra-headed monster of conspiracy and intrigue that had stampeded beyond control, and washed her hands of its depredations. The situation, however, was only susceptible to this view by an inner interpretation of the official disclaimers. In letter, but not in spirit, Germany disowned her own offspring by repudiating the deeds of plotters in terms which deftly avoided revealing any ground for the suspicion—belied by events—that those deeds had an official inception. Germany, in denying that the plotters were Government "agents," suggested that these men pursued their operations with the recognition that they alone undertook all the risks, and that if unmasked it was their patriotic duty not to betray "the cause," which might mean their country, the German Government, or the German officials who directed them. Not all the exposed culprits had been equal to this self-abnegating strain on their patriotism; some, like Fay, were at first talkative in their admissions that their pursuits were officially countenanced, another recounted defense of Werner Horn, who attempted to destroy a bridge connecting Canada and the United States, even went so far as to contend that the offense was military—an act of war—and therefore not criminal, on the plea that Horn was acting as a German army officer. In other cases incriminating evidence made needless the assumption of an attitude by culprits of screening by silence the complicity of superiors. Yet despite almost daily revelations linking the names of important German officials, diplomatic and consular, with exposed plots, a further repudiation came from Berlin in December, 1915, when the New York Grand Jury's investigation was at high tide. This further disavowal read:

"The German Government, naturally, has never knowingly accepted the support of any person, group of persons, society or

organization seeking to promote the cause of Germany in the United States by illegal acts, by counsels of violence, by contravention of law, or by any means whatever that could offend the American people in the pride of their own authority. . . . I can only say, and do most emphatically declare to Germans abroad, to German-American citizens of the United States, to the American people all alike, that whoever is guilty of conduct tending to associate the German cause with lawlessness of thought, suggestion or deed against life, property, and order in the United States is, in fact, an enemy of that very cause and a source of embarrassment to the German Government, notwithstanding he or they may believe to the contrary."

The stimulus for this politic disavowal, and one must be sought, since German statements always had a genesis in antecedent events—was not apparently due to continued plot exposures, which were too frequent, but could reasonably be traced to a ringing address President Wilson had previously made to Congress on December 7, 1915. The President, amid the prolonged applause of both Houses, meeting in joint session, denounced the unpatriotism of many Americans of foreign descent. He warned Congress that the gravest threats against the nation's peace and safety came from within, not from without. Without naming German-Americans, he declared that many "had poured the poison of disloyalty into the very arteries of our national life," and called for the prompt exercise of the processes of law to purge the country "of the corrupt distempers brought on by these citizens."

"I am urging you," he said in solemn tones, "to do nothing less than save the honor and self-respect of the nation. Such creatures of passion, disloyalty, and anarchy must be crushed out."

Three days before this denunciation, the Administration had demanded from Germany the recall of Captains Boy-Ed and Von Papen, respectively the military aid and naval attaché of the German embassy. Unlike the procedure followed in requesting Dr. Dumba's recall, no reasons were given. None according to historic usage were necessary, and if reasons were given, they

could not be questioned. It was sufficient that a diplomatic officer was *non persona grata* by the fact that his withdrawal was demanded.

Germany, through her embassy, showed some obduracy in acting upon a request for these officials' recall without citing the cause of complaint. There was an anxiety that neither should be recalled with the imputation resting upon them that they were concerned, say, in the so-called Huerta-Mexican plot—if one really existed—or with the conspiracies to destroy munition plants and munition ships, or, in Captain Boy-Ed's case, in the Hamburg-American line's chartered ships for provisioning of German cruisers, sailing with false manifests and clearance papers.

An informal note from Secretary Lansing to Count von Bernstorff so far acceded to the request for a bill of particulars, though not customary, that the German embassy professed to be satisfied. Secretary Lansing stated that Captains Boy-Ed and Von Papen had rendered themselves unacceptable by "their activities in connection with naval and military affairs." This was intended to mean that such activities here indicated had brought the two officials in contact with private individuals in the United States who had been involved in violation of the law. The incidents and circumstances of this contact were of such a cumulative character that the two attachés could no longer be deemed as acceptable to the American Government. Here was an undoubtedly implication of complicity by association with wrong-doers, but not in deed. The unofficial statement of the cause of complaint satisfied the embassy in that it seemed to relieve the two officers from the imputation of themselves having violated American laws. The record stood, however, that the United States had officially refused to give any reasons for demanding their recall. Germany officially recalled them on December 10, 1915, and before the year was out they quitted American soil under safe conducts granted by the British Government.

Captain von Papen, however, was not permitted to escape the clutches of the British on the ocean passage. While respecting his person, they seized his papers. These, duly published, made his complicity in the German plots more pronounced than ever.

His check counterfoils showed a payment of \$500 to "Mr. de Caserta, Ottawa." De Caserta was described in British records as "a dangerous German spy, who takes great risks, has lots of ability, and wants lots of money." He was supposed to have been involved in conspiracies in Canada to destroy bridges, armories, and munition factories. He had offered his services to the British Government, but they were rejected. Later he was reported to have been shot or hanged in London as a spy.

Another check payment by Captain von Papen was to Werner Horn for \$700. Horn, as before recorded, was the German who attempted to blow up a railroad bridge at Vanceboro, Maine. Other payments shown by the Von Papen check book were to Paul Koenig, of the Hamburg-American line. Koenig was arrested in New York in December, 1915, on a charge of conspiracy with others to set on foot a military expedition from the United States to destroy the locks of the Welland Canal for the purpose of cutting off traffic from the Great Lakes to the St. Lawrence River.

The German consul at Seattle was shown to have received \$500 from Captain von Papen shortly before an explosion occurred there in May, 1915, and \$1,500 three months earlier. Another payment was to a German, who, while under arrest in England on a charge of being a spy, committed suicide.

CHAPTER XXXVI

GREAT BRITAIN'S DEFENSE OF BLOCKADE— AMERICAN METHODS IN CIVIL WAR CITED

ISSUES with Great Britain interposed to engage the Administration's attention, in the brief intervals when Germany's behavior was not doing so, to the exclusion of all other international controversies produced by the war. In endeavoring to balance the scales between the contending belligerents, the United States

had to weigh judicially the fact that their offenses differed greatly in degree. Germany's crimes were the wanton slaughter of American and other neutral noncombatants, Great Britain's the wholesale infringements of American and neutral property rights. Protests menacing a rupture of relations had to be made in Germany's case; but those directed to Great Britain, though not less forceful in tone, could not equitably be accompanied by a hint of the same alternative. Arbitration by an international court was the final recourse on the British issues. Arbitration could not be resorted to, in the American view, for adjusting the issues with Germany.

The Anglo-American trade dispute over freedom of maritime commerce by neutrals during a war occupied an interlude in the crisis with Germany. The dispatch of the third *Lusitania* note of July 21, 1915, promised a breathing spell in the arduous diplomatic labors of the Administration, pending Germany's response. But a few days later the Administration became immersed in Great Britain's further defense of her blockade methods, contained in a group of three communications, one dated July 24, and two July 31, 1915, in answer to the American protests of March 31, July 14, and July 15, 1915. The main document, dated July 24, 1915, showed both Governments to be professing and insisting upon a strict adherence to the same principles of international law, while sharply disagreeing on the question whether measures taken by Great Britain conformed to those principles.

The United States had objected to certain interferences with neutral trade Great Britain contemplated under her various Orders in Council. The legality of these orders the United States contested. Great Britain was notified by a caveat, sent July 14, 1915, that American rights assailed by these interferences with trade would be construed under accepted principles of international law. Hence prize-court proceedings based on British municipal legislation not in conformity with such principles would not be recognized as valid by the United States.

Great Britain defended her course by stating the premise that a blockade was an allowable expedient in war—which the United States did not question—and upon that premise reared a struc-

ture of argument which emphasized the wide gap between British and American interpretations of international law. A blockade being allowable, Great Britain held that it was equally allowable to make it effective. If the only way to do so was to extend the blockade to enemy commerce passing through neutral ports, then such extension was warranted. As Germany could conduct her commerce through such ports, situated in contiguous countries, almost as effectively as through her own ports, a blockade of German ports alone would not be effective. Hence the Allies asserted the right to widen the blockade to the German commerce of neutral ports, but sought to distinguish between such commerce and the legitimate trade of neutrals for the use and benefit of their own nationals. Moreover, the Allies forebore to apply the rule, formerly invariable, that ships with cargoes running a blockade were condemnable.

On the chief point at issue Sir Edward Grey wrote:

"The contention which I understand the United States Government now puts forward is that if a belligerent is so circumstanced that his commerce can pass through adjacent neutral ports as easily as through ports in his own territory, his opponent has no right to interfere and must restrict his measure of blockade in such a manner as to leave such avenues of commerce still open to his adversary.

"This is a contention which his Majesty's Government feel unable to accept and which seems to them unsustained either in point of law or upon principles of international equity. They are unable to admit that a belligerent violates any fundamental principle of international law by applying a blockade in such a way as to cut out the enemy's commerce with foreign countries through neutral ports if the circumstances render such an application of the principles of blockade the only means of making it effective."

In this connection Sir Edward Grey recalled the position of the United States in the Civil War, when it was under the necessity of declaring a blockade of some 3,000 miles of coast line, a military operation for which the number of vessels available was at first very small:

"It was vital to the cause of the United States in that great struggle that they should be able to cut off the trade of the Southern States. The Confederate armies were dependent on supplies from overseas, and those supplies could not be obtained without exporting the cotton wherewith to pay for them.

"To cut off this trade the United States could only rely upon a blockade. The difficulties confronting the Federal Government were in part due to the fact that neighboring neutral territory afforded convenient centers from which contraband could be introduced into the territory of their enemies and from which blockade running could be facilitated.

"In order to meet this new difficulty the old principles relating to contraband and blockade were developed, and the doctrine of continuous voyage was applied and enforced, under which goods destined for the enemy territory were intercepted before they reached the neutral ports from which they were to be reexported. The difficulties which imposed upon the United States the necessity of reshaping some of the old rules are somewhat akin to those with which the Allies are now faced in dealing with the trade of their enemy."

Though an innovation, the extension of the British blockade to a surveillance of merchandise passing in and out of a neutral port contiguous to Germany was not for that reason impermissible. Thus that preceded the British contention, which, moreover, recognized the essential thing to be observed in changes of law and usages of war caused by new conditions was that such changes must "conform to the spirit and principles of the essence of the rules of war." The phrase was cited from the American protest by way of buttressing the argument to show that the United States itself, as evident from the excerpt quoted, had freely made innovations in the law of blockade within this restriction, but regardless of the views or interests of neutrals. These American innovations in blockade methods, Great Britain maintained, were of the same general character as those adopted by the allied powers, and Great Britain, as exemplified in the *Springbok* case, had assented to them. As to the American contention that there was a lack of written authority for the British

innovations or extensions of the law of blockade, the absence of such pronouncements was deemed unessential. Sir Edward Grey considered that the function of writers on international law was to formulate existing principles and rules, not to invent or dictate alterations adapting them to altered circumstances.

So, to sum up, the modifications of the old rules of blockade adopted were viewed by Great Britain as in accordance with the general principles on which an acknowledged right of blockade was based. They were not only held to be justified by the exigencies of the case, but could be defended as consistent with those general principles which had been recognized by both governments.

The United States declined to accept the view that seizures and detentions of American ships and cargoes could justifiably be made by stretching the principles of international law to fit war conditions Great Britain confronted, and assailed the legality of the British tribunals which determined whether such seizures were prizes. Great Britain had been informed :

“. . . So far as the interests of American citizens are concerned the Government of the United States will insist upon their rights under the principles and rules of international law as hitherto established, governing neutral trade in time of war, without limitation or impairment by order in council or other municipal legislation by the British Government, and will not recognize the validity of prize-court proceedings taken under restraints imposed by British municipal law in derogation of the rights of American citizens under international law.”

British prize-court proceedings had been fruitful of bitter grievances to the State Department from the American merchants affected. Sir Edward Grey pointed out that American interests had this remedy in challenging prize-court verdicts :

“It is open to any United States citizen whose claim is before the prize court to contend that any order in council which may affect his claim is inconsistent with the principles of international law, and is, therefore, not binding upon the court.

“If the prize court declines to accept his contentions, and if, after such a decision has been upheld on appeal by the judicial

committee of His Majesty's Privy Council, the Government of the United States considers that there is serious ground for holding that the decision is incorrect and infringes the rights of their citizens, it is open to them to claim that it should be subjected to review by an international tribunal."

One complaint of the United States, made on July 15, 1915, had been specifically directed to the action of the British naval authorities in seizing the American steamer *Neches*, sailing from Rotterdam to an American port, with a general cargo. The ground advanced to sustain this action was that the goods originated in part at least in Belgium, and hence came within the Order in Council of March 11, 1915, which stipulated that every merchant vessel sailing from a port other than a German port, carrying goods of enemy origin, might be required to discharge such goods in a British or allied port. The *Neches* had been detained at the Downs and then brought to London. Belgian goods were viewed as being of "enemy origin," because coming from territory held by Germany. This was the first specific case of the kind arising under British Orders in Council affecting American interests, the goods being consigned to United States citizens.

Great Britain on July 31, 1915, justified her seizure of the *Neches* as coming within the application of her extended blockade, as previously set forth, which with great pains she had sought to prove to the United States was permissible, under international law. Her defense in the *Neches* case, however, was viewed as weakened by her citing Germany's violations of international law to excuse her extension of old blockade principles to the peculiar circumstances of the present war. In intimating that so long as neutrals tolerated the German submarine warfare, they ought not to press her to abandon blockade measures that were a consequence of that warfare, Great Britain was regarded as lowering her defense toward the level of the position taken by Germany. Sir Edward Grey's plan was thus phrased:

"His Majesty's Government are not aware, except from the published correspondence between the United States and Ger-

many, to what extent reparation has been claimed from Germany by neutrals for loss of ships, lives, and cargoes, nor how far these acts have been the subject even of protest by the neutral governments concerned.

"While these acts of the German Government continue, it seems neither reasonable nor just that His Majesty's Government should be pressed to abandon the rights claimed in the British note and to allow goods from Germany to pass freely through waters effectively patrolled by British ships of war."

Such appeals the American Government had sharply repudiated in correspondence with Germany on the submarine issue. Great Britain, however, unlike Germany, did not admit that the blockade was a reprisal, and therefore without basis of law, on the contrary, she contended that it was a legally justifiable measure for meeting Germany's illegal acts.

The British presentation of the case commanded respect, though not agreement, as an honest endeavor to build a defense from basic facts and principles by logical methods. One commendatory view, while not upholding the contentions, paid Sir Edward Grey's handling of the British defense a generous tribute, albeit at the expense of Germany:

"It makes no claim which offends humane sentiment or affronts the sense of natural right. It makes no insulting proposal for the barter or sale of honor, and it resorts to no tricks or evasions in the way of suggested compromise. It seeks in no way to enlist this country as an auxiliary to the allied cause under sham pretenses of humane intervention."

The task before the State Department of making a convincing reply to Sir Edward Grey's skillful contentions was generally regarded as one that would test Secretary Lansing's legal resources. The problem was picturesquely sketched by the New York "Times":

"The American eagle has by this time discovered that the shaft directed against him by Sir Edward Grey was feathered with his own plumage. To meet our contentions Sir Edward cites our own seizures and our own court decisions. It remains to be seen whether out of strands plucked from the mane and tail of the

British lion we can fashion a bowstring which will give effective momentum to a counterbolt launched in the general direction of Downing Street."

CHAPTER XXXVII

BRITISH BLOCKADE DENOUNCED AS ILLEGAL AND INEFFECTIVE BY THE UNITED STATES—THE AMERICAN POSITION

SECRETARY Lansing succeeded in accomplishing the difficult task indicated at the conclusion of the previous chapter. The American reply to the British notes was not dispatched until October 21, 1915, further friction with Germany having intervened over the *Arabic*. It constituted the long-deferred protest which ex-Secretary Bryan vainly urged the President to make to Great Britain simultaneously with the sending of the third *Lusitania* note to Germany. The President declined to consider the issues on the same footing or as susceptible to equitable diplomatic survey unless kept apart.

The note embraced a study of eight British communications made to the American Government in 1915 up to August 13, relating to blockade restrictions on American commerce imposed by Great Britain. It had been delayed in the hope that the announced intention of the British Government "to exercise their belligerent rights with every possible consideration for the interest of neutrals," and their intention of "removing all causes of avoidable delay in dealing with American cargoes," and of causing "the least possible amount of inconvenience to persons engaged in legitimate trade," as well as their "assurance to the United States Government that they would make it their first aim to minimize the inconveniences" resulting from the "measures taken by the allied governments," would in practice not unjustifiably infringe upon the neutral rights of American citizens engaged in trade and commerce. The hope had not been realized.

The detentions of American vessels and cargoes since the opening of hostilities, presumably under the British Orders in Council of August 20 and October 29, 1914, and March 11, 1915, formed one specific complaint. In practice these detentions, the United States contended, had not been uniformly based on proofs obtained at the time of seizure. Many vessels had been detained while search was made for evidence of the contraband character of cargoes, or of intention to evade the nonintercourse measures of Great Britain. The question became one of evidence to support a belief—in many cases a bare suspicion—of enemy destination or of enemy origin of the goods involved. The United States raised the point that this evidence should be obtained by search at sea, and that the vessel and cargo should not be taken to a British port for the purpose unless incriminating circumstances warranted such action. International practice to support this view was cited. Naval orders of the United States, Great Britain, Russia, Japan, Spain, Germany, and France from 1888 to the opening of the present war showed that search in port was not contemplated by the government of any of these countries.

Great Britain had contended that the American objection to search at sea was inconsistent with American practice during the Civil War. Secretary Lansing held that the British view of the American sea policy of that period was based on a misconception:

“Irregularities there may have been at the beginning of that war, but a careful search of the records of this Government as to the practice of its commanders shows conclusively that there were no instances when vessels were brought into port for search prior to instituting prize court proceedings, or that captures were made upon other grounds than, in the words of the American note of November 7, 1914, evidence found on the ship under investigation and not upon circumstances ascertained from external sources.”

Great Britain justified bringing vessels to port for search because of the size and seaworthiness of modern carriers and the difficulty of uncovering at sea the real transaction owing to the intricacy of modern trade operations. The United States sub-

mitted that such commercial transactions were essentially no more complex and disguised than in previous wars, during which the practice of obtaining evidence in port to determine whether a vessel should be held for prize-court proceedings was not adopted. As to the effect of size and seaworthiness of merchant vessels upon search at sea, a board of naval experts reported:

"The facilities for boarding and inspection of modern ships are in fact greater than in former times, and no difference, so far as the necessities of the case are concerned, can be seen between the search of a ship of a thousand tons and one of twenty thousand tons, except possibly a difference in time, for the purpose of establishing fully the character of her cargo and the nature of her service and destination."

The new British practice, which required search at port instead of search at sea, in order that extrinsic evidence might be sought (i. e., evidence other than that derived from an examination of the ship at sea), had this effect:

"Innocent vessels or cargoes are now seized and detained on mere suspicion while efforts are made to obtain evidence from extraneous sources to justify the detention and the commencement of prize proceedings. The effect of this new procedure is to subject traders to risk of loss, delay and expense so great and so burdensome as practically to destroy much of the export trade of the United States to neutral countries of Europe."

The American note next assailed the British interpretation of the greatly increased imports of neutral countries adjoining Great Britain's enemies. These increases, Sir Edward Grey contended, raised a presumption that certain commodities useful for military purposes, though destined for those countries, were intended for reexportation to the belligerents, who could not import them directly. Hence the detention of vessels bound for the ports of those neutral countries was justified. Secretary Lansing denied that this contention could be accepted as laying down a just and legal rule of evidence:

"Such a presumption is too remote from the facts and offers too great opportunity for abuse by the belligerent, who could, if the rule were adopted, entirely ignore neutral rights on the high

seas and prey with impunity upon neutral commerce. To such a rule of legal presumption this Government cannot accede, as it is opposed to those fundamental principles of justice which are the foundation of the jurisprudence of the United States and Great Britain."

In this connection Secretary Lansing seized upon the British admission, made in the correspondence, that British exports to those neutral countries had materially increased since the war began. Thus Great Britain concededly shared in creating a condition relied upon as a sufficient ground to justify the interception of American goods destined to neutral European ports. The American view of this condition was:

"If British exports to those ports should be still further increased, it is obvious that under the rule of evidence contended for by the British Government, the presumption of enemy destinations could be applied to a greater number of American cargoes, and American trade would suffer to the extent that British trade benefited by the increase. Great Britain cannot expect the United States to submit to such manifest injustice or to permit the rights of its citizens to be so seriously impaired.

"When goods are clearly intended to become incorporated in the mass of merchandise for sale in a neutral country it is an unwarranted and inquisitorial proceeding to detain shipments for examination as to whether those goods are ultimately destined for the enemy's country or use. Whatever may be the conjectural conclusions to be drawn from trade statistics, which, when stated by value, are of uncertain evidence as to quantity, the United States maintains the right to sell goods into the general stock of a neutral country, and denounces as illegal and unjustifiable any attempt of a belligerent to interfere with that right on the ground that it suspects that the previous supply of such goods in the neutral country, which the imports renew or replace, has been sold to an enemy. That is a matter with which the neutral vendor has no concern and which can in no way affect his rights of trade."

The British practice had run counter to the assurances Great Britain made in establishing the blockade, which was to be so

extensive as to prohibit all trade with Germany or Austria-Hungary, even through the ports of neutral countries adjacent to them. Great Britain admitted that the blockade should not, and promised that it would not, interfere with the trade of countries contiguous to her enemies. Nevertheless, after six months' experience of the "blockade," the United States Government was convinced that Great Britain had been unsuccessful in her efforts to distinguish between enemy and neutral trade.

The United States challenged the validity of the blockade because it was ineffective in stopping all trade with Great Britain's enemies. A blockade, to be binding, must be maintained by force sufficient to prevent all access to the coast of the enemy, according to the Declaration of Paris of 1856, which the American note quoted as correctly stating the international rule as to blockade that was universally recognized. The effectiveness of a blockade was manifestly a question of fact:

"It is common knowledge that the German coasts are open to trade with the Scandinavian countries and that German naval vessels cruise both in the North Sea and the Baltic and seize and bring into German ports neutral vessels bound for Scandinavian and Danish ports. Furthermore, from the recent placing of cotton on the British list of contraband of war it appears that the British Government had themselves been forced to the conclusion that the blockade is ineffective to prevent shipments of cotton from reaching their enemies, or else that they are doubtful as to the legality of the form of blockade which they have sought to maintain."

Moreover, a blockade must apply impartially to the ships of all nations. The American note cited the Declaration of London and the prize rules of Germany, France, and Japan, in support of that principle. In addition, "so strictly has this principle been enforced in the past that in the Crimean War the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council on appeal laid down that if belligerents themselves trade with blockaded ports they cannot be regarded as effectively blockaded. (The *Franciska*, Moore, P. C. 56). This decision has special significance at the present time

since it is a matter of common knowledge that Great Britain exports and reexports large quantities of merchandise to Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Holland, whose ports, so far as American commerce is concerned, she regards as blockaded."

Finally, the law of nations forbade the blockade of neutral ports in time of war. The Declaration of London specifically stated that "the blockading forces must not bar access to neutral ports or coasts." This pronouncement the American Government considered a correct statement of the universally accepted law as it existed to-day and prior to the Declaration of London. Though not regarded as binding upon the signatories because not ratified by them, the Declaration of London, the American note pointed out, had been expressly adopted by the British Government, without modification as to blockade, in the Order in Council of October 9, 1914. More than that, Secretary Lansing recalled the views of the British Government "founded on the decisions of the British Courts," as expressed by Sir Edward Grey in instructing the British delegates to the conference which formulated the Declaration of London, and which had assembled in that city on the British Government's invitation in 1907. These views were:

"A blockade must be confined to the ports and coast of the enemy, but it may be instituted of one port or of several ports or of the whole of the seaboard of the enemy. It may be instituted to prevent the ingress only, or egress only, or both."

The United States Government therefore concluded that, measured by the three universally conceded tests above set forth, the British policy could not be regarded as constituting a blockade in law, in practice, or in effect. So the British Government was notified that the American Government declined to recognize such a "blockade" as legal.

Stress had been laid by Great Britain on the ruling of the Supreme Court of the United States on the *Springbok* case. The ruling was that goods of contraband character, seized while going to the neutral port of Nassau, though actually bound for the blockaded ports of the South, were subject to condemnation. Secretary Lansing recalled that Sir Edward Grey, in his instruc-

tion to the British delegates to the London conference before mentioned, expressed this view of the case, as held in England prior to the present war:

"It is exceedingly doubtful whether the decision of the Supreme Court was in reality meant to cover a case of blockade running in which no question of contraband arose. Certainly if such was the intention the decision would *pro tanto* be in conflict with the practice of the British courts. His Majesty's Government sees no reason for departing from that practice, and you should endeavor to obtain general recognition of its correctness."

The American note also pointed out that "the circumstances surrounding the *Springbok* case were essentially different from those of the present day to which the rule laid down in that case is sought to be applied. When the *Springbok* case arose the ports of the confederate states were effectively blockaded by the naval forces of the United States, though no neutral ports were closed, and a continuous voyage through a neutral port required an all sea voyage terminating in an attempt to pass the blockading squadron."

Secretary Lansing interjected new elements into the controversy in assailing as unlawful the jurisdiction of British prize courts over neutral vessels seized or detained. Briefly, Great Britain arbitrarily extended her domestic law, through the promulgation of Orders in Council, to the high seas, which the American Government contended were subject solely to international law. So these Orders in Council, under which the British naval authorities acted in making seizures of neutral shipping, and under which the prize courts pursued their procedure, were viewed as usurping international law. The United States held that Great Britain could not extend the territorial jurisdiction of her domestic law to cover seizures on the high seas. A recourse to British prize courts by American claimants, governed as those courts were by the same Orders in Council which determined the conditions under which seizures and detentions were made, constituted in the American view, the form rather than the substance of redress:

"It is manifest, therefore, that, if prize courts are bound by the laws and regulations under which seizures and detentions are made, and which claimants allege are in contravention of the law of nations, those courts are powerless to pass upon the real ground of complaint or to give redress for wrongs of this nature. Nevertheless, it is seriously suggested that claimants are free to request the prize court to rule upon a claim of conflict between an Order in Council and a rule of international law. How can a tribunal fettered in its jurisdiction and procedure by municipal enactments declare itself emancipated from their restrictions and at liberty to apply the rules of international law with freedom? The very laws and regulations which bind the court are now matters of dispute between the Government of the United States and that of His Britannic Majesty."

The British Government, in pursuit of its favorite device of seeking in American practice parallel instances to justify her prize-court methods, had contended that the United States, in Civil War contraband cases, had also referred foreign claimants to its prize courts for redress. Great Britain at the time of the American Civil War, according to an earlier British note, "in spite of remonstrances from many quarters, placed full reliance on the American prize courts to grant redress to the parties interested in cases of alleged wrongful capture by American ships of war and put forward no claim until the opportunity for redress in those courts had been exhausted."

This did not appear to be altogether the case, Secretary Lansing pointed out that Great Britain, during the progress of the Civil War, had demanded in several instances, through diplomatic channels, while cases were pending, damages for seizures and detentions of British ships alleged to have been made without legal justification. Moreover, "it is understood also that during the Boer War, when British authorities seized the German vessels, the *Herzog*, the *General* and the *Bundesrath*, and released them without prize court proceedings, compensation for damages suffered was arranged through diplomatic channels."

The point made here was by way of negativing the position Great Britain now took that, pending the exhaustion of legal

remedies through the prize courts with the result of a denial of justice to American claimants, "it cannot continue to deal through the diplomatic channels with the individual cases."

The United States summed up its protest against the British practice of adjudicating on the interference with American shipping and commerce on the high seas under British municipal law as follows:

"The Government of the United States, has, therefore, viewed with surprise and concern the attempt of His Majesty's Government to confer upon the British prize courts jurisdiction by this illegal exercise of force in order that these courts may apply to vessels and cargoes of neutral nationalities, seized on the high seas, municipal laws and orders which can only rightfully be enforceable within the territorial waters of Great Britain, or against vessels of British nationality when on the high seas.

"In these circumstances the United States Government feels that it cannot reasonably be expected to advise its citizens to seek redress before tribunals which are, in its opinion, unauthorized by the unrestricted application of international law to grant reparation, nor to refrain from presenting their claims directly to the British Government through diplomatic channels."

The note, as the foregoing series of excerpts show, presented an array of legal arguments formidable enough to persuade any nation at war of its wrongdoing in adopting practices that caused serious money losses to American interests and demoralized American trade with neutral Europe. Great Britain, however, showed that she was not governed by international law except in so far as it was susceptible to an elastic interpretation, and held, by implication, that a policy of expediency imposed by modern war conditions condoned, if it did not also sanction, infractions.

Nothing in Great Britain's subsequent actions, nor in the utterances of her statesmen, could be construed as promising any abatement of the conditions. In fact, there was an outcry in England that the German blockade should be more stringent by extending it to all neutral ports. Sir Edward Grey duly convinced the House of Commons that the Government could not

contemplate such a course, which he viewed as needless, as well as a wrong to neutrals.

As to the hostility of the neutrals to British blockade methods, Sir Edward Grey said:

“What I would say to neutrals is this: There is one main question to be answered—Do they admit our right to apply the principles which were applied by the American Government in the war between the North and South—to apply those principles to modern conditions, and to do our best to prevent trade with the enemy through neutral countries?

“If they say ‘Yes’—as they are bound in fairness to say—then I would say to them: ‘Do let chambers of commerce, or whatever they may be, do their best to make it easy for us to distinguish.’

“If, on the other hand, they answer it that we are not entitled to interrupt trade with the enemy through neutral countries, I must say definitely that if neutral countries were to take that line, it is a departure from neutrality.”

CHAPTER XXXVIII

G R E A T B R I T A I N U N Y I E L D I N G — E F F E C T O F T H E B L O C K A D E — T H E C H I C A G O M E A T P A C K E R S ’ C A S E

THE existing restrictions satisfied Great Britain that Germany, without being brought to her knees, was feeling the pinch of food shortage. To that extent—and it was enough in England’s view—the blockade was effective, the contentions of the United States notwithstanding. So Great Britain’s course indicated that she would not relax by a hair the barrier she had reared round the German coast; but she sought to minimize the obstacles to legitimate neutral trade, so far as blockade conditions permitted, and was disposed to pay ample compensation for losses as judicially determined. The outlook was that American

scores against her could only be finally settled by arbitral tribunals after the war was over. Satisfaction by arbitration thus remained the only American hope in face of Great Britain's resolve to keep Germany's larder depleted and her export trade at a standstill, whether neutrals suffered or not. Incidentally, the United States was reminded that in the Civil War it served notice on foreign governments that any attempts to interfere with the blockade of the Confederate States would be resented. The situation then, and the situation now, with the parts of the two countries reversed, were considered as analogous.

A parliamentary paper showed that the British measures adopted to intercept the sea-borne commerce of Germany had succeeded up to September, 1915, in stopping 92 per cent of German exports to America. Steps had also been taken to stop exports on a small scale from Germany and Austria-Hungary by parcel post. The results of the blockade were thus summarized:

"First, German exports to overseas countries have almost entirely stopped. Exceptions which have been made are cases in which a refusal to allow the export goods to go through would hurt the neutral country concerned without inflicting injury upon Germany.

"Second, all shipments to neutral countries adjacent to Germany have been carefully scrutinized with a view to the detection of a concealed enemy destination. Wherever there has been a reasonable ground for suspecting the destination, the goods have been placed in charge of a prize court. Doubtful consignments have been detained pending satisfactory guarantees.

"Third, under agreement with bodies of representative merchants of several neutral countries adjacent to Germany, stringent guarantees have been exacted from importers. So far as possible all trade between neutrals and Germany, whether arising from oversea or in the country itself, is restricted.

"Fourth, by agreements with shipping lines and by vigorous use of the power to refuse bunker coal in large proportions the neutral mercantile marine which trades with Scandinavia and Holland has been induced to agree to conditions designed to prevent the goods of these ships from reaching Germany.

"Fifth, every effort is being made to introduce a system of rationing which will insure that the neutrals concerned will import only such quantities of articles as are specified as normally imported for their own consumption."

The case of the Chicago meat packers, involving food consignments to neutral European countries since the war's outbreak, came before a British prize court before the American protest had been lodged. Apparently the issues it raised dictated in some degree the contentions Secretary Lansing made. The British authorities had seized thirty-three vessels mainly bearing meat products valued at \$15,000,000, twenty-nine of which had been held without being relegated for disposal to the prize courts. The remaining four cargoes, held for ten months, and worth \$2,500,000 were confiscated by a British prize court on September 15, 1915. The goods were declared forfeited to the Crown. One of the factors influencing the decision was the sudden expansion in shipments of food products to the Scandinavian countries immediately after the war began. The president of the prize court, Sir Samuel Evans, asserted that incoming vessels were carrying more than thirteen times the amount of goods to Copenhagen—the destination of the four ships involved—above the volume which under normal conditions arrived at that port. He cited lard, the exportation of which by one American firm had increased twentyfold to Copenhagen in three weeks after the war, and canned meat, of which Denmark hitherto had only taken small quantities, yet the seized vessels carried hundreds of thousands of tins.

The confiscation formed the subject of a complaint made by Chicago beef packers to the State Department on October 6, 1915. The British Court condemned the cargoes on the grounds: (1) that the goods being in excess of the normal consumption of Denmark, raised a presumption that they were destined for, i. e., eventually would find their way into Germany. (2) That, owing to the highly organized state of Germany, in a military sense, there was practically no distinction between the civilian and military population of that country and therefore there was a presumption that the goods, or a very large proportion of them,

would necessarily be used by the military forces of the German Empire. (3) That the burden of proving that such goods were not destined for, i. e., would not eventually get into the hands of the German forces, must be accepted and sustained by the American shippers.

The Chicago beef firms besought the Government to register an immediate protest against the decision of the prize court and demand from the British Government adequate damages for losses arising from the seizure, detention and confiscation of the shipments of meat products. They complained that the judgment and the grounds on which it was based were contrary to the established principles of international law, and subversive of the rights of neutrals. The judgment, they said, was unsupported by fact, and was based on inferences and presumptions. Direct evidence on behalf of the American firms interested, to the effect that none of the seized shipments had been sold, consigned or destined to the armed forces or to the governments of any enemy of Great Britain, was uncontradicted and disregarded and the seizures were upheld in the face of an admission that no precedent of the English courts existed justifying the condemnation of goods on their way to a neutral port.

An uncompromising defense of the prize court's decision came to the State Department from the British Government a few days later. Most of the seizures, it said, were not made under the Order in Council of March 11, 1915, the validity of which and of similar orders was disputed by the United States Government. The larger part of the cargoes were seized long before March, 1915. The ground for the seizures was that the cargoes were conditional contraband destined from the first by the Chicago beef packers, largely for the use of the armies, navies and Government departments of Germany and Austria, and only sent to neutral ports with the object of concealing their true destination.

From cablegrams and letters in the possession of the British Government and produced in court, the statement charged, "it was clear and that packers' agents in these neutral countries, and also several of the consigners, who purported to be genuine

neutral buyers, were merely persons engaged by the packers on commission, or sent by the packers from their German branches for the purpose of insuring the immediate transit of these consignments to Germany. . . . No attempt was made by any written or other evidence to explain away the damning evidence of the telegrams and letters disclosed by the Crown. The inference was clear and irresistible that no such attempt could be made, and that any written evidence there was would have merely confirmed the strong suspicion, amounting to a practical certainty, that the whole of the operations of shipment to Copenhagen and other neutral ports were a mere mask to cover a determined effort to transmit vast quantities of supplies through to the German and Austrian armies."

A portion of the Western press had denounced the confiscation as a "British outrage" and as "robbery by prize court"; but the more moderate Eastern view was that, while American business men had an undoubted right to feed the German armies, if they could, they were in the position of gamblers who had lost if the British navy succeeded in intercepting the shipments.

Exaggerated values placed on American-owned goods held up for months at Rotterdam and other neutral ports by British became largely discounted on October 1, 1915, under the scrutiny of the Foreign Trade Advisers of the State Department. These goods were German-made for consignment to the United States, and would only be released if the British Government were satisfied that they were contracted for by American importers before March 1, 1915, the date on which the British blockade of Germany began. Early protests against their detention complained that \$50,000,000 was involved; later the value of the detained goods was raised to \$150,000,000. But actual claims made by American importers to the British Embassy, through the Foreign Trade Advisers, seeking the release of the consignments, showed that the amount involved was not much more than \$11,000,000 and would not exceed \$15,000,000 at the most.

CHAPTER XXXIX

SEIZURE OF SUSPECTED SHIPS—TRADING
WITH THE ENEMY—THE APPAM—THE
ANGLO-FRENCH LOAN—FORD
PEACE- EXPEDITION

THE next issue the United States raised with Great Britain related to the seizure of three ships of American registry—the *Hocking*, *Genesee* and the *Kankakee*—in November, 1915, on the ground that they were really German-owned. France had also confiscated the *Solveig* of the same ownership for a like reason. The four vessels belonged to the fleet of the American Transatlantic Steamship Company, the formation of which under unusual circumstances was recorded earlier in this history. Great Britain and France served notice that this company's vessels were blacklisted, and became seizable as prizes of war because of the suspicion that German interests were behind the company, and that its American officials with their reputed holdings of stock were therefore really prizes for German capital. The Bureau of Navigation had at first refused registry to these vessels, but its ruling was reversed, and the vessels were admitted, the State Department taking the view that it could not disregard the company's declaration of incorporation in the United States, and that its officers were American citizens. Great Britain sought to requisition the vessels for navy use without prize-court hearings, but on the United States protesting she agreed to try the cases.

Another dispute arose, in January, 1916, over the operation of the Trading with the Enemy Act, one of Great Britain's war measures, the provisions of which were enlarged to forbid British merchants from trading with any person or firm, resident in a neutral country, which had German ownership or German trade connections. The United States objected to the prohibition as constituting a further unlawful interference with American trade. It held that in war time the trade of such a

person or firm domiciled in a neutral country had a neutral status, and consequently was not subject to interference; hence goods in transit of such a trader were not subject to confiscation by a belligerent unless contraband and consigned to an enemy country.

An example of the working of the act was the conviction of three members of a British glove firm for trading with Germany through their New York branch. They had obtained some \$30,000 worth of goods from Saxony between October, 1915, and January, 1916, the consignments evading the blockade and reaching New York, whence they were reshipped to England. One defendant was fined \$2,000; the two others received terms of imprisonment.

While the act would injure American firms affiliated with German interests, it aimed to press hardest upon traders in neutral European countries contiguous to Germany who were trading with the Germans and practically serving as intermediaries to save the Germans from the effect of the Allies' blockade.

The appearance of a captured British steamer, the *Appam*, at Newport News, Va., on February 1, 1916, in charge of a German naval lieutenant, Hans Berg, and a prize crew, involved the United States in a new maritime tangle with the belligerents. One of the most difficult problems which Government officials had encountered since the war began, presented itself for solution. The *Appam*, as elsewhere described, was captured by a German raider, the *Moewe* (Sea Gull), off Madeira, and was crowded with passengers, crews, and German prisoners taken from a number of other ships the *Moewe* had sunk. Lieutenant Berg, for lack of a safer harbor, since German ports were closed to him, sought for refuge an American port, and claimed for his prize the privilege of asylum under the protection of American laws—until he chose to leave. Count von Bernstorff, the German Ambassador, immediately notified the State Department that Germany claimed the *Appam* as a prize under the Prussian-American Treaty of 1828, and would contend for possession of the ship.

This treaty was construed as giving German prizes brought to American ports the right to come and go. The British Government contested the German claim by demanding the release of the *Appam* under The Hague Convention of 1907. This international treaty provided that a merchantman prize could only be taken to a neutral port under certain circumstances of distress, injury, or lack of food, and if she did not depart within a stipulated time the vessel could not be interned, but must be restored to her original owners with all her cargo. Were the *Appam* thus forcibly released she would at once have been recaptured by British cruisers waiting off the Virginia Capes. The view which prevailed officially was that the case must be governed by the Prussian treaty, a liberal construction of which appeared to permit the *Appam* to remain indefinitely at Newport News. This was what happened, but not through any acquiescence of the State Department in the German contention. The *Appam* owners, the British and African Steam Navigation Company, brought suit in the Federal Courts for the possession of the vessel, on the ground that, having been brought into a neutral port, she lost her character as a German prize, and must be returned to her owners. Pending a determination of this action, the *Appam* was seized by Federal marshals under instructions from the United States District Court, under whose jurisdiction the vessel remained.

After twelve months of war Great Britain became seriously concerned over the changed conditions of her trade with the United States. Before the war the United States, despite its vast resources and commerce, bought more than it sold abroad, and was thus always a debtor nation, that is, permanently owing money to Europe. In the stress of war Great Britain's exports to the United States, like those of her Allies, declined and her imports enormously increased. She sold but little of her products to her American customers and bought heavily of American foodstuffs, cotton, and munitions. The result was that Great Britain owed a great deal more to the United States than the latter owed her. The unparalleled situation enabled the United States to pay off her old standing indebtedness to Europe and

became a creditor nation. American firms were exporting to the allied powers, whose almoner Great Britain was, commodities of a value of \$100,000,000 a month in excess of the amount they were buying abroad. Hence what gold was sent from London, at the rate of \$15,000,000 to \$40,000,000 monthly, to pay for these huge purchases was wholly insufficient to meet the accumulating balance of indebtedness against England.

The effect of this reversal of Anglo-American trade balance was a decline in the exchange value of the pound sterling, which was normally worth \$4.86½ in American money, to the unprecedented level of \$4.50. This decline in sterling was reflected in different degrees in the other European money markets, and the American press was jubilant over the power of the dollar to buy more foreign money than ever before. Because Europe bought much more merchandise than she sold the demand in London for dollar credit at New York was far greater than the demand in New York for pound credit at London. Hence the premium on dollars and the discount on pounds. It was not a premium upon American gold over European gold, but a premium on the means of settling debts in dollars without the use of gold. Europe preferred to pay the premium rather than send sufficient gold, because, for one reason, shipping gold was costly and more than hazardous in war time, and, for another, all the belligerents wanted to retain their gold as long as they could afford to do so.

An adjustment of the exchange situation and a reestablishment of the credit relations between the United States and the allied powers on a more equitable footing was imperative. The British and French Governments accordingly sent a commission to the United States, composed of some of their most distinguished financiers—government officials and bankers—to arrange a loan in the form of a credit with American bankers to restore exchange values and to meet the cost of war munitions and other supplies. After lengthy negotiations a loan of \$500,000,000 was agreed upon, at 5 per cent interest, for a term of five years, the bonds being purchasable at 98 in denominations as low as \$100. The principal and interest were payable in New

York City—in gold dollars. The proceeds of the loan were to be employed exclusively in the United States to cover the Allies' trade obligations; and the loan's primary purpose was to stabilize exchange.

The loan was an attractive one to the American investor, yielding as it did a fraction over 5½ per cent. It was the only external loan of Great Britain and France, for the repayment of which the two countries pledged severally and together their credit, faith, and resources. No such an investment had before been offered in the United States, American investors being unaccustomed to buy the securities of foreign governments. It was thus the first great investment adventure of the United States as a creditor nation. The effect of the successful flotation of the loan was to restore sterling exchange in the neighborhood of \$4.76.

Strong opposition to the loan came from German-American interests. Dr. Charles Hexamer, president of the German-American Alliance, made a country-wide appeal urging American citizens to "thwart the loan" by protesting to the President and the Secretary of State. Threats were likewise made by German depositors to withdraw their deposits from banks which participated in the loan. The Government, after being consulted, had given assurances that it would not oppose the transaction as a possible violation of neutrality—if a straight credit, not as actual loan, was negotiated. Conformity to this condition made all opposition fruitless.

Toward the close of 1915 an ambitious peace crusade to Europe was initiated by Henry Ford, the automobile manufacturer. Accompanied by 148 pacifists, he sailed on the Scandinavian-American liner, *Oscar II*, early in December, 1915, with the avowed purpose of ending the war before Christmas. The expedition was viewed dubiously by the allied powers, who discerned pro-German propaganda in the presence of Teutonic sympathizers among the delegates. They also suspected a design to accelerate a peace movement while the gains of the war were all on Germany's side, thus placing the onus of continuing hostilities on the Allies if they declined to recognize the Ford peace party as

mediators. The American Government, regardful of the obligations of neutrality, notified the several European Governments concerned that the United States had no connection with the expedition, and assumed no responsibility for any activities the persons comprising it might undertake in the promotion of peace.

The American press and public did not view the project seriously. Reports professing to describe the vicissitudes of the voyage of the *Oscar II* told of a lack of harmony among the delegates, who appeared to be at cross-purposes regarding the organization of their mission for submission to the belligerents through neutral channels. So far as the Allies were concerned, there was no prospect of the project reaching that stage. The peace expedition, which seemed to acquire the character of a sight-seeing excursion, was slighted and ridiculed in the allied capitals. A cabinet minister referred to it in the British Parliament as composed of "persons of no importance." Consequently the peace party avoided the allied countries, which had no welcome to extend to them.

Their original aim, as expressed by Mr. Ford, was: "Out of the trenches before Christmas, never to go back," and as forerunners of his mission he sent peace pleas to the heads of the European countries engaged in the war, but to no purpose. The specified object of the expedition then became modified to the establishment of a permanent international peace board, composed of representatives from neutral countries, to deliberate indefinitely in Europe as to means for effecting an enduring peace.

The peace ship was overhauled at Kirkwall by the British, in search of contraband. Thence its ports of call were Christiansand, Norway; Stockholm, Sweden; and Copenhagen, Denmark. Dissensions divided the party on board, and a number of the delegates severed from it and returned to the United States, including Mr. Ford himself. He left a check for \$270,000 to cover the further expenses needed for the expedition, the entire cost of which he had borne. The delegates remaining visited The Hague by way of Germany, where the windows of the train they

occupied were screened to conceal from the travelers the country through which they passed. Most of the party returned to the United States early in 1916.

The net results of their efforts appeared to be the formation of the Ford Permanent Peace Board, to be financed by Mr. Ford at an estimated cost of \$500,000 yearly. The neutral countries the delegates visited did not recognize them officially, but every hospitality was informally extended to them as Americans.

CHAPTER XL

AMERICAN PACIFISM—PREPAREDNESS—
MUNITION SAFEGUARD

THE Ford peace mission, lightly regarded though it was, nevertheless recorded itself on the annals of the time as symptomatic of a state of mind prevailing among a proportion of the American people. It might almost be said to be a manifestation of the pacifist sentiment of the country. This spirit found a channel for expression in the Ford project, bent on hurling its protesting voice at the chancellories of Europe, and heedless of the disadvantage its efforts labored under in not receiving the countenance of the Administration.

“The mission of America in the world,” said President Wilson in one of his speeches, “is essentially a mission of peace and good will among men. She has become the home and asylum of men of all creeds and races. America has been made up out of the nations of the world, and is the friend of the nations of the world.”

But Europe was deaf alike to official and unofficial overtures of the United States as a peacemaker. The Ford expedition was foredoomed to failure, not because it was unofficial—official proposals of mediation would have been as coldly received—but more because the pacifist movement it represented was a home growth of American soil. The European belligerents, inured and case-hardened as they were to a militarist environment, had not been sufficiently chastened by their self-slaughter.

The American pacifists, with a scattered but wide sentiment behind them, consecrated to promoting an abiding world peace, and espousing the internationalism of the Socialists to that end, and President Wilson, standing aloof from popular manifestations, a solitary watchman on the tower, had perforce to wait until the dawning of the great day when Europe had accomplished the devastating achievement of bleeding herself before she could extend beckoning hands to American mediation.

In the autumn of 1915 the President inaugurated his campaign for national defense, or "preparedness," bred by the dangers more or less imminent while the European War lasted. "We never know what to-morrow might bring forth," he warned. In a series of speeches throughout the country he impressed these views on the people:

The United States had no aggressive purposes, but must be prepared to defend itself and retain its full liberty and self-development. It should have the fullest freedom for national growth. It should be prepared to enforce its right to unmolested action. For this purpose a citizen army of 400,000 was needed to be raised in three years, and a strengthened navy as the first and chief line of defense for safeguarding at all costs the good faith and honor of the nation. The nonpartisan support of all citizens for effecting a condition of preparedness, coupled with the revival and renewal of national allegiance, he said, was also imperative, and Americans of alien sympathies who were not responsive to such a call on their patriotism should be called to account.

This, in brief, constituted the President's plea for preparedness. But such a policy did not involve nor contemplate the conquest of other lands or peoples, nor the accomplishment of any purpose by force beyond the defense of American territory, nor plans for an aggressive war, military training that would interfere unduly with civil pursuits, nor panicky haste in defense preparations.

The President took a midway stand. He stood between the pacifists and the extremists, who advocated the militarism of Europe as the inevitable policy for the United States to adopt to meet the dangers they fancied.

The country's position, as the President saw it, was stated by him in a speech delivered in New York City:

"Our thought is now inevitably of new things about which formerly we gave ourselves little concern. We are thinking now chiefly of our relations with the rest of the world, not our commercial relations, about those we have thought and planned always, but about our political relations, our duties as an indi-

vidual and independent force in the world to ourselves, our neighbors and the world itself.

"Within a year we have witnessed what we did not believe possible, a great European conflict involving many of the greatest nations of the world. The influences of a great war are everywhere in the air. All Europe is embattled. Force everywhere speaks out with a loud and imperious voice in a Titanic struggle of governments, and from one end of our own dear country to the other men are asking one another what our own force is, how far we are prepared to maintain ourselves against any interference with our national action or development.

"We have it in mind to be prepared, but not for war, but only for defense; and with the thought constantly in our minds that the principles we hold most dear can be achieved by the slow processes of history only in the kindly and wholesome atmosphere of peace, and not by the use of hostile force.

"No thoughtful man feels any panic haste in this matter. The country is not threatened from any quarter. She stands in friendly relations with all the world. Her resources are known and her self-respect and her capacity to care for her own citizens and her own rights. There is no fear among us. Under the new-world conditions we have become thoughtful of the things which all reasonable men consider necessary for security and self-defense on the part of every nation confronted with the great enterprise of human liberty and independence. That is all."

Readiness for defense was also the keynote of the President's address to Congress at its opening session in December, 1915; but despite its earnest plea for a military and naval program, and a lively public interest, the message was received by Congress in a spirit approaching apathy.

The President, meantime, pursued his course, advocating his preparedness program, and in no issue abating his condemnation of citizens with aggressive alien sympathies.

In one all-important military branch there was small need for anxiety. The United States was already well armed, though not well manned. The munitions industry, called into being by the European War, had grown to proportions that entitled the

country to be ranked with first-class powers in its provision and equipment for rapidly producing arms and ammunition and other war essentials on an extensive scale. Conditions were very different at the outset of the war. One of the American contentions in defense of permitting war-munition exports—as set forth in the note to Austria-Hungary—was that if the United States accepted the principle that neutral nations should not supply war materials to belligerents, it would itself, should it be involved in war, be denied the benefit of seeking such supplies from neutrals to amplify its own meager productions.

But the contention that the country in case of war would have to rely on outside help could no longer be made on the face of the sweeping change in conditions existing after eighteen months of the war. From August, 1914, to January, 1916, inclusive, American factories had sent to the European belligerents shipment after shipment of sixteen commodities used expressly for war purposes of the unsurpassed aggregate value of \$865,795,668. Roughly, \$200,000,000 represented explosives, cartridges, and firearms; \$150,000,000 automobiles and accessories; and \$250,-000,000 iron and steel and copper manufacturing.

This production revealed that the United States could meet any war emergency out of its own resources in respect of supplies. Its army might be smaller than Switzerland's and its navy inadequate, but it would have no cause to go begging for the guns and shells needful to wage war.

How huge factories were built, equipped, and operated in three months, how machinery for the manufacture of tinware, typewriters, and countless other everyday articles was adapted to shell making; and how methods for producing steel and reducing ores were revolutionized—these developments form a romantic chapter in American industrial history without a parallel in that of any other country.

The United States, in helping the European belligerents who had free intercourse with it, was really helping itself. It was building better than it knew. The call for preparedness, primarily arising out of the critical relations with Germany, turned the country's attention to a contemplation of an agreeable new

condition—that the European War, from which it strove to be free, had given it an enormous impetus for the creation of a colossal industry, which in itself was a long step in national preparedness, and that much of this preparedness had been provided without cost. The capital sunk in the huge plants which supplied the belligerents represented, at \$150,000,000, an outlay amortized or included in the price at which the munitions were sold. Thus, when the last foreign contract was fulfilled, the United States would have at its own service one of the world's greatest munition industries—and Europe will have paid for it.

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